Heh, that's completely inverted.  You're claiming that fewer interactions 
between the individual and its environment imply a tighter coupling between 
them.  I'm claiming that more interactions between them imply a tighter 
coupling.

Maybe think about it this way.  Imagine 2 androids (no "beliefs", just 
behaviors) lying on tables in a lab.  Android A reaches down with an arm to 
touch the ground, then moves its legs and gets off the table. We can count 2 
(coarse) interactions with the ground: touching it, then standing on it.  
Android B just gets off the table without touching it first.  We count 1 
(coarse) interaction.  You claim Android B is more tightly coupled with the 
ground than Android A.  I claim Android A is more tightly coupled with the 
ground than Android B.

###

On 03/28/2018 07:23 PM, Eric Charles wrote:
> Glen... I quite confused as to what you mean by tight and loose control...
> 
> Let us take the case of belief in a tight relationship between my height off 
> the ground and my likelihood of being injured in a jump. If I firmly believe 
> that, then whether or not I jump is tightly coupled with the height. If I 
> doubt such a relationship exists, then the height I find myself at will be 
> only loosely coupled with my likelihood of jumping... right? Is that not the 
> type of thing you are referring to with "tight" and "loose" control?
> 
> Either way, Peirce is more interested in the higher-order question of what 
> leads beliefs to be stable. There are many answers to that question (see his 
> "Fixation of Belief"), though the interesting answer, the one he tries to 
> elaborate for the rest of his life, is fixation via the scientific process, 
> in which beliefs stabilize (control behavior more tightly) as their 
> implications attain in practice, and destabilize (control behavior more 
> loosely) as their implications fail to attain in practice. In that context, 
> the scientific context, "Truth" or "Real" are odd terms we use to refer to 
> those things for which all implications will attain in the very, very long 
> run.
>  
> (... which might, in the very, very long run, turn out to be almost 
> nothing...)
> 
> So, there is, on the one hand, something to be said about the "control" that 
> is the belief itself, and something else to be said about the "control" that 
> is the sociological stability of the belief and the basis of that stability.
> 
> In your case of the "dead horse" of putting feet on the floor, the "tight 
> coupling" is what happens when one acts their entire daily life without once 
> checking the belief. Doubt makes one put ones feet down tentatively, makes 
> one walk with caution. The relation of the person to the floor gets looser as 
> doubt increases... doesn't it? The person who firmly believes the floor is 
> there acts towards it unhesitatingly the whole day, thousands of times; his 
> behavior is tightly coupled to a floor being present... as becomes obvious in 
> a dramatic fall if it isn't.

-- 
☣ uǝlƃ

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