To claim that: "without a language, no communication would be possible"
one must be using the term "language" in a highly metaphoric sense. Is scent marking a language? Music? Sexual displays, like a peacock's tail? How about a smile or frown? Is the pattern of colors of a flower that attracts bees a language? Was the evolution of language in humans just more of the same, not something distinct from a dog's bark? When a person is depressed, their way of walking often communicates this fact to others; so is this slight modification of posture part of a language? If I get the hiccups after eating is this part of a language that communicates my indigestion? Is this usage of the term 'language' simply referring to the necessity of a shared medium of communication? Is it possible to develop a general theory of information by simply failing to make distinctions? — Terry On 2/12/18, Sungchul Ji <s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu> wrote: > Hi FISers, > > > (1) I think language and communication cannot be separated, since without a > language, no communication would be possible (see Figure 1). > > > > f > g > Sender -------> Message > --------> Receiver > | > ^ > | > | > | > | > > |_____________________________| > > h > > “Language and communication are both irreducibly triadic; i.e., the three > nodes and three edges are essential for communication, given a language or > code understood by both the sender and receiver.” f = encoding; g = > decoding; h = information flow. > > Figure 1. A diagrammatic representation of the irreducibly triadic nature > of communication and language. > > > > > (2) I think it may be justified and useful to distinguish between > anthropomorphic language metaphor (ALM) and non-athropomorphic language > metaphor (NLM). I agree with many of the members of this list that we > should not apply ALM to biology uncritically, since such an approch to > biology may lead to unjustifiable anthropomorphisms. > (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus) and the anthropocentric theory of > creatiion. > > > (3) Table 1 below may represent one possible example of NLM. Although the > linguistic terms such as letters, words, sentences, etc. are used in this > table, they are matrially/ontologically different from their molecular > coutner parts; e.g., letters are different from nucleotides, protein > domians , etc.,and words are different from genes, proteins, etc., but > there are unmistakable common formal features among them. > > Table 1. The formal and material aspects of the cell language (Cellese). > > \ Material Aspect > \ (Function) > \ > \ > \ > \ > \ > Formal Aspect \ > (Function) \ > \ > > DNA Language > (DNese; > Information transmission in time) > > RNA Language > (RNese; > Information transmission in space, from DNA to proteins) > > Protein Language > (Proteinese; > Energy transduction > from chemical to mechanical; i.e., conformon production) > > Chemical Language > (Moleculese; > Source of free energy) > > Letters* > (To build) > > 4n nucleotides > n = 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . > Exons (?) > > > > Protein domains > > Partial chemical reactions > > Words > (To denote) > > Genes > > > > Proteins > > Full chemical reactions > > Sentences > (To decide) > > cis-Genes (?)** > > > > Metabolic pathways > > Chemical gradients > > Texts > (To reason/compute) > > trans-Genes (?)** > > > > ‘Hypermetabolic pathways’ > > Chemical waves (?) > > > *I recently proposed that there are n (with n = 1 ~103?) genetic alphabets, > each containing 4^n letters and each letter in turn consisting of n > nucleotides. In this view, the 64 codons are the so-called 3rd-order > letters , not words as widely assumed. > **cis-Genes are here defined as those genes covalently linked to each other > and hence being in the same chromosome, whereas trans-genes are defined as > those genes that are located in different chromos > > (4) The terms, DNese, RNese, and proteinese were coined by a young American > biochemist from Mexico City whom I met at the International Workshop on the > Linguistics of Biology and the Biology of Language held in Cuernavaca, > Mexico, in 1998, where I had presented the cell language ('cellese') theory, > prior to the young biochemist’s lecture which followed mine the next day. > In his lecture, he surprised me by announcing these neologisms, which I did > not quite know how to justify. But it took almost 20 years for me to > finally realize the utility of these terms for entirely different reasons, I > am sure, from those of the young biochemist from Mexico City. I am > responsible for the coinage of cellese and chemicalese in Table 1. > > (5) If Table 1 is right, the cellese and its sub-languages, DNese, RNese, > proteinese and chemiclaese, are complemetary unions of form and matter. > > If you have any questions or comments, pleae let me know. > > All the best. > > Sung > (My time is out. I am signing out in a hurry.) > > > > > > > > > ________________________________ > From: Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> on behalf of Xueshan Yan > <y...