Right then, some summaries of much longer arguments by these Marxist
critics of subimperialism, are below.
• Immanuel Wallerstein’s World-Systems ‘semi-periphery’ (1975)
• Ibbo Mandaza’s warning about subimperialism practices of the apartheid-era
South African state and capital (1980)
• David Harvey’s application of the subimperialism concept to post-1970s
footloose capital’s ‘spatial fix’ (2003)
• Sam Moyo’s and Paris Yeros’ application of Marini’s theory to the BRICS (2013)
• Samir Amin’s labelling of post-apartheid South Africa as ‘subimperialist’
(2019)
• Gorden Moyo’s confirmation that in the African economy, BRICS are subimperial
(2024)
Please do.
thanks, Mark
Imperialism, according to Luxemburg in 1913, originally stemmed from an
underlying capitalist crisis tendency – the ‘overaccumulation of
capital’ – and capital’s need for wider-ranging super-exploitation, due
to the
ceaseless flow of capital from one branch of production to another… in
the periodical and cyclical swings of [capitalism’s] reproduction
between overproduction and crisis… Accumulation of capital periodically
bursts out in crises and spurs capital on to a continual extension of
the market… Capital cannot accumulate without the aid of non-capitalist
relations, nor … can it tolerate their continued existence side by side
with itself. Only the continuous and progressive disintegration of
non-capitalist relations makes accumulation of capital possible.
This is not, though, a Global North versus Global South problem, as was
explained by Dani Nabudere (1977), because of a group of economies /in
between/:
Imperialism is not a centre-periphery phenomenon, but a world system.
The investment of capital in, or export of goods to, the other
capitalist countries will not be any less imperialistic if those other
countries are less developed. Imperialism knows neither geographical nor
racial barrier and to present it as solely a centre-periphery phenomenon
is to display a strange conception of imperialism. Just as imperialism
divides up the backward world and subjugates the peoples in these
countries to its own needs, so it also subjugates other weaker
capitalist states, exploiting them and their resources for the same
purpose.
Nabudere drew upon insights from Lenin’s booklet /Imperialism/ (1916):
Finance capital and its foreign policy, which is the struggle of the
great powers for the economic and political division of the world, give
rise to a number of transitional forms of state dependence. Not only are
the two main groups of countries, those owning colonies, and the
colonies themselves, but also the diverse forms of dependent countries
which, politically, are formally independent, but in fact, are enmeshed
in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence, typical of this epoch.
Brazilian dependency theorist Ruy Mauro Marini (1965) believed that this
category could be termed subimperialism: “It is not a question of
passively accepting North American power (although the actual
correlation of forces often leads to that result), but expansion the
position of a key nation.” The World Systems perspective that emerged
from such insights, as defined by Immanuel Wallerstein (1975), divided
the world into the category core, semi-periphery and periphery; which
overlap to a close extent with a semi-peripheral BRICS.
Applying capital-flow analysis to this framework, David Harvey (2004)
identified a crucial middle layer:
Global capitalism has experienced a chronic and enduring problem of
over-accumulation since the 1970s. I interpret the volatility of
international capitalism during these years, however, as a series of
temporary spatio- temporal fixes that failed even in the medium run to
deal with problems of over-accumulation… The opening up of global
markets in both commodities and capital created openings for other
states to insert themselves into the global economy, first as absorbers
but then as producers of surplus capitals. They then became competitors
on the world stage. What might be called ‘subimperialisms’ arose… each
developing centre of capital accumulation sought out systematic
spatio-temporal fixes for its own surplus capital by defining
territorial spheres of influence.
*South African subimperialism*
The subimperial layer was already apparent in the 1970s, according to an
assessment by Ibbo Mandaza of apartheid-era South Africa (1980),
There appears to be no crucial reason why the concept of
‘subimperialism’ cannot be used as meaning a ‘sub-form’ of imperialism;
but still dependent upon, as an appendage of, and as part and parcel of,
imperialism. This is certainly the meaning we attach to the concept of
‘subimperialism’; and precludes inferring ‘autonomy’ of the South
African State nor capital being ‘national’ within the confines of the
latter… The creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 was a
reflection of the acute importance that imperialism by this time
attached to South Africa, particularly in the course of the
industrialisation process triggered by the discovery of gold and
diamonds in the nineteenth century. At any rate it was this advance in
the discovery and exploitation of mineral resources that laid the basis
for the subsequent economic dependence on South Africa of the
neighbouring territories.
Equally, it is this economic dominance which accounts for the continued
and intensifying interest in South Africa on the part of imperialism as
a country offering among the most favourable conditions for the
super-exploitation of labour by capital; and places the South African
state in a special relationship with the U.S. and other Western European
capitalist countries in the joint venture to maximise the process of
surplus accumulation and appropriation in Southern Africa as a whole.
