I mean ... [sigh] ... if we take these meta-statements seriously, we can
imagine someone promoting an attribute to a property ... something like
reification. The setup of a proposition {P} and a meta-proposition like {P is
True} is too loaded. It would be easier to take something like {Apple} and
{Apple is Green}. Green is a humble attribute, unlike the aggressive True.
Promoting Green from an attribute to a property is more acceptable because of
that humility. A contrarian can in good faith say, no apples are red. Or a
color-blind person can say, no apples are gray#7. Or whatever.
But when some arrogant snot runs around saying {P is True}, we don't even know
where to begin. There is no common ground from which to start. At the very
least, those who want to claim things like {P is True} could be generous and
relax it a bit to {P is Consistent with L}, where L is some language. Then
maybe we could say {P is True}_L or something.
I know L is inferable from the subject line, the context of Dave's OP, etc. But
man, it's a lot of work to do that inferring and the subsequent error
correction in straw-steel-etc effigification.
On 4/7/21 1:08 PM, jon zingale wrote:
> Oh, let me comprehend the ways.
--
↙↙↙ uǝlƃ
- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