@pku.edu.cn> > Sent: Monday, February 12, 2018 6:31 AM > To: FIS Group > Cc: 'Jose Javier Blanco Rivero' > Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on > the cateogry theory > > > Dear Javier and Dear Stan, > > > > Javier: > > 1. I very much agree with you as follows: > > “I think that only signals can be transmitted, not information. Information > can only be gained by an observer (a self-referential system) that draws a > distinction.” > > A Chinese scholar Dongsheng Miao’s argument is: There is no information can > exists without carrier, i.e. No naked can exists. > > I think both of you two are expressing a principle of information science. > > > > 2. According to Linguistics, the relationship between language and > communication is: > > Language is a tool of communication about information. > > Of course, this is only limited to the human atmosphere. So I think that all > (Human) Semiotics ((Human) Linguistics), (Human) Communication Study should > be the subdisciplines of Human Informatics. > > > > ========================================================== > > Dear Xueshan, > > Thanks for sharing your interesting remarks and references. I think no one > really wants to deny the crucial role the language metaphor has played in > the thinking of communication and information models. But I believe the > crucial point is to distinguish between language and communication. Language > is for us humans the main communication medium, though not the only one. We > tend to describe other communication media in society and nature by mapping > the language-like characteristics they have. This has been useful and > sucessful so far. But pushing the language metaphor too far is showing its > analytical limits. I think we need to think of a transdisciplinary theory of > communication media. On the other hand, I agree with you that we need to > check the uses of the concepts of signal and information. I think that only > signals can be transmitted, not information. Information can only be gained > by an observer (a self-referential system) that draws a distinction. > > Best, > > Javier > > ============================================== > > Stan: > > According to Peirce, language is only one of the systematic signs. Here we > consider sign, signal, symbol as the same thing. So, more precisely in my > opinion: > > {signal {information}}, or {substrate {signal {information}}} > > But not > > {language {signal {information}}} > > If you remember, in our previous discussions, I much appreciate the > > The hierarchy idea is very important to our study which is initially > introduced by Pedro, Nikhil and you. > > =============================================================== > > Xueshan -- I think one can condense some of your insights hierarchically, > as: > > In a system having language, information seemingly may be obtained in other > ways as well. It would be a conceptually broader category. Thus (using the > compositional hierarchy): > > [information [language [signal]]] > > Meaning that, when a system has language, all information will be understood > or construed by way of linguistic constructs. > > (Here I am using ‘signal’ as being more specific than Peirce’s ‘sign’, > where: > > [sign [information [...]]] ) > > Then, more dynamically (using the subsumptive hierarchy): > > {language {signal {information}}} > > Information in a languaged system is derived by way linguistic formations, > so that, even though it is an extremely broad category, information > (informing) only emerges by way of linguistically informed transformations. > > STAN > > > > Best wishes to all, > > Xueshan > > =============================================================== > > El feb 10, 2018 5:23 AM, "Xueshan Yan" > <y...@pku.edu.cn<mailto:y...@pku.edu.cn>> escribió: > > Dear Colleagues, > > I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana > recommended, and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination > with Sung's comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and human > language, I have the following learning feelings to share with everyone: > > In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have evolved multiple > languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- and > interspecies cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate various > biological activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. Such > as AI-2, it is a general language that bacteria use for intergenera > signaling. > > I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the concept > information 3 times but the concept signal (signal or signaling) 55 times, > so we have to review the history and application of “information” and > “signal” in biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for us to understand the > relationship between language, signal, and information. > > The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) can be > traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and > endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of > Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" in > Nature, in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. Since > then, the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and > biochemistry. > > As for any information transmission system, if we pay more attention to its > transmission carrier instead of its transmission content, we are used to > employing "signal transmission" instead of "signal transduction". From the > tradition of the early use of information concept, the signal transduction > study of cells is only equivalent to the level of telecommunications before > 1948. Outwardly, before the advent of Shannon's information theory, the > central issue of telecommunications is "signal" rather than "information". > After that, the central issue of telecommunications is "information" rather > than "signal". > > According to the application history of information concept, nearly all the > essential problems behind the concepts of communication, messenger, signal > and so on may be information problems. Just as the language problem what we > are discussing here, our ultimate goal is to analyze the information. > > > > For the same reason, I recommend another two papers: > > 1. Do Plants Think? (June 5, 2012, Scientific