One feature of subimperialism highlighted by Marini was local
‘super-exploitation,’ in which labour reproduction was augmented by
subsidisation beyond wages (which were not enough to provide for a
worker and their family’s living expensions, thus requiring
subsidisation mainly by women’s unpaid labour). Super-exploitation was
vital to capitalism under apartheid systems of domination, but was
retained after 1994, according to Patricia McFadden (2010):
South African society looks as much a neocolonial African socioeconomic
and political formation as its counterparts across the Southern African
region. The claims of exceptionalism, which characterised the earlier
years after apartheid, have been steadily eroded… The fact that
post-apartheid South Africa did not even attempt to implement the
mildest of social democratic reforms, in spite of having inherited the
most fractured society on the entire continent, is a glaring expression
of the internalisation of exceptionalism among the neocolonial elites…
By imposing the GEAR (Growth, Employment, and Redistribution) Program in
the early years of independence, the elites reinforced an already
existing structural adjustment program. Thus the new ruling class
re-entrenched the apartheid systems and relationships of white control
over the economy, with blacks now occupying the political terrain. Not
much else changed... Neocolonial elites frantically entered into
alliances with all sorts of configurations of white and multinational
capital and used the neocolonial state to ensure the emergence of a
black ruling class that is still largely situated in the environs of
state-based institutions.
Much of the original labour force for mining came from the region, as
Samir Amin explained in his (2019) posthumous autobiography:
South Africa, freed from odious apartheid, is now confronted with a
truly formidable challenge: how to go beyond the facade of multiracial
democracy to transform society profoundly? The choices of the ANC
government have, up to now, evaded the question and, as a result,
nothing has changed. South Africa’s subimperialist role has been
reinforced, still dominated as it is by the Anglo-American
mining monopolies.
One military thinktank, Stratfor (known as a ‘private-sector CIA’),
explained a broader logic in a confidential 2009 report obtained by
WikiLeaks:
South Africa’s geopolitical imperatives are grounded in a hundred odd
years of expansion and conquest occurring during the 19th century. These
continue to drive the country’s internal behaviour and its relations
with neighbouring and foreign states… Despite being led by a
democratically-elected government, the core imperatives of South Africa
remain: maintenance of a liberal regime that permits the free flow of
labour and capital to and from the southern Africa region, and
maintenance of a superior security capability able to project into
south-central Africa…
South Africa still depends on an abundant and freely flowing supply of
labour migrating from neighbouring states to service its labour
requirements. South African produced goods are exported into the
southern African region. South African mining houses both large and
small still dominate the mining sector of southern and central
Africa…the ANC government knows that it can bring its influence to bear
to present South African companies favourably to gain mining concessions…
Pretoria will intervene in a neighbouring state should the free flow of
labour into South Africa be disrupted. It will intervene in case a
critical supply of infrastructure is impeded (such was the case of the
supply of water… from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project during
Lesotho’s near-civil war in 1998). Pretoria will strong-arm negotiations
with neighbouring states in order to extract best possible commercial
concessions.
*Applying the concept of subimperialism to the BRICS*
The BRICS member economies became a major force within global capitalism
by the time the bloc expanded in the early 2010s, followed by further
2023-25 expansions and the creation of a new category, ‘partner.’
With the rise of the BRICS as a formal bloc, especially with South
Africa’s membership in 2010, Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros (2013) recognised
a new set of contradictions. The internationalisation of production has
continued to differentiate the South among peripheries,
semi-peripheries, and now ‘emerging’ semi-peripheries. One of the key
questions is what role do semi-peripheries, and especially the
‘emerging’ ones, play in the system. Semi-peripheries have in the past
been seen as systemic safety-valves, by which monopoly capital
outsources its production to areas with cheaper labour and natural
resources…
The most precious proxy, then as today, was Israel, but there were other
important ones, like Brazil, where the phenomenon was termed
‘subimperialism,’ that is, an attempt to go beyond semi-peripheral
conveyor-belt functions. The term called attention to a new
contradiction, not only between peripheries and semi-peripheries, but
also between centres and the emerging semi-peripheries of the time,
regardless of their ideological orientation (Brazil was under a
right-wing dictatorship). The concrete result today is a new wave of
natural resource grabs and new military interventions in the
peripheries, accompanied by the demise of social pacts in the centres of
the system…
The term also called attention to the fact that whatever emergence
occurred under monopoly capitalism, and its financial and technological
domination, it could only be based on the super-exploitation of domestic
labour (not the social pacts characterising the centres of imperialism).
