> On 27 Jan 2021, at 08:36, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, January 26, 2021 at 9:27:43 AM UTC-7 Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 15 Jan 2021, at 23:34, Alan Grayson <[email protected] >> <applewebdata://7CB9F1A7-02C6-45C3-AAD3-0CB33B8316A1>> wrote: >> >> Why not assume the wf applies only before the measurement? > > That’s Bohr idea. But it means that measurement are no more describe by QM, > and this introduces a dualism in the the possible theory of mind that you > need to use. The élégance if the MWI is that QM applies to both the observed > and the observer, again, like it has to do assuming mechanism. > > > >> Or why not withhold judgement on a phenomenon not yet understood? Instead >> you totally dismiss empirical evidence that no one ever observes a split. AG > > We still observe the result predicted when accepting the superposed wave > going through all slit. The fact that we don’t feel the split is entirely > explained by the wave evolution and the self-duplication thought experiment. > Occam razor favours the simplest conceptual explanation, or we add add as > many “epicycle” to favour any interpretation, up to the super determinism, > which I take as an abandon of rationality… > > Bruno > > Yeah, "entirely explained", except for the huge gorilla in the room. Where's > the beef, I mean the energy to create those other worlds? Is it in the > non-computable irrational numbers? AG
The term “world” is hard to define. For logician, it usually mean an element of some non empty set, for a metaphysician, it means the objet of the ontological commitment. The problem here is that some metaphysical assumption are done implicitly. I prefer to avoid any ontological commitment bigger than what we need when we do metaphysics, and with Mechanism, I can explain that we need only a universal machinery (in the sense of the logicians, Turing, Kleene). It happens that for the ontology, the very elementary arithmetic is enough. It is given by the usual classical predicate calculus and the axioms: 1) 0 ≠ s(x) 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y) 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 4) x+0 = x 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y) 6) x*0=0 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x Then an observer is defined by any machine/number having those axioms as belief, together with the scheme of axioms of induction, the set of rationally-believable proposition of the agent contains all formula, with A an arbitrary arithmetical formula: [A(0) & for all n (A(n) -> (A(s(n)) ] -> for all n A(n) Note that the observer has many more axioms than what we need for the ontology. In the ontological theory, we can define what is a universal machine, and what is a computation. The Digital Mechanist hypothesis entails that the ontology is enough to get *all* computations, and it makes the machine non determined with respect to which computations support it. But the machine can do reasoning, and indeed the observer can prove that if mechanism is correct, the observable (“physics”) can arise only from a statistic on all computations, and the math indicates already that this will obey a quantum logic quite close to the quantum logic based on the Hartle-Graham, or Griffith-Omnes (see also Isham) logic of alternate (but first person fungible) histories. It is up to a materialist (or a believer in some god) to explain how matter (or god) can select histories in the set of all histories. An history here is defined by a computation as seen by some observer (as defined above, with observable being defined by an intensional (modal variant of the Gödel-Löb-Solovay logic G* (in the study of arithmetical self-reference). We cannot use the usual brain-mind identity principle (it is false with Mechanism, and unclear in most interpretation of QM). We can attach some person to a machine, but no person can attach his own mind to a “particular machine”, only to all digital machines occurring in arithmetic and getting the state of that observer (there are infinitely many). The “beef” is what I want to explain, and the result is that there is no beef, only sets of “dreams of beef”, and the math explain why such set get structured into physical persistent observable. Einstein said that time is an illusion, albeit a persistent one! Mechanism go farer, and explains that the whole physicalness is an illusion by number, and explain its persistence and its apparent localisation as part of the machine reference and self-reference relatively to infinitely many universal numbers. The advantage of this approach is twofold: 1) it does not rely on an ontological commitment different than the term we need to define a machine (of course, we have to still postulate elementary arithmetic (this can be explained not deducible from less or equivalent). 2) we get a natural explanation of the difference between quanta and qualia. Both are measurable numbers, but only the quanta are first person plural sharable. The qualia are irreducibly NON sharable, and not perceivable as numbers, but as different sort of sensations. It is hard for me to explain much more if you don’t buy some book in mathematical logic, which is the main tool to proceed on difficult metaphysical question with some amount of rigour. You can read my “grand public” paper here, which explains the basic things, and how to extract physics from the mind of the universal Turing machine (the big heroin here) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html> But ask any question. My goal is not too provide new foundation of the physical science, but to solve the mind)body problem. Bruno > > > > >> >> On Friday, January 15, 2021 at 1:18:53 PM UTC-7 [email protected] >> <http://gmail.com/> wrote: >> On Fri, Jan 15, 2021 at 2:22 PM Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: >> >> > Why do you assume that the initial observer splits after initial trial >> > when it's not observed? AG >> >> For heaven sake haven't you been listening?! Because that is the least >> bizarre interpretation anybody can think of to explain the utterly bizarre >> results observed from the two slit experiment. There is just no getting >> around it, if Many Worlds isn't true then something even stranger must be. >> >> John K Clark >> > >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <applewebdata://7CB9F1A7-02C6-45C3-AAD3-0CB33B8316A1>. > >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2a6bf029-a37a-4049-ab90-0ee889ba9820n%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2a6bf029-a37a-4049-ab90-0ee889ba9820n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/18a5ee2c-2afb-49d4-9e4e-e8ecaa207de6n%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/18a5ee2c-2afb-49d4-9e4e-e8ecaa207de6n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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