American) > > (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think-daniel-chamovitz/#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931e64057ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.scientificamerican.com%2Farticle%2Fdo-plants-think-daniel-chamovitz%2F%23rd%3Fsukey%3Dfc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931e64057ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b&data=02%7C01%7Csji%40pharmacy.rutgers.edu%7Cd21bd1ad9ddf46d01a3e08d5720c681d%7Cb92d2b234d35447093ff69aca6632ffe%7C1%7C0%7C636540320007030420&sdata=2buOZeZpeC9UCNIIuY6bVfAr%2B4yOET6l35UU6ZwMhdU%3D&reserved=0>） > > 2. Plants Can Think, Feel and Learn (December 3, 2014, New Scientist) > > (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root-intelligence-plants-can-think-feel-and-learn<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.newscientist.com%2Farticle%2Fmg22429980-400-root-intelligence-plants-can-think-feel-and-learn&data=02%7C01%7Csji%40pharmacy.rutgers.edu%7Cd21bd1ad9ddf46d01a3e08d5720c681d%7Cb92d2b234d35447093ff69aca6632ffe%7C1%7C0%7C636540320007030420&sdata=zfHmH3VG30OLHtjwoFmaVX2OVlwZRaxqdOXRIo69GMc%3D&reserved=0>) > > From which we can judge whether or not a plants informatics can exists. > > > > Best wishes, > > Xueshan > > > > From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> > [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>] > On Behalf Of Sungchul Ji > Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 9:10 PM > To: Francesco Rizzo > <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com<mailto:13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>>; Terrence > W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu<mailto:dea...@berkeley.edu>> > Cc: Fis, <fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>> > Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on > the cateogry theory > > > > Hi Terry, and FISers, > > > > Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical) knife that, in > the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong hand, can kill? > > > > All the best. > > > > Sung > > ________________________________ > > From: Francesco Rizzo > <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com<mailto:13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>> > Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 2:56:11 AM > To: Terrence W. DEACON > Cc: Fis,; Sungchul Ji > Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on > the cateogry theory > > > > Caro Terry estensibile a tutti, > > è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La general theory of information è > preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e seguita da un > sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si ha un processo > comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non significa > necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un Trasmettitore, > lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra macchina e macchina > il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal caso non si ha > significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di informazione. > Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è necessario che la fonte > sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un processo di > significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione semiotica > autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che > l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- o > tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che > biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o > specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica della > significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è > impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da una > semiotica della significazione. > > Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10. Umberto > Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della scienza > economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza dell'economia o > l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997). Nello mio stesso > libro si trovano: > > - il capitolo 15. Semiotica economico-estimativa (pp. 327-361) che si > colloca nel quadro di una teoria globale di tutti i sistemi di > significazione e i processi di comunicazione; > > - il sottoparagrafo 5.3.3 La psicologia genetica di Jean Piaget e la > neurobiologia di Humberto Maturana e Francesco Varela. una nuova > epistemologia sperimentale della qualità e dell'unicità (pp. 120-130). > > Chiedo scusa a Tutti se Vi ho stancati o se ancora una volta il mio scrivere > in lingua italiana Vi crea qualche problema. Penso che il dono che mi fate > è, a proposito della QUALITA' e dell'UNICITA', molto più grande del > (per)dono che Vi chiedo. Grazie. > > Un saluto affettuoso. > > Francecso > > > > > > 2018-02-07 23:02 GMT+01:00 Terrence W. DEACON > <dea...@berkeley.edu<mailto:dea...@berkeley.edu>>: > > Dear FISers, > > > > In previous posts I have disparaged using language as the base model for > building a general theory of information. > > Though I realize that this may seem almost heretical, it is not a claim that > all those who use linguistic analogies are wrong, only that it can be > causally misleading. > > I came to this view decades back in my research into the neurology and > evolution of the human language capacity. > > And it became an orgnizing theme in my 1997 book The Symbolic Species. > > Early in the book I describe what I (and now other evolutionary biologists) > have come to refer to as a "porcupine fallacy" in evolutionary thinking. > > Though I use it to critique a misleading evolutionary taxonomizing tendency, > I think it also applies to biosemiotic and information theoretic thinking as > well. > > So to exemplify my reasoning (with apologies for quoting myself) I append > the following excerpt from the book. > > > > "But there is a serious problem with using language as the model for > analyzing other > > species’ communication in