"Mark J. Roberts" wrote:
> On 23 Dec 2000, Mr.Bad wrote:
>
> > Well, it was bound to happen some time. There's now software that
> > claims to be able to attack Freenet:
> >
> > http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,40816,00.html
> >
> > Blargh.
>
> This thing scans through an huge block of IP addresses, checking for file
> sharing (Napster, FTP, Freenet, Gnutella). If it finds one, it searches it
> for forbidden content. If it can identify any, it adds your IP address to
> an email to your ISP, along with the evidence for your crimes. (I doubt
> ISPs are ever going to go along with this, DMCA of no DMCA.)
>
> This is the interesting part:
>
> "People claim if you don't know the original provider on Freenet, you
> can't do anything," Hill said. "When all these people are running
> Freenet, we connect to each one of them, throw in a query and if a
> particular node responds to that key, we consider that IP address to be
> infringing."
>
> If the HTL was set to 1, he has a point. Requests for data still work
> with a HTL of 1. Interestingly, inserts with a HTL of 1 pretend to work,
> but never stick. What's up with this? I assume it's protection against
> someone inserting illegal materials to your node, and then turning you
> in? Whereas, if they inserted it with a HTL of 2, it may or may not be
> stored in your node, but with a HTL of 1, they're sure it is?
>
> What's the current consensus about requesting data with a HTL of 1, as
> these people plan to do (as I understand it)?
What's the current consensus about where to stop when counting down? ;)
Can a scheme be thought out that doesn't really use a fixed HTL, but
introduces an element of random, so that there's only a ~50% chance of a HTL1
actually being processed at that node, and an equal chance of it continuing
yet another hop, at no influence of the original HTL-setting seeker?
In that case, the HTL1-attack would be disabled, at least unless your sole
network connection would be sniffed by a man in the middle to prove that there
is nobody else that your node could request it any further from.
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