Cari Tutti,
l'8 febbraio Vi ho inviato un messaggio il cui contenuto, senza alcuna
presunzione, può essere utile per dirimere le questioni
onto-epistemo-logiche che sono sorte.
Allora lo trasmetto nuovamente.
Caro Terry estensibile a tutti,
è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La general theory of information è
preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e seguita da un
sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si ha un
processo comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non significa
necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un Trasmettitore,
lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra macchina e macchina
il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal caso non si ha
significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di informazione.
Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è necessario che la fonte
sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un processo di
significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione semiotica
autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che
l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- o
tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che
biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o
specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica della
significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è
impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da una
semiotica della significazione.
Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10. Umberto
Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della scienza
economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza dell'economia
o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997). Nello mio stesso
libro si trovano:
- il capitolo 15. Semiotica economico-estimativa (pp. 327-361) che si
colloca nel quadro di una teoria globale di tutti i sistemi di
significazione e i processi di comunicazione;
- il sottoparagrafo 5.3.3 La psicologia genetica di Jean Piaget e la
neurobiologia di Humberto Maturana e Francesco Varela. una nuova
epistemologia sperimentale della qualità e dell'unicità (pp. 120-130).
Chiedo scusa a Tutti se Vi ho stancati o se ancora una volta il mio
scrivere in lingua italiana Vi crea qualche problema. Penso che il dono che
mi fate è, a proposito della QUALITA' e dell'UNICITA', molto più grande
del (per)dono che Vi chiedo. Grazie.
Un saluto affettuoso.
Francesco
2018-02-21 11:03 GMT+01:00 Xueshan Yan <y...@pku.edu.cn>:
> Dear colleagues,
>
>
>
> In the first half of this month, we have a heated discussion about the
> relationship among Information, Language, and Communication started by
> Sung. I am simply summing up part of the different opinions as follows:
>
>
>
> *Sung: Without a language, no communication would be possible. Encoding,
> decoding, information (flow) are essential for communication*.
>
> Part of the related different opinions:
>
> Terry: (In this way), one must use the term "language" in a highly
> metaphoric sense. Communications take place in the following situations,
> are there languages? Such as scent, music, sexual display of some animals,
> smile, frown, pattern of colors of a flower that attracts bees, dog's bark,
> walk of a depressed person, hiccup after eating. There is a serious problem
> with using language as the model for analyzing other species’ communication
> in hindsight.…… It is an understandable anthropocentric bias.
>
> Javier: *Not every* communication process involves coding/decoding and
> meaning. so they could not be simply paralleled to language. For instance,
> there is no coding/decoding process when I communicate to my dog. It does
> not understand my speaking, and I do not understand its barking. Yet still
> both of us interact. I would not define communication as information
> transfer. There is no information "traveling" from one place to another,
> from sender to receiver. The system itself becomes the medium of
> information production and processing.
>
> Xueshan and Stan: The hierarchy idea is not only suitable for different
> species which communication take places between them, from elementary
> particle(?), molecule(?) to cell, brain(human, other animals), plant(?),
> even other different planets(?). It is also suitable for different
> information carrier. Stan think the carriers can be layered as {language
> {signal {information}}}, Xueshan think they can be layered as {substrate
> {signal {information}}}, here we simply consider sign, signal, symbol,
> token, marker and so forth as the same.
>
> Gordana: It might be possible to develop a general theory of language ……
> with different levels of cognition which communicate and process
> information in order to survive. As in biology there are different kinds of
> organisms there are also different kinds of “languages”. There are small
> languages communicated in relatively simple ways between simple agents
> (like cells) and big languages used by complex agents like humans.
>
>
>
> (In all the above discussions, we all omitted the Sung’s deep layer
> analysis of cell language and category theory).
>
>
>
> Others:
>
> Arturo: I suggest to fully REMOVE from the TRUE scientific adventures the
> terms: "symbol", "signal", "marker", "information".
>
> Howard: Information is anything a receiver can interpret. Information is
> in the eye of the beholder.
>
> Javier: Information and meaning are not the same.
>
> Christophe: I take communications as related to meaning generation.
>
> Mayank: Can we not make conceptual leap from networks, information,
> communication, and language to sound?
>
> Koichiro: Focusing upon languaging comes to shed light on the
> communication in time between whatever parties.
