For us women this is what we are typically confronted with and have developed various work-arounds. We fear the divorce solicitor for she is telling us how we have built our belief system on trusting our feelings.
Am Sonntag, 8. März 2015 schrieb frantheman : > Sheldon Cooper of *The Big Bang Theory *justifies his claim always to be > right thus: "If I were wrong I would know it!" > > Am Sonntag, 8. März 2015 02:25:40 UTC+1 schrieb frantheman: >> >> What a wonderful overview, Neil! I envy your capacity to cook down the >> huge amount of controversy involving epistemology, sociology, ideology, >> modernism and post-modernism into a few comprehensible paragraphs. >> >> >> >> Personally, I find myself suspended between the kind of modernism >> proposed by Habermas and the various post-modernist critiques of it. Not >> always an easy (or consistent) position, I'm trying to figure out a way to >> construct a hammock on the basis of this suspension which allows me to >> comfortably swing from one to the other as I please. And didn't someone >> once comment that consistency is the privilege of small minds? >> >> >> >> If critical theory has established anything, it's that the old >> metaphysical arguments about ontology and "das Ding in sich" are just a >> waste of time. We can't ultimately get out of our skins; our knowledge is >> *human *knowledge, worked out and communicated in *human *terms, and as >> such it will always have a cultural and societal framework. Such frameworks >> are dynamic, interacting with each other, growing, changing ... organic >> really - which is no wonder, given that humans are organic beings. "Pure" >> rationality is a chimera, because as humans we can only think in human >> categories. Should we ever encounter aliens, I suspect that the >> intercommunication would be difficult, frustrating and endlessly >> fascinating, because they might very well structure their thinking >> according to other categories (that's why they can travel faster than >> light, by the way, their way of doing logic doesn't see the problem of *e=mc2 >> – *they just take the interdimensional back-way through their granny’s >> garden. That is if we don’t kill them first, or they run away from us in >> horror to call the inter-stellar exterminators to come and deal with us >> because we’re not fit to be let loose on civilized galactic society). And, >> of course, one of the major – perhaps *the *major characteristic of the >> inevitable human context of our knowledge is language. >> >> >> >> Habermas is wonderfully attractive in his appeal for reasonable and >> reasoned discourse on societal issues - this conviction that it is possible >> through dialogue and mutual understanding to reach conclusions which will >> actually make things better. In the end, of course, he's a good >> old-fashioned bourgeois liberal who believes in "progress". The problem >> with him is that he is convinced that his position (and the post-WWII >> western German society in which he lived in, and which he has worked on >> forming all his adult life) is the *superior *position (as I said before >> - typical German philosopher). I become ever more suspicious of people who >> *know *that they're right - and that everyone else is consequently less >> right - or to put it more bluntly, *wrong.* >> >> >> >> This is where the post-modernists gleefully point their fingers at him. >> Denying others absolute truth, he implicitly and pragmatically claims it >> for himself. (It’s also why he can’t stand them!) On the other hand, the >> various post-modernist *turns *run the risk (and are repeatedly accused) >> of falling into complete *laissez-faire *multi-culti, anything-goes >> relativism. If our truth-values – to which our moral values belong – are >> societally, historically and culturally conditioned, what right do I have >> to claim my moral values are better than yours? Weren’t the niggers better >> off as slaves on the plantation, being looked after by a kind and >> paternalistic massa, than being condemned to living a constant life of >> danger, deprivation, drugs and depression in some run-down project in >> contemporary decrepit Detroit? Or let’s not even bother with spurious >> justifications, let’s go all the way to social Darwinism; the strong do as >> they will, and the weak suffer as they must. As it was in the beginning, is >> now, and ever shall be, world without end, Amen. >> >> >> >> So, at the moment, this is where I find myself intellectually at the >> moment, gently swinging in my hammock between these two positions. >> Descartes may have found his answer to doubt in his own affirmation of his >> self-cognitive rationality (though Dan Dennett >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_Explained> believes he can >> define this out of existence), but it’s still a big step to the conviction >> of the ultimate *rightness *of the particular positions one espouses. >> Maybe the recognition of the conditionality of our own premises, and the >> openness to the possibility of their correctibility – while not >> automatically offering them up as being completely conjectural and relative >> - is the real prerequisite for meaningful discourse. Or as Oliver Cromwell >> (normally not someone over-inclined to questioning his own righteousness) >> once asked the Assembly of the Church of Scotland, “I beseech you, in the >> bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken!” Of course, that >> still leaves the question open; how can you even begin to discuss with >> people who *know *they’re right? >> >> >> Am Samstag, 7. März 2015 12:54:02 UTC+1 schrieb archytas: >> >> Good to see you too Don. I'm not