On 6/27/2021 5:18 AM, Tomas Pales wrote:

On Sunday, June 27, 2021 at 1:21:32 PM UTC+2 Bruce wrote:

    On Sun, Jun 27, 2021 at 7:38 PM Tomas Pales <[email protected]>
    wrote:

        On Sunday, June 27, 2021 at 2:36:38 AM UTC+2 Bruce wrote:

            Much as I respect Russell, his book is not an
            authoritative source for anything. It is all rampant
            speculation.
            On the matter of the stability of laws and the connection
            with simplicity, I refer you to the 'grue/bleen' paradox
            introduced by Nelson Goodman. That shows that the idea of
            simplicity as an explanation for anything is misplaced.


        Note that the relation between simplicity and frequency is not
        Russell's speculation but a fact following from Kolmogorov's
        definition of complexity: simpler objects are more frequent
        than more complex objects because the same simpler object is
        contained in less simple objects.


    This is only if everything is considered to be a bit string. There
    is no reason to suppose that this is true.


No, atoms are more simple than ducks, and atoms are also more frequent than ducks because there are atoms in every duck but there is no duck in an atom. However, it seems that every object can be represented as a binary string, which is a useful representation in computer science.

Actually that's doubtful.  You're idealizing "object" into a class. A specific duck or atom may require and infinite string to define it's relation to the rest of the universe.  But you've tried to pull a switch from "being" to "represented"; a common move for those enamored of language, description, computers,...

    What a load of garbage! Science is not a matter of induction from
    observed data.


What is science a matter of then?

    Goodman's grue/bleen paradox puts paid to that idea. Algorithmic
    simplicity has nothing to do with real world data.


But the property of "grue" is more complex than the property of "green". "Grue" means "green before time t (for example year 2030) and blue after time t". More complex properties are less frequent than simpler properties.

A supposition on the same order as nature has regularities. Remember you're talking about "properties" within theories...not necessarily the same as within objects.

Brent

For this reason, and given the way the world has been until now, objects that have been observed as remaining green in the past are more likely to remain green in the future, instead of becoming blue at some time.

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