On Saturday, 22 November 2003, Lawrence E. Rosen wrote:

  1. I think we *are* beginning to observe instances of the problem we are
  trying to solve.  The EOLAS patents, for example, were such a threat that
  W3C formed a PAG that recommended reexamination (which the PTO just agreed
  to do).  I've read emails from Bruce Perens identifying patents that have
  affected IETF standards.  Perhaps others in cc have specific examples.  On
  the other hand, what evidence can you adduce to suggest that there is some
  form of "natural immunity" for open source software?
  
Well, yes but no, Larry.  Eolas sues not the developers or
distributors of Mozilla, but Microsoft, looking for the deepest
pocket, as one would expect from a traditional patent plaintiff
primarily concerned with recovering royalties.  The W3C behaves as you
and I want it to, and as we told our colleagues on the PPWG it would
have to begin behaving: affirmatively challenging patents that
threaten obstruction.  That the members who were skeptical of that
course of conduct when the Free World first raised the possibility in
the PPWG in November 2001 found themselves doing it less than two
years later is a sign of one part of the ecology's development: like
Dan Ravicher's Public Patent Foundation, the W3C activity
demonstrates, I believe, that one aspect of patent defense will be
organizational, based on non-profit legal advocacy rather than
market-based license-controlled activity.

But I'm not, as I said before, asking argumentative questions, and I
wasn't leading up to "adducing evidence."  I'm asking how to interpret
negative evidence: the non-occurrence of actions against free software.
In that context I think I hear you saying that it's an artifact: given
more time, such suits will begin to happen in reasonable profusion and
addressing them by license provision will be necessary.  I don't say
you're wrong, just that I'm not yet sure.

  2. The escape hatch you describe can be prevented by appropriate license
  language.  For example, many open source licenses define the licensee as
  "any entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control
  with" licensee.  I've wondered if the EOLAS patent would be less a threat to
  open source browsers if the University of California, a passive plaintiff in
  that infringement lawsuit, were threatened with loss of its rights to open
  source software.  If current language provisions like these aren't
  sufficient, can you suggest more effective language?
  
You may be right here too, but it might be more complicated.  I think
the way a litigant intending disruption would probably circumvent the
licenses would be to form a non-profit and assign the patents
charitably.  A party interested in royalties would either sell the
claims to a patent-reclamation investor like Eugene Lang, or create an
arms'-length investment vehicle.  In the first instance, which I think
concerns me most, I see no likelihood of convincing a judge that the
donor "controls" in any relevant sense the non-profit to which it
donated the claims.  In the investment-entity case, any one particular
free software licensor *might* be able to pierce the veil and show
that the original entity should be found to have forfeited its
copyright license under the patent retaliation clause, but the costs
of enforcement and the uncertainty of success would have been
multiplied substantially.  Only the wealthiest free software licensor
could afford that effort, thus making the mutual defense aspect of
such clauses much less valuable.  At any rate, that's the speculation
that concerns me.  Let's hear what other people think.

Best.
Eben

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