John, I think you are right to reject the idea that the left caucuses have no power in DSA. That is too simple. DSA is not run only from the top, and caucus influence is real—especially around the International Committee and foreign policy. The Ukraine/NATO line is a good example: condemn Russia formally, but then oppose the material means by which Ukraine can defend itself. That contradiction is not accidental. It reflects a real political current inside DSA.
But I would separate three things that your argument sometimes runs together: caucus influence, organizational policy, and elected-official discipline. DSA’s International Committee and parts of its national leadership may express the politics of the left caucuses. That does not automatically mean Ilhan Omar voted as she did because DSA told her to, or because DSA’s influence was decisive. It may be true, but unless there is evidence of coordination, it remains an inference. The stronger argument is not that DSA directly caused her vote but that DSA’s foreign-policy common sense creates the political atmosphere in which that vote becomes intelligible: anti-NATO, anti-sanctions, and anti-U.S. aid but often evasive on the concrete right of Ukrainians to resist Russian imperialism. The same applies to Mamdani. He is clearly rooted in DSA, and DSA’s organizing was essential to his rise. But now he is also a citywide governing figure. That means he is under pressures DSA does not control: New York capital, unions, immigrant constituencies, the Democratic ballot line, national media, and the immediate demands of municipal administration. His silence or caution on Ukraine may reflect DSA politics, but it may also reflect the ordinary evasiveness of a politician trying not to split his coalition. That distinction matters. On Kat Abughazaleh, I think your example is useful but cuts both ways. Her campaign showed that a candidate can be broadly aligned with the DSA/progressive milieu and still diverge from the prevailing campist line on Ukraine. If DSA did not endorse her, Ukraine may have been part of the reason, but again we should be careful about claiming more than we can prove. The bigger issue, as you say, is the election. Falling oil prices could help Trump and the Republicans blunt one of the strongest immediate sources of working-class anger: the cost of living. If gas prices fall, the administration gets breathing room. That makes the political question sharper for the left. Does DSA use the opening created by Mamdani and related victories to build a broader working-class pole, or does it retreat into sectarian foreign-policy shibboleths that make it harder to unite people around class politics? That is where I think the real criticism should land. The danger is not simply that DSA is “too left.” The danger is that it can be radical in its symbolic foreign policy posture while remaining strategically dependent on Democratic primaries and politically evasive on what independent working-class organization would actually require. That is a much deeper problem than whether one caucus or another has too many seats on a committee. -- Tony -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#42346): https://groups.io/g/marxmail/message/42346 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/120140354/21656 -=-=- POSTING RULES & NOTES #1 YOU MUST clip all extraneous text when replying to a message. #2 This mail-list, like most, is publicly & permanently archived. #3 Subscribe and post under an alias if #2 is a concern. #4 Do not exceed five posts a day. -=-=- Group Owner: [email protected] Unsubscribe: https://groups.io/g/marxmail/leave/13617172/21656/1316126222/xyzzy [[email protected]] -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