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Xueshan
>
>
>
> *From:* Stanley N Salthe [mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu]
> *Sent:* Wednesday, February 14, 2018 11:44 PM
> *To:* y...@pku.edu.cn
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on the cateogry theory
>
> Xueshan -- My {language {signal {information}}} is meant apply only to a
> system that has language. That is, my assertion would be that no
> information can be gained in such a system that has not passed through a
> linguistic filter. The idea is that in such a system language dominates
> everything. Perhaps this has not been definitively demonstrated as yet. I
> suppose it would depend upon, for example, whether or not we consider our
> bodily reaction to, for example, having just burned our finger to have been
> ‘informationally mediated. If not (which seems possible to me) then my
> supposition might be OK. But if we think that neuron communications mediate
> information, then I am wrong.
>
>
>
> STAN
>
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 6:31 AM, Xueshan Yan <y...@pku.edu.cn> wrote:
>
> Dear Javier and Dear Stan,
>
>
>
> Javier:
>
> 1. I very much agree with you as follows:
>
> “I think that only signals can be transmitted, not information.
> Information can only be gained by an observer (a self-referential system)
> that draws a distinction.”
>
> A Chinese scholar Dongsheng Miao’s argument is: There is no information
> can exists without carrier, i.e. No naked can exists.
>
> I think both of you two are expressing a principle of information science.
>
>
>
> 2. According to Linguistics, the relationship between language and
> communication is:
>
> Language is a tool of communication about information.
>
> Of course, this is only limited to the human atmosphere. So I think that
> all (Human) Semiotics ((Human) Linguistics), (Human) Communication Study
> should be the subdisciplines of Human Informatics.
>
>
>
> ==========================================================
>
> Dear Xueshan,
>
> Thanks for sharing your interesting remarks and references. I think no one
> really wants to deny the crucial role the language metaphor has played in
> the thinking of communication and information models. But I believe the
> crucial point is to distinguish between language and communication.
> Language is for us humans the main communication medium, though not the
> only one. We tend to describe other communication media in society and
> nature by mapping the language-like characteristics they have. This has
> been useful and sucessful so far. But pushing the language metaphor too far
> is showing its analytical limits. I think we need to think of a
> transdisciplinary theory of communication media. On the other hand, I agree
> with you that we need to check the uses of the concepts of signal and
> information. I think that only signals can be transmitted, not information.
> Information can only be gained by an observer (a self-referential system)
> that draws a distinction.
>
> Best,
>
> Javier
>
> ==============================================
>
> Stan:
>
> According to Peirce, language is only one of the systematic signs. Here we
> consider sign, signal, symbol as the same thing. So, more precisely in my
> opinion:
>
> {signal {information}}, or {substrate {signal {information}}}
>
> But not
>
> {language {signal {information}}}
>
> If you remember, in our previous discussions, I much appreciate the
>
> The hierarchy idea is very important to our study which is initially
> introduced by Pedro, Nikhil and you.
>
> ===============================================================
>
> Xueshan -- I think one can condense some of your insights hierarchically,
> as:
>
> In a system having language, information seemingly may be obtained in
> other ways as well. It would be a conceptually broader category. Thus
> (using the compositional hierarchy):
>
> [information [language [signal]]]
>
> Meaning that, when a system has language, all information will be
> understood or construed by way of linguistic constructs.
>
> (Here I am using ‘signal’ as being more specific than Peirce’s ‘sign’,
> where:
>
> [sign [information [...]]] )
>
> Then, more dynamically (using the subsumptive hierarchy):
>
> {language {signal {information}}}
>
> Information in a languaged system is derived by way linguistic formations,
> so that, even though it is an extremely broad category, information
> (informing) only emerges by way of linguistically informed transformations.
>
> STAN
>
>
>
> Best wishes to all,
>
> Xueshan
>
> ===============================================================
>
> El feb 10, 2018 5:23 AM, "Xueshan Yan" <y...@pku.edu.cn> escribió:
>
> Dear Colleagues,
>
> I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana
> recommended, and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination
> with Sung's comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and human
> language, I have the following learning feelings to share with everyone:
>
> In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have evolved multiple
> languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- and
> interspecies cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate various
> biological activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. Such
> as AI-2, it is a general language that bacteria use for intergenera
> signaling.
>
> I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the
> concept *information* 3 times but the concept *signal* (signal or
> signaling) 55 times, so we have to review the history and application of “
> information” and “signal” in biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for
> us to understand the relationship between language, signal, and information.
>
> The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) can be
> traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and
> endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of
> Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" in
> *Nature,
> *in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. Since then,
> the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and biochemistry.
