Sheldon Cooper of *The Big Bang Theory *justifies his claim always to be right thus: "If I were wrong I would know it!"
Am Sonntag, 8. März 2015 02:25:40 UTC+1 schrieb frantheman: > > What a wonderful overview, Neil! I envy your capacity to cook down the > huge amount of controversy involving epistemology, sociology, ideology, > modernism and post-modernism into a few comprehensible paragraphs. > > > > Personally, I find myself suspended between the kind of modernism proposed > by Habermas and the various post-modernist critiques of it. Not always an > easy (or consistent) position, I'm trying to figure out a way to construct > a hammock on the basis of this suspension which allows me to comfortably > swing from one to the other as I please. And didn't someone once comment > that consistency is the privilege of small minds? > > > > If critical theory has established anything, it's that the old > metaphysical arguments about ontology and "das Ding in sich" are just a > waste of time. We can't ultimately get out of our skins; our knowledge is > *human *knowledge, worked out and communicated in *human *terms, and as > such it will always have a cultural and societal framework. Such frameworks > are dynamic, interacting with each other, growing, changing ... organic > really - which is no wonder, given that humans are organic beings. "Pure" > rationality is a chimera, because as humans we can only think in human > categories. Should we ever encounter aliens, I suspect that the > intercommunication would be difficult, frustrating and endlessly > fascinating, because they might very well structure their thinking > according to other categories (that's why they can travel faster than > light, by the way, their way of doing logic doesn't see the problem of *e=mc2 > – *they just take the interdimensional back-way through their granny’s > garden. That is if we don’t kill them first, or they run away from us in > horror to call the inter-stellar exterminators to come and deal with us > because we’re not fit to be let loose on civilized galactic society). And, > of course, one of the major – perhaps *the *major characteristic of the > inevitable human context of our knowledge is language. > > > > Habermas is wonderfully attractive in his appeal for reasonable and > reasoned discourse on societal issues - this conviction that it is possible > through dialogue and mutual understanding to reach conclusions which will > actually make things better. In the end, of course, he's a good > old-fashioned bourgeois liberal who believes in "progress". The problem > with him is that he is convinced that his position (and the post-WWII > western German society in which he lived in, and which he has worked on > forming all his adult life) is the *superior *position (as I said before > - typical German philosopher). I become ever more suspicious of people who > *know *that they're right - and that everyone else is consequently less > right - or to put it more bluntly, *wrong.* > > > > This is where the post-modernists gleefully point their fingers at him. > Denying others absolute truth, he implicitly and pragmatically claims it > for himself. (It’s also why he can’t stand them!) On the other hand, the > various post-modernist *turns *run the risk (and are repeatedly accused) > of falling into complete *laissez-faire *multi-culti, anything-goes > relativism. If our truth-values – to which our moral values belong – are > societally, historically and culturally conditioned, what right do I have > to claim my moral values are better than yours? Weren’t the niggers better > off as slaves on the plantation, being looked after by a kind and > paternalistic massa, than being condemned to living a constant life of > danger, deprivation, drugs and depression in some run-down project in > contemporary decrepit Detroit? Or let’s not even bother with spurious > justifications, let’s go all the way to social Darwinism; the strong do as > they will, and the weak suffer as they must. As it was in the beginning, is > now, and ever shall be, world without end, Amen. > > > > So, at the moment, this is where I find myself intellectually at the > moment, gently swinging in my hammock between these two positions. > Descartes may have found his answer to doubt in his own affirmation of his > self-cognitive rationality (though Dan Dennett > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_Explained> believes he can > define this out of existence), but it’s still a big step to the conviction > of the ultimate *rightness *of the particular positions one espouses. > Maybe the recognition of the conditionality of our own premises, and the > openness to the possibility of their correctibility – while not > automatically offering them up as being completely conjectural and relative > - is the real prerequisite for meaningful discourse. Or as Oliver Cromwell > (normally not someone over-inclined to questioning his own righteousness) > once asked the Assembly of the Church of Scotland, “I beseech you, in the > bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken!” Of course, that > still leaves the question open; how can you even begin to discuss with > people who *know *they’re right? > > > Am Samstag, 7. März 2015 12:54:02 UTC+1 schrieb archytas: > > Good to see you too Don. I'm not much into the nuances of translation > stuff, partly because I lack Gabby's skills and Francis' patience. There > are many versions of Chris' 'make the language simple enough for > translation' angle - one here is called the 'Crystal Method' and is taught > to our bullshit bureaucrats, so they can confuse us with smaller words. We > scientists got the 'Fog Index', screwed as soon as you use an equation or > start talking about attribution tests and extreme value analysis. > > I see another kind of 'translation'. Habermas is actually quite easy > compared with other Germans like Gunter Ludwig on how scientific theories > come about. Russell and Whitehead wrote three volumes on why one and one > make two and, eventually, were wrong. Things get relative when we try to > ground stuff in origin (I was told to remove the word 'stuff' from my > thesis as it was too common a word). I translate this complex social stuff > into a long line of philosophical effort. > > There is no 'start' or 'origin'. If I mention the pre-Socratics and > the pyrrhonists, I know they were much influenced from Persia and India. > They at least knew argument can nearly always be made in several different > ways that are very difficult to choose between. One gets a line from this > stuff to Descartes and that 'I am thinking therefore I am' stuff - I'm more > of an I woke up and am still here bloke. Socrates and Bacon more or less > said public opinion ain't worth shit and Descartes continued this in > radical doubt, supposedly grounded on not being able to deny one's own > presence. Actually, there being thoughts does not imply a thinker, and if > you doubt everything you are, in fact, doubting nothing and have made doubt > into something that can't ground itself. Wittgenstein eventually says we > have been arguing over the same terrain for centuries, not resolved > anything and thus must be bewitched by the language we are using. So we > should know more about language. > > This turns into what we now call social epistemology, away from the > individual introspective sole thinker to something more social. Marx is a > classic example and the discipline of sociology. One can split this in > many ways, though the standard differences are as follows: > " The classical approach could be realized in at least two forms. One > would emphasize the traditional epistemic goal of acquiring true beliefs. > It would study social practices in terms of their impact on the > truth-values of agents' beliefs. A second version of the classical approach > would focus on the epistemic goal of having justified or rational beliefs. > Applied to the social realm, it might concentrate, for example, on when a > cognitive agent is justified or warranted in accepting the statements and > opinions of others. Proponents of the anti-classical approach have little > or no use for concepts like truth and justification. In addressing the > social dimensions of knowledge, they understand "knowledge" as simply what > is believed, or what beliefs are "institutionalized" in this or that > community, culture, or context. They seek to identify the social forces and > influences responsible for knowledge production so conceived. Social > epistemology is theoretically significant because of the central role of > society in the knowledge-forming process. It also has practical importance > because of its possible role in the redesign of information-related social > institutions." > > Karl Marx's theory of ideology could well be considered a type of social > epistemology. On one interpretation of Marx's conception of "ideology", an > ideology is a set of beliefs, a world-view, or a form of consciousness that > is in some fashion false or delusive. The cause of these beliefs, and > perhaps of their delusiveness, is the social situation and interests of the > believers. Since the theory of ideology, so described, is concerned with > the truth and falsity of beliefs, it might even be considered a form of > classical social epistemology. > Karl Mannheim (1936) extended Marx's theory of ideology into a sociology > of knowledge. He classed forms of consciousness as ideological when the > thoughts of a social group can be traced to the group's social situation or > "life conditions". Critical theory aims at emancipation and enlightenment > by making agents aware of hidden coercion in their environment, enabling > them to determine where their true interests lie. Beliefs that agents would > agree upon in the ideal speech situation are ipso facto true beliefs > (Habermas and Luhmann 1971: 139, 224). Here a social communicational device > is treated as a type of epistemic standard. > Habermas, Jurgen and Luhmann, Niklas (1971), Theorie der Gesellschaft oder > Sozialtechnologie – Was Leistet die Systemforschung? Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. > > I could easily extend this to a book so tedious that Francis would be > smashing windows rather than cleaning them. I have read loads of this > stuff, only to conclude the mechanisms involved more or less avoid the > human condition. In the 1930s, Ludwik Fleck (1896–1961), a Polish-Jewish > microbiologist, developed the first system of the historical philosophy and > sociology of science. Fleck claimed that cognition is a collective > activity, since it is only possible on the basis of a certain body of > knowledge acquired from other people. When people begin to exchange ideas, > a thought collective arises, bonded by a specific mood, and as a result of > a series of understandings and misunderstandings a peculiar thought style > is developed. When a thought style becomes sufficiently sophisticated, the > collective divides itself into an esoteric circle (professionals) and an > exoteric circle (laymen). A thought style consists of the active elements, > which shape ways in which members of the collective see and think about the > world, and of the passive elements, the sum of which is perceived as an > “objective reality”. What we call “facts”, are social constructs: only what > is true to culture is true to nature. Thought styles are often > incommensurable: what is a fact to the members of a thought collective A > sometimes does not exist to the members of a thought collective B, and a > thought that is significant and true to the members of A may sometimes be > false or meaningless for members of B. > > The story goes on and on. Most people get more or less no chance to learn > any of it. Fleck's ideas in brief are in“Crisis in Science. Towards a Free > and More Human Science”, in R. S. Cohen and Th. Schnelle (eds.), 1986, pp. > 153–158. > > One of the big questions is how we can translate much of this into > something that translates to quick understanding and doesn't lead to a > bunch of Guardians replacing current control as in Soviet Paradise or > neo-liberalism under the US military umbrella. > > > On Saturday, March 7, 2015 at 7:06:31 AM UTC, Don Johnson wrote: > > Very much enjoying the commentary. Gabby, I have read that the divide > between what is classical-liberalism and modern-liberalism in the States > began during FDR's administration. Campiagn speeches by Hoover and > Roosevelt were both peppered with classical-liberal rhetoric. Indeed, there > was some competition to see who would be the most fiscally conservative. > FDR won. Then came the New Deal and unprecedented goverment spending and > involvement in everyday life. Thus changing the public's view on what > "liberalism" was all about. Now we have a neoclassical liberalism called > Libertarianism. It will be interesting to see how this will be perverted in > the decades to come as no doubt it will be if we ever get a President > elected on this ticket. > > Nice to see the old crew at it again. > > dj > > > On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 7:03 PM, frantheman <[email protected]> wrote: > > Habermas is fine with "herrschaftsfreier Diskurs" as long as he has the > "Herrschaft"! :-) > > I came at Habermas sideways this semester; I was doing pretty intensive > work on the historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans-Ulrich_Wehler>, in particular his > monumental five-volume *Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1770-1989*, and you > can't work on Wehler without having to look at Habermas. The two of them > met as kids in the Hitler-Jugend in Gummersbach, where Habermas was > Wehler's *Gruppenführer*, and remained friends and close associates all > their lives - coming to each other's defence in many of those vicious > intellectual fights German academics are so fond of (e.g. the Sonderweg > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonderweg> discussion, or the > Historikerstreit <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historikerstreit>). > > Both Habermas and Wehler are proponents of what is called in German the > *bürgerliche > Gesellschaft*. To come back to a major theme of this thread, this is a > term which it is very difficult to accurately translate into English > without losing much of its meaning in German and adding things in English > which are not there in German. There is, in fact, no real English word for > *bürgerlich*; conventionally the French term *bourgeois *is used. But > *bourgeois > *has many negative connotations in English (particularly since the 60s, > when it was almost exclusively used in a pejorative Marxist sense) - > *bürgerlich > *is used in German in a much more varied, and often matter-of-fact > fashion. "Middle class" could also be used, but that's a term that can also > be problematic. "Civil society" also captures some of its meaning in a more > neutral sense. When I use the term "liberal democracy," or "western > liberalism" in English, I think the German translation for what I am trying > to describe is *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*. And when I speak of "New Deal, > social-democratic, open, liberal (in the true sense) democracy," it's > basically an attempt to describe what German much more concisely calls > *soziale > Marktwirtschaft*. > > Translation is difficult, because languages both define and are defined by > culture. What's the German for leadership? *Führung. *So what's the > German for leader? *Führer. *But because of German history, there are > major difficulties with using that word, particularly in a German context. > In English there's no problem with calling Angela Merkel the "German > leader." But *deutsche Führer *or *Führerin? *Good luck with that > one! Or, taking a feminist turn - the most common German translation for > authority (in the sense of *power/control*) is *Herrschaft. *How about > *Frau-schaft? > *Or even *Frau schafft*! > > Language is tricky - translation even more so. > > Am Mittwoch, 4. März 2015 23:16:47 UTC+1 schrieb Gabby: > > Much as I would like to see it, I find myself despairing more and more > over the possibility of the kind of decent rational discourse Chris is > pleading for. > > > Hm? Chris was pleading for you and Habermas is pleading for > "herrschaftsfreier Diskurs", so not all hope is lost. ;) > > *Western liberalism *is the concept that I find needs further > problematization. This is what I would see you working on. I am often > astounded how differently the idea of "liberal" is taken in English > speaking countries. > > 2015-03-04 17:55 GMT+01:00 frantheman <[email protected]>: > > One of my professors has suggested that I do a research paper next > semester on the reception of Habermas' thinking about society in the > English-speaking (academic) world, Neil. I'm internally resisting because I > find him so long-winded, obtuse, boring, and self-important (a typical > German academic in other words). I can think of about a hundred things I'd > rather do than immerse myself in his writings - like cleaning the windows > in my flat for instance. > > Fundamentally, Habermas is also a typical German philosopher (like > Leibnitz and Hegel) in that he believes he lives in the best possible world > - that of centre-left North European liberal democracy (though, should he > in his dotage find the way to this group, he would probably deny this and > condemn us all from his self-appointed position as the doyen of German > ivory-tower intellectuals). I would argue that there may have been a moment > when he was perhaps partially right, but this moment has gone. > > In a longer historical context of the past 250 years, there was a moment > when the rationalist liberal bourgeois spirit seemed to be reaching some > kind of fruition in the West - between the end of WWII and the beginning of > the 80s. Then came Reagan, Thatcher, and the religious orthodoxy of > neo-liberal economics and the moment was lost. What I believe happened was > that the old (and some new) elites had finally recovered enough power over > the basic decency of New Deal, social-democratic, open, liberal (in the > true sense) democracy to once more rearrange things to their own maximised > benefit. This is the central point made by Piketty in *Capital in the > Twenty-First Century. *No wonder he has been so viciously attacked by > various acolytes of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy. Since then, Habermas' > "unfinished project" of western liberalism has been continuously - and > purposely - unravelled, often leaving the forms intact while killing the > living substance. > > Much as I would like to see it, I find myself despairing more and more > over the possibility of the kind of decent rational discourse Chris is > pleading for. It's possible - sometimes - in microcosmic areas like this > forum (though even here it can be easily sabotaged). There's one way of > telling the narrative of the history of ideas in the past 250 years which > goes like this: Once upon a time there was a dream of rational and reasoned > discourse. It was called the Enlightenment. It soon became tainted by the > virus of Romanticism and it turned into Modernity, which came with lots of > unpleasant features like nationalism and fascism. It has now almost > completely disappeared, constantly castigated by braying apologists of > nationalist, ideological, or religious certainty before ultimately drowning > in a sea of triviality. > > Of course, that's only one way of telling the story. I don't think I'd > like to live in a platonic republic ruled by philosopher-kings and > Robespierre, Saint-Just, and the Committee of Public Safety justified the > Terror with an appeal to Reason. As humans we are more than just our > rationality. This is what makes real communication so difficult - but also > so rich and fascinating. What we need, perhaps, is less certainty and > self-righteousness, more decency, respect, and listening. > > On Wednesday, March 4, 2015 at 10:10:37 AM UTC+1, archytas wrote: > > Interesting dictionaries Gabby. You actually sound a