Dear FIS colleagues: I apologize for being so quiet, considering the interesting topics arisen with the occasion of our proposal to the COST open call of past March, which we thank once again. This proposal as revisited by FIS came to coincide in time with a call for themes proposal by the European Science Foundation (Eurocores Theme Proposal), which we also presented with a short timing. We may not succeed in the first attempt, but anyhow it aims at opening a new scientific topic in the ESF. If the proposed theme were selected, new projects in the delimited field (well fitted to FIS interests) from any European state could be presented to joint the research network. I say that, to justify our silence in the FIS arena, while we were actually working on it, although in the background. Afterwards, it was too late to answer, when already other issues were under discussion… To keep on the argument thread of our COST essays: we were not among the few selected proposals, but were given reasons to hope and reworked the proposal and applied again one week ago. About the theme proposal for Eurocores, we do not have any evaluation yet.
Even if I am not answering straight forward Pedro’s words, I feel that we should let FISers know our efforts in finding new cooperative research scenarios within the realm of FIS interests. Now taking back Pedro’s proposal of discussion about knowledge: on the one hand, I cordially thank Pedro’s initiative of bringing to this outstanding stage a part of our elucidation; on the other hand, before saying something about the topic, I feel the need to set the context were the strive for this definition take place, which also implies giving a general idea about BITrum project (see <http://www.unileon.es/congresos/bitrum/T_Bitrum_presentation.htm>), where we pursue an interdisciplinary approach to the information concept from a maximally open perspective, aiming at the mutual understanding of all the concerned points of view. As you may see in the given link, one of the main means to get such a mutual understanding is a glossary of concepts, metaphors, theories and problems concerning information. At the first stage, it should help in the definition of working teams, while in following stages it may become an arena of discussion about particular issues, a reference of specific themes and crystallization of both research (within working teams) and consensus. Hence, the elucidation itself will be somehow reflected in this glossary, which edition has already started and its first public version -although very incomplete- will see the light at the end of this year. Although BITrum members are committed to feed the glossary, any interested author is wellcomed to contribute. The managing schema of the glossary includes: 1) a coordination board for glossary edition; 2) an editor per article, who takes over the integration of every contribution to such voice in a non redundant and rather systematic article; 3) any other may contribute, as author or coauthor, with entries, which will be afterwards integrated by the editor in an article. As an example, Pedro is editor of the voices: “Action-perception cycle”; “Cognit”; “Foundations of Information Science”; “Knowledge recombination”. Other FISers, like Rafael Capurro, Wolfgang Hofkirchner or Peter Fleissner also contribute as editors of other voices. After having given a general picture of the glossary and the projects where it is a main axis, I feel free to go to the settled discussion about knowledge, in which I contributed with the following entry to the voice (I do not bring the other two entries to this voice, since they are still in Spanish): * * * KNOWLEDGE * * * NOTE: “>[voice]” denotes that such voice is developed among glossary voices. >From the most viewpoints regarding information and knowledge, the relationships between these two concepts are close, especially as far as the common use of both terms is concerned. As a rule, the position of information is lower than that of knowledge, with information somehow ‘nourishing’ knowledge. Nevertheless, this connection is ignored in case of a radical syntactic vision, where the problem of the relationship is avoided to address only its technical dimension (as in the >Mathematical Theory of Communication), or also from a radical pragmatic point of view, in which only what-is-being-done is called into question. If that were the case, information is just considered as a mere instrument of the action and, therefore, the problem of whether information refers to objects is ignored (be it in terms of whether we are dealing with a correct perception or if it is known that p is the case). Although conceptions of knowledge are and have been very different, such as for the opinions regarding its definition, possibility, basis or its modes, we can say that two fundamental models have prevailed: the iconic one, according to which knowledge is an accurate picture (of mental nature) of the object of knowledge, and the propositional model, whereby knowledge is a real proposition. The problems of the iconic model, where perception and apprehension play a key role, lies in the specification of the limits between object and subject, as well as in the explanation of non-iconic knowledge (such as logical, mathematical and relational “truths”). However, in the propositional model, where the scientific statement plays an exemplary role, the inevitable circle, which comprises the justification of knowledge, becomes problematic (>Gödel´s incompleteness theorem). But, whatever the model of representation, there would be a difference between knowledge and a true opinion, insofar as only that one knows how to justify himself (although its justification is only partial or problematic). According to what is said, it is clear that in all those ideas on information in which semantic dimension is considered, its link with knowledge must appear. Normally, a more analytic concept for information is adopted and a more synthetic one for knowledge, as well as a bigger proximity to the object on the part of the information and to the subject on the part of knowledge. For >Dretske “knowledge is belief produced by information”, and belief always relates to a background of knowledge. From a naturalistic perspective, in which a casual dependence occurs among the internal states of a living being and external conditions, information for Dretske creates experience (sensory representations) and causes beliefs (cognitive experiences), which underlie the sedimentation of knowledge. According to Floridi’s semantic approach, knowledge is constituted in terms of justifiable semantic information, i.e. information constitutes the elements for further inquiry. In its turn, information is the result of a data modelling process, which unlike the Dretske’s naturalistic assumption does not necessarily represent the intrinsic nature of the studied system (or is not necessarily directly linked to it by a causal chain), instead, it will depend on the development of the data by knowledge. In turn, the data are conceived as resources and restrictions that allow for the construction of information. Therefore, one can say that Floridi proposes an architectural relationship between knowledge, information and data, where the first one is situated on the summit and the data on the base. At the same time, and as a result of this interrelationship, he replaces the requirement of truth of Dretske (who also endorses the situational semantic theory) by a requirement of truthfulness, so that instead of searching for a correspondence between the statement and the content of the information, a correspondence is rather being sought between what is reported and the informant. In the >Unified Theory of Information, knowledge is constituted by means of interpreting the data (or assigning meaning), which, in turn, is the basis for decision-making that makes up “practical wisdom”. In this case, we are talking about different levels of information rather than a dependency relationship, so that information is gradually processed: first, at the syntactic or structural level, then at the semantic or state level, and, finally, at the pragmatic or behavioural level. The information processing is performed by means of interrelationship between the adjacent strata and not in terms of a casual progression (as in Dretske’s naturalism). * * * Sorry if it was too long: I just wanted, besides contributing to Pedro’s opened discussion, to show how we are developing the glossary, to which all of you are very kindly invited. I thank again Pedro for giving us this opportunity. Best regards to all, José María Díaz Nafría BITrum project Coordination board Universidad Alfonso X el Sabio Madrid (Spain) > Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2009 18:16:12 +0200 > From: "Pedro C. Marijuan" <pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> > Subject: [Fis] Definition of Knowledge? > To: fis <fis@listas.unizar.es> > > Dear FISers, > > I was asked several months ago, in the context of the Leon conference > (BITrum & interdisciplinary elucidation of the information concept, last > June) to participate in the definition of some info-related concepts. > "Knowledge" was one of them (if I am not wrong). After some trials I > have realized that the task is outside the bounds of my competence > --except in a rather trivial, anthropomorphic sense, one gets caught in > regressions almost inevitably... Maybe one has to take care > simultaneously of the whole lot of basic characteristics pertaining to > informational entities ("concepts" included...). Well, sorry to the Leon > colleagues that I have failed to fulfill the compromise, but I think > there is interesting discussion to be advanced behind it. > > best > > Pedro > > PS. We are starting the firs steps in the neurodynamic central theory > proyect (NCT). Interested parties might have openings yet, contact Fivos > Panetsos (fivos.panet...@opt.ucm.es) and me (marij...@unizar.es). _______________________________________________ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