>
> As for any information transmission system, if we pay more attention to
> its transmission carrier instead of its transmission content, we are used
> to employing "signal transmission" instead of "signal transduction". From
> the tradition of the early use of information concept, the signal
> transduction study of cells is only equivalent to the level of
> telecommunications before 1948. Outwardly, before the advent of Shannon's
> information theory, the central issue of telecommunications is "signal"
> rather than "information". After that, the central issue of
> telecommunications is "information" rather than "signal".
>
> According to the application history of information concept, nearly all
> the essential problems behind the concepts of communication, messenger,
> signal and so on may be information problems. Just as the language problem
> what we are discussing here, our ultimate goal is to analyze the
> information.
>
>
>
> For the same reason, I recommend another two papers:
>
> 1. Do Plants Think? (June 5, 2012, *Scientific American*)
>
> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think-
> daniel-chamovitz/#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931
> e64057ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b）
>
> 2. Plants Can Think, Feel and Learn (December 3, 2014, *New Scientist*)
>
> (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root-
> intelligence-plants-can-think-feel-and-learn)
>
> From which we can judge whether or not a plants informatics can exists.
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Xueshan
>
>
>
> *From:* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es]
> *On Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji
> *Sent:* Thursday, February 8, 2018 9:10 PM
> *To:* Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>; Terrence W. DEACON <
> dea...@berkeley.edu>
> *Cc:* Fis, <fis@listas.unizar.es>
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on the cateogry theory
>
>
>
> Hi Terry, and FISers,
>
>
>
> Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical) knife that,
> in the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong hand, can kill?
>
>
>
> All the best.
>
>
>
> Sung
> ------------------------------
>
> *From:* Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Thursday, February 8, 2018 2:56:11 AM
> *To:* Terrence W. DEACON
> *Cc:* Fis,; Sungchul Ji
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on the cateogry theory
>
>
>
> Caro Terry estensibile a tutti,
>
> è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La general theory of information
> è preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e seguita da un
> sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si ha un
> processo comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non significa
> necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un Trasmettitore,
> lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra macchina e macchina
> il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal caso non si ha
> significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di informazione.
> Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è necessario che la fonte
> sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un processo di
> significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione semiotica
> autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che
> l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- o
> tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che
> biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o
> specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica della
> significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è
> impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da una
> semiotica della significazione.
>
> Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10. Umberto
> Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della scienza
> economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza dell'economia
> o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997). Nello mio stesso
> libro si trovano:
>
> - il capitolo 15. Semiotica economico-estimativa (pp. 327-361) che si
> colloca nel quadro di una teoria globale di tutti i sistemi di
> significazione e i processi di comunicazione;
>
> - il sottoparagrafo 5.3.3 La psicologia genetica di Jean Piaget e la
> neurobiologia di Humberto Maturana e Francesco Varela. una nuova
> epistemologia sperimentale della qualità e dell'unicità (pp. 120-130).
>
> Chiedo scusa a Tutti se Vi ho stancati o se ancora una volta il mio
> scrivere in lingua italiana Vi crea qualche problema. Penso che il dono che
> mi fate è, a proposito della QUALITA' e dell'UNICITA', molto più grande
> del (per)dono che Vi chiedo. Grazie.
>
> Un saluto affettuoso.
>
> Francecso
>
>
>
>
>
> 2018-02-07 23:02 GMT+01:00 Terrence W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu>:
>
> Dear FISers,
>
>
>
> In previous posts I have disparaged using language as the base model for
> building a general theory of information.
>
> Though I realize that this may seem almost heretical, it is not a claim
> that all those who use linguistic analogies are wrong, only that it can be
> causally misleading.
>
> I came to this view decades back in my research into the neurology and
> evolution of the human language capacity.
>
> And it became an orgnizing theme in my 1997 book The Symbolic Species.
>
> Early in the book I describe what I (and now other evolutionary
> biologists) have come to refer to as a "porcupine fallacy" in evolutionary
> thinking.
>
> Though I use it to critique a misleading evolutionary taxonomizing
> tendency, I think it also applies to biosemiotic and information theoretic
> thinking as well.
>
> So to exemplify my reasoning (with apologies for quoting myself) I append
> the following excerpt from the book.
>
>
>
> "But there is a serious problem with using language as the model for
> analyzing other
>
> species’ communication in hindsight. It leads us to treat every other form
> of communication as
>
> exceptions to a rule based on the one most exceptional and divergent case.