hindsight. It leads us to treat every other form > of communication as > > exceptions to a rule based on the one most exceptional and divergent case. > No analytic method > > could be more perverse. Social communication has been around for as long as > animals have > > interacted and reproduced sexually. Vocal communication has been around at > least as long as frogs > > have croaked out their mating calls in the night air. Linguistic > communication was an afterthought, > > so to speak, a very recent and very idiosyncratic deviation from an ancient > and well-established > > mode of communicating. It cannot possibly provide an appropriate model > against which to assess > > other forms of communication. It is the rare exception, not the rule, and a > quite anomalous > > exception at that. It is a bit like categorizing birds’ wings with respect > to the extent they possess or > > lack the characteristics of penguins’ wings, or like analyzing the types of > hair on different mammals > > with respect to their degree of resemblance to porcupine quills. It is an > understandable > > anthropocentric bias—perhaps if we were penguins or porcupines we might see > more typical wings > > and hair as primitive stages compared to our own more advanced > adaptations—but it does more to > > obfuscate than clarify. Language is a derived characteristic and so should > be analyzed as an > > exception to a more general rule, not vice versa." > > > > Of course there will be analogies to linguistic forms. > > This is inevitable, since language emerged from and is supported by a vast > nonlinguistic semiotic infrastructure. > > So of course it will inherit much from less elaborated more fundamental > precursors. > > And our familiarity with language will naturally lead us to draw insight > from this more familiar realm. > > I just worry that it provides an elaborate procrustean model that assumes > what it endeavors to explain. > > > > Regards to all, Terry > > > > > > > > On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero > <javierwe...@gmail.com<mailto:javierwe...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > In principle I agree with Terry. I have been thinking of this, though I am > still not able to make a sound formulation of the idea. Still I am afraid > that if I miss the chance to make at least a brief formulation of it I will > lose the opportunity to make a brainstorming with you. So, here it comes: > > I have been thinking that a proper way to distinguish the contexts in which > the concept of information acquires a fixed meaning or the many contexts on > which information can be somehow observed, is to make use of the distinction > between medium and form as developed by N. Luhmann, D. Baecker and E. > Esposito. I have already expressed my opinion in this group that what > information is depends on the system we are talking about. But the concept > of medium is more especific since a complex system ussualy has many sources > and types of information. > So the authors just mentioned, a medium can be broadly defined as a set of > loosely coupled elements. No matter what they are. While a Form is a > temporary fixed coupling of a limited configuration of those elements. > Accordingly, we can be talking about DNA sequences which are selected by RNA > to form proteins or to codify a especific instruction to a determinate cell. > We can think of atoms forming a specific kind of matter and a specific kind > of molecular structure. We can also think of a vocabulary or a set of > linguistic conventions making possible a meaningful utterance or discourse. > The idea is that the medium conditions what can be treated as information. > Or even better, each type of medium produces information of its own kind. > According to this point of view, information cannot be transmitted. It can > only be produced and "interpreted" out of the specific difference that a > medium begets between itself and the forms that take shape from it. A medium > can only be a source of noise to other mediums. Still, media can couple > among them. This means that media can selforganize in a synergetic manner, > where they depend on each others outputs or complexity reductions. And this > also mean that they do this by translating noise into information. For > instance, language is coupled to writing, and language and writing to print. > Still oral communication is noisy to written communication. Let us say that > the gestures, emotions, entonations, that we make when talking cannot be > copied as such into writing. In a similar way, all the social practices and > habits made by handwriting were distorted by the introduction of print. From > a technical point of view you can codify the same message orally, by writing > and by print. Still information and meaning are not the same. You can tell > your girlfriend you love her. That interaction face to face where the lovers > look into each others eye, where they can see if the other is nervous, is > trembling or whatever. Meaning (declaring love and what that implies: > marriage, children, and so on) and information (he is being sincere, she can > see it in his eye; he brought her to a special place, so he planned it, and > so on) take a very singular and untranslatable configuration. If you write a > letter you just can say "I love you". You shall write a poem or a love > letter. Your beloved would read it alone in her room and she would have to > imagine everything you say. And imagination makes information and meaning > to articulate quite differently as in oral communication. It is not the same > if you buy a love card in the kiosk and send it to her. Maybe you compensate > the simplicity of your message by adding some chocolates and flowers. Again, > information (jumm, lets see what he bought her) and meaning are not