bit like Luhmann in > this tense and grammar version. We could send all our messages to you in > order to get the genuine and objective version of whatever we meant to say, > though I'm sure you might resist the censorship implications of the new > Gabbledegook. Understanding transitions from sensual to intellectual and > various aspects of nuance has long been part of racist and classist > presupposition in intelligence. > > The verstehen problematic includes the idea that we should not expect to > treat language in our theoretical expectations, as 'naive' participants > have their own assumptions and hypotheses of which researchers themselves > may be ignorant. One thus goes for more 'ethno' approaches such as > ethnomethodology. The literature is generally boring, not unlike > dictionaries. I suppose we enter the learning hoping to stand on the > shoulders of giants, but few enter these educational processes on a > voluntary basis. Science, with its objective outcomes, should be easy to > teach, yet is not. In Chris' 'strip the language for easy interpretation' > terms, what could be easier than teaching people simple standardisation > like "measuring a meniscus"? You can demonstrate the doing to explain the > word and necessary actions. Now send the little dears off to do some > titration. Simples! Yet much gets in the way even of this kind of simple > instruction. Many kids aren't even considered fit to enter the laboratory > and, indeed, even fit to have such simple pointed instruments as a compass > to learn a bit of geometry (owing to stabbings, self-harm and so on). > > Gabby's spin is a delight, even if I get a vision of her standing with two > feet in a rabbit hole, and was waiting for the barb at the end, which came > here with a smile. AI can catch these patterns. Most of us in this game > have noticed we are after machine intelligence because we despair of the > glib internet world Francis describes.and that defeasible logic loses all > beauty contests with Chris holding up a craft beer. The despair on human > rationality and the libidinal biologically bound trivial is a motivator, > perhaps once found in science cutting out the Idols Gabby has an undeclared > better version of she has forgotten, in trying to get machines to do what > humans have always failed at - argument properly informed by Reason and > 'big data' approaches not constrained to selling us another planet-burning > widget. One thing I think we have been very bad at is grasping frames of > ideology, including why people generally act in them. This was the big > theme in both Luhmann and Habermas, who did nothing on how we might live > without the violence of poverty and needing to make livings. There is no > grasp of Gabby as the existential cash girl she described herself as. One > can model all of us in fuzzy sets on such lines, not unlike her idea of the > trace of people's histories to the 'moment'. Socrates was described by his > wife as a good-looking waster, not much good at putting food on the family > table and helping with childcare. We neglect what argument is and why > anyone else would want to listen to it. The dogs watch me, concerned only > that I finish and enter their rationality of being off the lead along the > riverbank. > > There is an old joke about standing in something on both feet. This is a > punishment in hell, standing in excrement up to one's neck. This, of > course, is for the tea break. One spends the rest of the day standing on > one's hands. > > > On Wednesday, March 4, 2015 at 12:54:25 AM UTC, Gabby wrote: > > What a question, Francis! Here is basically everything you can get about > "verstehen" in ist linguistic context: > > http://www.dwds.de/?view=1&qu=verstehen > > I guess you are interested in the tipping point when the sensuous meaning > "I am standing in this with both my feet" transgressed to the field where > it became an expression for the process of intellectual comprehension: > > in-stân besagt 'in einem gegenstande stehen, fuszen, zuhause sein', > under-standen, under-stân 'dazwischen d. h. mitten darin stehen'. wenn nun > noch, ob auch ganz vereinzelt, ein nhd. bestehen (th. 1, 1672) in demselben > sinne gebraucht wird, so würde es die anschauung vertreten 'einen > gegenstand umstehen, bestehen, in seiner gewalt haben' (ahd. bi-standan > vgl. umbi-: griech. ἀμφι-). von diesem ausgangspunkte läszt sich der > übergang von dem sinnlichen auf das geistige gebiet verstehen, wie uns die > ähnlich entwickelten bildungen be-greifen und ver-nehmen noch heute > semasiologisch durchsichtig sind. > > > > You can also see what the "ver"-prefix can do and has done to the root > words and vice versa: http://www.dwds.de/?view=1&qu=ver > > > And to do something "aus Versehen" would be an example of how an educated > Minds Eyer would justify their mistake. ;) > > 2015-03-03 18:56 GMT+01:00 frantheman <[email protected]>: > > I and I sometimes overstand. Sometimes don't! And does *ver-stehen *have > the same relationship to standing as *sich vertun *has to