> No analytic method
>
> could be more perverse. Social communication has been around for as long
> as animals have
>
> interacted and reproduced sexually. Vocal communication has been around at
> least as long as frogs
>
> have croaked out their mating calls in the night air. Linguistic
> communication was an afterthought,
>
> so to speak, a very recent and very idiosyncratic deviation from an
> ancient and well-established
>
> mode of communicating. It cannot possibly provide an appropriate model
> against which to assess
>
> other forms of communication. It is the rare exception, not the rule, and
> a quite anomalous
>
> exception at that. It is a bit like categorizing birds’ wings with respect
> to the extent they possess or
>
> lack the characteristics of penguins’ wings, or like analyzing the types
> of hair on different mammals
>
> with respect to their degree of resemblance to porcupine quills. It is an
> understandable
>
> anthropocentric bias—perhaps if we were penguins or porcupines we might
> see more typical wings
>
> and hair as primitive stages compared to our own more advanced
> adaptations—but it does more to
>
> obfuscate than clarify. Language is a derived characteristic and so should
> be analyzed as an
>
> exception to a more general rule, not vice versa."
>
>
>
> Of course there will be analogies to linguistic forms.
>
> This is inevitable, since language emerged from and is supported by a vast
> nonlinguistic semiotic infrastructure.
>
> So of course it will inherit much from less elaborated more fundamental
> precursors.
>
> And our familiarity with language will naturally lead us to draw insight
> from this more familiar realm.
>
> I just worry that it provides an elaborate procrustean model that assumes
> what it endeavors to explain.
>
>
>
> Regards to all, Terry
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero <
> javierwe...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> In principle I agree with Terry. I have been thinking of this, though I am
> still not able to make a sound formulation of the idea. Still I am afraid
> that if I miss the chance to make at least a brief formulation of it I will
> lose the opportunity to make a brainstorming with you. So, here it comes:
>
> I have been thinking that a proper way to distinguish the contexts in
> which the concept of information acquires a fixed meaning or the many
> contexts on which information can be somehow observed, is to make use of
> the distinction between medium and form as developed by N. Luhmann, D.
> Baecker and E. Esposito. I have already expressed my opinion in this group
> that what information is depends on the system we are talking about. But
> the concept of medium is more especific since a complex system ussualy has
> many sources and types of information.
> So the authors just mentioned, a medium can be broadly defined as a set of
> loosely coupled elements. No matter what they are. While a Form is a
> temporary fixed coupling of a limited configuration of those elements.
> Accordingly, we can be talking about DNA sequences which are selected by
> RNA to form proteins or to codify a especific instruction to a determinate
> cell. We can think of atoms forming a specific kind of matter and a
> specific kind of molecular structure. We can also think of a vocabulary or
> a set of linguistic conventions making possible a meaningful utterance or
> discourse.
> The idea is that the medium conditions what can be treated as information.
> Or even better, each type of medium produces information of its own kind.
> According to this point of view, information cannot be transmitted. It can
> only be produced and "interpreted" out of the specific difference that a
> medium begets between itself and the forms that take shape from it. A
> medium can only be a source of noise to other mediums. Still, media can
> couple among them. This means that media can selforganize in a synergetic
> manner, where they depend on each others outputs or complexity reductions.
> And this also mean that they do this by translating noise into information.
> For instance, language is coupled to writing, and language and writing to
> print. Still oral communication is noisy to written communication. Let us
> say that the gestures, emotions, entonations, that we make when talking
> cannot be copied as such into writing. In a similar way, all the social
> practices and habits made by handwriting were distorted by the introduction
> of print. From a technical point of view you can codify the same message
> orally, by writing and by print. Still information and meaning are not the
> same. You can tell your girlfriend you love her. That interaction face to
> face where the lovers look into each others eye, where they can see if the
> other is nervous, is trembling or whatever. Meaning (declaring love and
> what that implies: marriage, children, and so on) and information (he is
> being sincere, she can see it in his eye; he brought her to a special
> place, so he planned it, and so on) take a very singular and untranslatable
> configuration. If you write a letter you just can say "I love you". You
> shall write a poem or a love letter. Your beloved would read it alone in
> her room and she would have to imagine everything you say. And imagination
> makes information and meaning to articulate quite differently as in oral
> communication. It is not the same if you buy a love card in the kiosk and
> send it to her. Maybe you compensate the simplicity of your message by
> adding some chocolates and flowers. Again, information (jumm, lets see what
> he bought her) and meaning are not the same. I use examples of social
> sciences because that is my research field, although I have the intuition
> that it could also work for natural sciences.