the > same. I use examples of social sciences because that is my research field, > although I have the intuition that it could also work for natural sciences. > > Best, > > JJ > > El feb 7, 2018 10:47 AM, "Sungchul Ji" > <s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu<mailto:s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu>> escribió: > > Hi FISers, > > > > On 10/8/2017, Terry wrote: > > > > " So basically, I am advocating an effort to broaden our discussions and > recognize that the term information applies in diverse ways to many > different contexts. And because of this it is important to indicate the > framing, whether physical, formal, biological, phenomenological, linguistic, > etc. > > . . . . . . The classic syntax-semantics-pragmatics distinction introduced > by Charles Morris has often been cited in this respect, though it too is in > my opinion too limited to the linguistic paradigm, and may be misleading > when applied more broadly. I have suggested a parallel, less linguistic (and > nested in Stan's subsumption sense) way of making the division: i.e. into > intrinsic, referential, and normative analyses/properties of information." > > > > I agree with Terry's concern about the often overused linguistic metaphor in > defining "information". Although the linguistic metaphor has its > limitations (as all metaphors do), it nevertheless offers a unique advantage > as well, for example, its well-established categories of functions (see the > last column in Table 1.) > > > > The main purpose of this post is to suggest that all the varied theories of > information discussed on this list may be viewed as belonging to the same > category of ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) diagrammatically represented > as the 3-node closed network in the first column of Table 1. > > > > Table 1. The postulated universality of ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) > as manifested in information theory, semiotics, cell language theory, and > linguistics. > > > Category Theory > > f g > A -----> B ------> C > | ^ > | | > |______________| > h > > > > ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) > > > Deacon’s theory of information > > > Shannon’s > > Theory of > > information > > > Peirce’s theory of signs > > > Cell language theory > > > Human language > (Function) > > > A > > > Intrinsic information > > > Source > > > Object > > > Nucleotides*/ > Amion acids > > > Letters > (Building blocks) > > > B > > > Referential information > > > Message > > > Sign > > > Proteins > > > Words > (Denotation) > > > C > > > Normative information > > > Receiver > > > Interpretant > > > Metabolomes > (Totality of cell metabolism) > > > Systems of words > (Decision making & Reasoning) > > > f > > > ? > > > Encoding > > > Sign production > > > Physical laws > > > Second articulation > > > g > > > ? > > > Decoding > > > Sign interpretation > > > Evoutionary selection > > > First and Third articulation > > > h > > > ? > > > Information flow > > > Information flow > > > Inheritance > > > Grounding/ > > Habit > > > Scale > > > Micro-Macro? > > > Macro > > > Macro > > > Micro > > > Macro > > > > > *There may be more than one genetic alphabet of 4 nucleotides. According to > the "multiple genetic alphabet hypothesis', there are n genetic alphabets, > each consisting of 4^n letters, each of which in turn consisting of n > nucleotides. In this view, the classical genetic alphabet is just one > example of the n alphabets, i.e., the one with n = 1. When n = 3, for > example, we have the so-called 3rd-order genetic alphabet with 4^3 = 64 > letters each consisting of 3 nucleotides, resulting in the familiar codon > table. Thus, the 64 genetic codons are not words as widely thought > (including myself until recently) but letters! It then follows that > proteins are words and metabolic pathways are sentences. Finally, the > transient network of metbolic pathways (referred to as "hyperstructures" by > V. Norris in 1999 and as "hypermetabolic pathways" by me more recently) > correspond to texts essential to represent arguement/reasoning/computing. > What is most exciting is the recent discovery in my lab at Rutgers that the > so-called "Planck-Shannon plots" of mRNA levels in living cells can identify > function-dependent "hypermetabolic pathways" underlying breast cancer before > and after drug treatment (manuscript under review). > > > > Any comments, questions, or suggestions would be welcome. > > > > Sung > > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffis&data=02%7C01%7Csji%40pharmacy.rutgers.edu%7Cca4905ddbcb943df537b08d56ec96c4c%7C927347c284584fde99b9ca9ba94d96e0%7C1%7C0%7C636536733755726637&sdata=ir%2FcgnTkNiV8YXWkbn3T4FULEtrqVHFhg%2FFFVuDc9IA%3D&reserved=0> > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffis&data=02%7C01%7Csji%40pharmacy.rutgers.edu%7Cca4905ddbcb943df537b08d56ec96c4c%7C927347c284584fde99b9ca9ba94d96e0%7C1%7C0%7C636536733755726637&sdata=ir%2FcgnTkNiV8YXWkbn3T4FULEtrqVHFhg%2FFFVuDc9IA%3D&reserved=0> > > > > > > -- > > Professor Terrence W. Deacon > University of California, Berkeley > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffis&data=02%7C01%7Csji%40pharmacy.rutgers.edu%7Cca4905ddbcb943df537b08d56ec96c4c%7C927347c284584fde99b9ca9ba94d96e0%7C1%7C0%7C636536733755726637&sdata=ir%2FcgnTkNiV8YXWkbn3T4FULEtrqVHFhg%2FFFVuDc9IA%3D&reserved=0> > > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffis&data=02%7C01%7Csji%40pharmacy.rutgers.edu%7Cd21bd1ad9ddf46d01a3e08d5720c681d%7Cb92d2b234d35447093ff69aca6632ffe%7C1%7C0%7C636540320007030420&sdata=JTnL%2BthMsdQUEzTx%2F9UKr5xzKQom6%2FINA8VkaDyPI80%3D&reserved=0> > -- Professor Terrence W. Deacon University of California, Berkeley _______________________________________________ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
