> On 10 Jul 2021, at 14:17, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sat, Jul 10, 2021 at 3:52 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >> "Brain" is a noun, "consciousness" is not > > > I disagree with this > > An embalmed brain rotting in a grave is a noun. Do you therefore think it's > conscious?
A brain is not conscious. Only a person is conscious, and the brain has some role here. Anyways this does not make the term “consciousness" not being a noun. > I don't because it's not doing anything that 3 pounds of rotting hamburger > isn't doing, and neither of the two are behaving intelligently. > > >> therefore "consciousness" is not a noun, it's a word that describes what a > >> noun (in this case the brain) does, in other words consciousness is an > >> adject > > > This is logically inconsistent with Descartes Mechanism. > > I have no idea what "Descartes Mechanism" is, and after listening to you all > these years I am quite certain you can't give a coherent explanation for it > either, but whatever it means if it is logically inconsistent with what I > said then "Descartes Mechanism" is wrong. Descartes’s Mechanism is the idea that the human (and animal’s) body is a (natural) machine. By (indexical, digital) mechanism, aka computationalism, I mean since the beginning the thesis that we can survive with a digital brain (a physical computer) transplantation, like most people believe that we can survive with an artificial heart. Then the consequence is that the min body problem is reduced to a statistics on the infinitely many computations going through our actual states. This makes the logic of the observable having to obey to the modes []p & <>t & p, and some others, and that works as we get both the many-histories view on the physical reality, and its quantum formalism. We cannot prove mechanism, but we can count the evidence for. > > Without mechanism, it is consistent, but still problematic with Occam razor > > As I said before, Occam razor is about economy of assumptions not economy of > results. Absolutely. In this case Mechanism win, because the theory of everything can be just the two equations/assumptions: Kxy = x Sxyz = xz(yz) + identity rules (as I have described in detail last year) Everett assumes this implicitly, but assume also the Wave Equation, when actually Mechanism enforces that it has to be derive from the “many-worlds” interpretation of elementary arithmetic, or combinator (like K and S), etc. In that theory, using Mechanism, we can prove the existence of all universal machine, and of all the computations, and we extract the theology of the Gödel-Löbian machine, whose main axioms is Löb’s formula ([]([]p -> p) -> []p). My point is that we cannot use an ontological commitment to prevent the logical consequence of mechanism, once we assume it.. Bruno > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis> > 0o6 > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv18k88O-_k7%3D8EwyzvKm1uTn84_ZaLxycbrpb0O6D9oRA%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv18k88O-_k7%3D8EwyzvKm1uTn84_ZaLxycbrpb0O6D9oRA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/BA109DE5-3151-4E8E-B831-53FD604CF11D%40ulb.ac.be.