It was this internal relation that intensified external dependence,
creating the need for export markets for semi-peripheral manufactures
and exertion of regional political- military influence, so as to resolve
its chronic profit realisation crisis. The subsequent ‘reconversion’ of
semi-peripheries generally has produced contradictory effects, whereby a
process of privatisation, enhanced extroversion, and de- nationalisation
has accentuated internal class conflicts, but also led to the formation
of new giant blocs of domestic capitals, which are once again vying for
a place in the sun. They are no longer simply looking to export
manufactures but also capital.
The ‘re-emerging’ semi-peripheries are even engaged in the ‘new
scramble’ for land and natural resources in Africa. Of course, they are
also being scrambled, which is no paradox, given their persisting
incorporation into external monopolies. The question has been raised as
to whether the newly ‘emerging’ semi-peripheries are essentially
subservient regional stabilisers, or a force antagonistic to
imperialism. Some have argued that the collective emergence of these
semi-peripheries implies a system-changing diversification of economic
partners in the South…
We can pin our hopes neither on the newly shining bourgeoisies nor on
inexorable historical laws. The immediate question is political, and it
concerns the type of alliances that are necessary to oppose imperialism,
especially as it escalates its military project. Thus, we should also be
asking: are all emerging semi-peripheries equally subservient or
antagonistic to imperialism?...
The degree of participation in the Western military project is also
different from one case to the next, although a ‘schizophrenia’ – one
might say typical of subimperialism – is inherent to all this.
Ironically, the most reconverted state, South Africa, has signed up to a
regional mutual defense pact, effectively against Western military
interference in Southern Africa, while continuing to serve as a conveyor
belt for Western economic interests on the continent… Whatever one makes
of the new semi-peripheries, they are certainly not the main agents of
imperialism, nor are they militarising their foreign policies. Nor, for
that matter, are they cohesive nations internally, given the ongoing
super-exploitation on which their extroversion is based.
To ensure the reproduction of the broader system, /The Economist/
reflected on neoliberal assimilation in a 2014 interview with Barack Obama:
The Economist: You see countries like China creating a BRICS bank, for
instance – institutions that seem to be parallel with the system, rather
– and potentially putting pressure on the system rather than adding to
it and strengthening it. That is the key issue, whether China ends up
inside that system or challenging it. That’s the really big issue of our
times, I think.
Obama: It is. And I think it’s important for the United States and
Europe to continue to welcome China as a full partner in these
international norms. It’s important for us to recognise that there are
going to be times where there are tensions and conflicts. But I think
those are manageable. And it’s my belief that as China shifts its
economy away from simply being the low-cost manufacturer of the world to
wanting to move up the value chain, then suddenly issues like protecting
intellectual property (IP) become more relevant to their companies, not
just to US companies.
Obama was right. The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic broke the BRICS: Cyril
Ramaphosa and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi advocated an IP waiver
within the WTO; Jair Bolsonaro was against it; Xi Jinping and Vladimir
Putin had their own vaccines, so did not co-sponsor.
Gorden Moyo (2024) argues that there are other aspects of this
schizophrenia:
The emergent and emerging economies including Brazil, Russia, India,
Turkiye, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and China, among
others, are competing for Africa’s natural resources, markets, and
military bases just like the France, Germany, the UK, and the USA have
been doing for several decades. Perhaps the biblical analogy of ‘wolves
in sheep skin’ may not be off the mark as an appropriate descriptor for
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and other
emerging economies in Africa. Their claim to be alternatives to Africa’s
ex-colonisers is questionable. Bond is right in describing the BRICS as
subimperial powers that ‘talk left but walk right.’ In fact, the BRICS
are loud in their anti-imperialist rhetoric while behaving like typical
global capitalists in their business and commercial transactions. What
must be emphasised from the outset is that the BRICS… have not so far
contributed towards the change of the historical locus of Africa as an
enabler of development in the rest of the world through its commodity
exports, capital flight, and human capital. Contrary to the growing
literature that celebrates the rise and re-rise of the BRICS+ countries,
the arguments contained in this volume cast doubt on the capability of,
or willingness of, these new powers to reverse the unequal relations
between Africa and the rest of the world… the traditional Euro-Western
powers and the BRICS club deploy similar geoeconomic tools, namely,
debt, data, grants, investment, technology, and trade, to extract
benefits from Africa and elsewhere in the Global South.
The profound contradictions within the BRICS along ideological and
material lines became explicit in February 2026, when a split was
formalised between Washington-alignment and Tehran-solidarity,
especially after the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran. One feature was the
‘Board of Peace’ which, on the one hand, witnessed Egypt, Indonesia,
Saudi Arabia and the UAE join Trump to recolonise Gaza, with India also
attending as an observer.
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