>
> Best,
>
> JJ
>
> El feb 7, 2018 10:47 AM, "Sungchul Ji" <s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu> escribió
> :
>
> Hi FISers,
>
>
>
> On 10/8/2017, Terry wrote:
>
>
>
> " So basically, I am advocating an effort to broaden our discussions and
> recognize that the term information applies in diverse ways to many
> different contexts. And because of this it is important to indicate the
> framing, whether physical, formal, biological, phenomenological,
> linguistic, etc.
>
> . . . . . . The classic syntax-semantics-pragmatics distinction introduced
> by Charles Morris has often been cited in this respect, though it too is in
> my opinion too limited to the linguistic paradigm, and may be misleading
> when applied more broadly. I have suggested a parallel, less linguistic
> (and nested in Stan's subsumption sense) way of making the division: i.e.
> into intrinsic, referential, and normative analyses/properties of
> information."
>
>
>
> I agree with Terry's concern about the often overused linguistic metaphor
> in defining "information". Although the linguistic metaphor has its
> limitations (as all metaphors do), it nevertheless offers a unique
> advantage as well, for example, its well-established categories of
> functions (see the last column in *Table 1*.)
>
>
>
> The main purpose of this post is to suggest that all the varied theories
> of information discussed on this list may be viewed as belonging to the
> same category of ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) diagrammatically
> represented as the 3-node closed network in the first column of *Table 1*.
>
>
>
> *Table 1.* The postulated universality of ITR (Irreducible Triadic
> Relation) as manifested in information theory, semiotics, cell language
> theory, and linguistics.
>
> *Category Theory*
>
>
> * f g*
>
>
>
>
> * A -----> B ------>
> C | ^ | |
> |______________|*
> * h*
>
>
>
> *ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation**)*
>
> *Deacon’s theory of information*
>
> *Shannon’s*
>
> *Theory of*
>
> *information*
>
> *Peirce’s theory of signs*
>
> *Cell language theory*
>
>
> *Human language(Function)*
>
> A
>
> *Intrinsic *information
>
> Source
>
> Object
>
> Nucleotides*/
> Amion acids
>
> Letters
> (Building blocks)
>
> B
>
> *Referential *information
>
> Message
>
> Sign
>
> Proteins
>
> Words
> (Denotation)
>
> C
>
> *Normative *information
>
> Receiver
>
> Interpretant
>
> Metabolomes
> (Totality of cell metabolism)
>
> Systems of words
> (Decision making & Reasoning)
>
> f
>
> ?
>
> Encoding
>
> Sign production
>
> Physical laws
>
> Second articulation
>
> g
>
> ?
>
> Decoding
>
> Sign interpretation
>
> Evoutionary selection
>
> First and Third articulation
>
> h
>
> ?
>
> Information flow
>
> Information flow
>
> Inheritance
>
> Grounding/
>
> Habit
>
> *Scale*
>
> *Micro-Macro?*
>
> *Macro*
>
> *Macro*
>
> *Micro*
>
> *Macro*
>
>
>
> *There may be more than one genetic alphabet of 4 nucleotides. According
> to the "multiple genetic alphabet hypothesis', there are n genetic
> alphabets, each consisting of 4^n letters, each of which in turn
> consisting of n nucleotides. In this view, the classical genetic
> alphabet is just one example of the n alphabets, i.e., the one with n = 1.
> When n = 3, for example, we have the so-called 3rd-order genetic alphabet
> with 4^3 = 64 letters each consisting of 3 nucleotides, resulting in the
> familiar codon table. Thus, the 64 genetic codons are not words as widely
> thought (including myself until recently) but letters! It then follows
> that proteins are words and metabolic pathways are sentences. Finally,
> the transient network of metbolic pathways (referred to as
> "hyperstructures" by V. Norris in 1999 and as "hypermetabolic pathways" by
> me more recently) correspond to texts essential to represent
> arguement/reasoning/computing. What is most exciting is the recent
> discovery in my lab at Rutgers that the so-called "Planck-Shannon plots" of
> mRNA levels in living cells can identify function-dependent "hypermetabolic
> pathways" underlying breast cancer before and after drug
> treatment (manuscript under review).
>
>
>
> Any comments, questions, or suggestions would be welcome.
>
>
>
> Sung
>
>
>
>
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>
> --
>
> Professor Terrence W. Deacon
> University of California, Berkeley
>
>
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