> On 19 Jun 2021, at 16:02, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > Suppose there is an AI that behaves more intelligently than the most > intelligent human who ever lived, however when the machine is opened up to > see how this intelligence is actually achieved one consciousness theory > doesn't like what it sees and concludes that despite its great intelligence > it is not conscious, but a rival consciousness theory does like what it sees > and concludes it is conscious. Both theories can't be right although both > could be wrong, so how on earth could you ever determine which, if any, of > the 2 consciousness theories are correct?
A consciousness theory has no value if it does not make testable prediction. But that is the case for the theory of consciousness brought by the universal machine/number in arithmetic. They give the logic of the observable, and indeed until now that fits with quantum logic. The mechanist brain-mind identity theory would be confirmed if Bohm’s hidden variable theory was true, or if we could find an evidence that the physical cosmos is unique, or that Newton physics was the only correct theory, etc. But quantum mechanics saved Mechanism here, and its canonical theory of consciousness (defined as a truth that no machine can miss, nor prove, nor define without using the notion of truth, immediatey knowable, indubitable, etc.). Consciousness is “just” a semantical fixed point, invariant for all universal machines. Without the induction axioms, that consciousness is highly dissociate from any computation, from the machine perspective. With the induction axioms, the machine get Löbian (and consciousnesss becomes basically described by Grzegorczyk formula []([](p->[]p) -> p) -> p Bruno > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis> > qno > yrm > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv241V2Kw2L%3DsUUGrFrhc8684TGzi%3DRC_yHm-_1rez%2BC_w%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv241V2Kw2L%3DsUUGrFrhc8684TGzi%3DRC_yHm-_1rez%2BC_w%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/EF619D6E-7EAC-4190-A745-2CA78A65BE4A%40ulb.ac.be.