doing? > > On Tuesday, March 3, 2015 at 6:36:22 PM UTC+1, Gabby wrote: > > Cheers Francis! > > Schonhaltung or schon Haltung. The break makes the difference. And your > medical knowledge bridges the gap. > > Actually "overs", short form of "overstand", was my initial key word that > got me looking deeper/higher into language construction long time ago. I > was deeply impressed by what I had learned about Jamaican itations and > Rastafari poltitical poetry. In your case the ability to do religious > contextualization of language items certainly helps when studying > Kulturwissenschaften. Viel Erfolg! > > 2015-03-03 17:15 GMT+01:00 frantheman <[email protected]>: > > I'm still here - in some sense anyway. More passive, thoughtful, watching, > listening and thinking. As they say on Facebook; it's complicated. There's > such a volume of *stuff *out on the web now that I find my reluctance to > contribute to it growing ever stronger in the past years. Do I have > anything to say that thousands are others aren't saying? Is any attempt we > make to say something not drowned out in a cacophony of of puppies, > selfies, mindless chatter and incivility? In a world where significance > seems to have become dependent on reduction to a viral hash-tagged tweet, > or a five-second video on Vine, what happens to depth, complexity, the > possibility of real interaction? Has communication finally reduced itself > to atomic brevity and superficiality? Otherwise - tl;dr. > > "There is always an easy solution to every human problem -- neat, > plausible, and wrong." What Menken actually said was a little different; > "Explanations exist; they have existed for all time; there is always a > well-known solution to every human problem — neat, plausible, and wrong" > (*The > Divine Afflatus*, 1917). Even within the same language quotational drift > occurs. Interpretative drift is a constitutive element of discourse. Our > communication is always a hit-and-miss thing, or maybe, better, a > constantly creative process. What you say, what I understand. Each of us > culturally in our own particular place, but sharing enough to bring some > kind of communication into being - a wonderful, organic, continually > self-creating kind of thing, with all sorts of levels, eddies, > side-effects. An orchestral symphonic symbolic performance of memes and > tropes. And that's just when it's carried out between people who "share" a > common language. > > Accurate, one-to-one translation/conveyance of meaning is impossible; even > between two speakers of the same language. Communication becomes something > else, something independent. The German theorist, Niklas Luhmann > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niklas_Luhmann>, has some interesting ideas > in this area. It's a deeply counter-intuitive way of seeing things - and > useful as an instrument to challenge one's own assumptions, even if you > don't go all the way with him. > > Nobody - as far as I know - has translated Luhmann's major works from > German into English. Understandably - it's hard enough trying to figure out > what exactly he's saying in one language without trying to express it in > another, and when you move to his discussions and arguments with Habermas > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J%C3%BCrgen_Habermas> (another German > master of the complicated obtuse) ... forgeddaboudit! > > Though translation programmes have improved in the past decade, they're > still a long way from being good. Because "meaning"/"sense" is always > contextual (human subjective contextual), therefore always fluid and > shifting. This is more than just "fuzzy logic." I suspect we will need > genuine AI as the basis of operating systems to make them really work. Two > people from different lingusitic backrounds with very limited vocabularies > can communicate better - agree that they have achieved some kind of > understanding - than a programme which has access to comprehensive > dictionaries. > > For the past months I've been formally studying - in the academic sense - > in German. *Kulturwissenschaft *at that. It's a weird experience - > there's stuff I can understand better in English, other stuff works better > in German. There isn't even a good translation of the subject I'm doing my > Masters in. A literal English translation of *Kulturwissenschaft *would > be "cultural science" but English academia generally calls it "cultural > studies." Which, when you think about it, means something else. Well, it's > a post-modernist phenomenon anyway, which, arguably, allows one to be > multidimensional with reference to meaning! > > And sometimes it can be enormously productive to take an ordinary, > everyday word in a particular language and twist it, mine it, pummel it, > *rape > *it, alienate it. Poets do this all the time. Sometimes even academics (a > pretty mediocre lot for the most part) manage it. > > ... -- --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups ""Minds Eye"" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