much into the nuances of translation >> stuff, partly because I lack Gabby's skills and Francis' patience. There >> are many versions of Chris' 'make the language simple enough for >> translation' angle - one here is called the 'Crystal Method' and is taught >> to our bullshit bureaucrats, so they can confuse us with smaller words. We >> scientists got the 'Fog Index', screwed as soon as you use an equation or >> start talking about attribution tests and extreme value analysis. >> >> I see another kind of 'translation'. Habermas is actually quite easy >> compared with other Germans like Gunter Ludwig on how scientific theories >> come about. Russell and Whitehead wrote three volumes on why one and one >> make two and, eventually, were wrong. Things get relative when we try to >> ground stuff in origin (I was told to remove the word 'stuff' from my >> thesis as it was too common a word). I translate this complex social stuff >> into a long line of philosophical effort. >> >> There is no 'start' or 'origin'. If I mention the pre-Socratics and >> the pyrrhonists, I know they were much influenced from Persia and India. >> They at least knew argument can nearly always be made in several different >> ways that are very difficult to choose between. One gets a line from this >> stuff to Descartes and that 'I am thinking therefore I am' stuff - I'm more >> of an I woke up and am still here bloke. Socrates and Bacon more or less >> said public opinion ain't worth shit and Descartes continued this in >> radical doubt, supposedly grounded on not being able to deny one's own >> presence. Actually, there being thoughts does not imply a thinker, and if >> you doubt everything you are, in fact, doubting nothing and have made doubt >> into something that can't ground itself. Wittgenstein eventually says we >> have been arguing over the same terrain for centuries, not resolved >> anything and thus must be bewitched by the language we are using. So we >> should know more about language. >> >> This turns into what we now call social epistemology, away from the >> individual introspective sole thinker to something more social. Marx is a >> classic example and the discipline of sociology. One can split this in >> many ways, though the standard differences are as follows: >> " The classical approach could be realized in at least two forms. One >> would emphasize the traditional epistemic goal of acquiring true beliefs. >> It would study social practices in terms of their impact on the >> truth-values of agents' beliefs. A second version of the classical approach >> would focus on the epistemic goal of having justified or rational beliefs. >> Applied to the social realm, it might concentrate, for example, on when a >> cognitive agent is justified or warranted in accepting the statements and >> opinions of others. Proponents of the anti-classical approach have little >> or no use for concepts like truth and justification. In addressing the >> social dimensions of knowledge, they understand "knowledge" as simply what >> is believed, or what beliefs are "institutionalized" in this or that >> community, culture, or context. They seek to identify the social forces and >> influences responsible for knowledge production so conceived. Social >> epistemology is theoretically significant because of the central role of >> society in the knowledge-forming process. It also has practical importance >> because of its possible role in the redesign of information-related social >> institutions." >> >> Karl Marx's theory of ideology could well be considered a type of social >> epistemology. On one interpretation of Marx's conception of "ideology", an >> ideology is a set of beliefs, a world-view, or a form of consciousness that >> is in some fashion false or delusive. The cause of these beliefs, and >> perhaps of their delusiveness, is the social situation and interests of the >> believers. Since the theory of ideology, so described, is concerned with >> the truth and falsity of beliefs, it might even be considered a form of >> classical social epistemology. >> Karl Mannheim (1936) extended Marx's theory of ideology into a sociology >> of knowledge. He classed forms of consciousness as ideological when the >> thoughts of a social group can be traced to the group's social situation or >> "life conditions". Critical theory aims at emancipation and enlightenment >> by making agents aware of hidden coercion in their environment, enabling >> them to determine where their true interests lie. Beliefs that agents would >> agree upon in the ideal speech situation are ipso facto true beliefs >> (Habermas and Luhmann 1971: 139, 224). Here a social communicational device >> is treated as a type of epistemic standard. >> Habermas, Jurgen and Luhmann, Niklas (1971), Theorie der Gesellschaft >> oder Sozialtechnologie – Was Leistet die Systemforschung? Frankfurt: >> Suhrkamp. >> >> I could easily extend this to a book so tedious that Francis would be >> smashing windows rather than cleaning them. I have read loads of this >> stuff, only to conclude the mechanisms involved more or less avoid the >> human condition. In the 1930s, Ludwik Fleck (1896–1961), a Polish-Jewish >> microbiologist, developed the first system of the historical philosophy and >> sociology of science. Fleck claimed that cognition is a collective >> activity, since it is only possible on the basis of a certain body of >> knowledge acquired from other people. When people begin to exchange ideas, >> a thought collective arises, bonded by a specific mood, and as a result of >> a series of understandings and misunderstandings a peculiar thought style >> is developed. When a thought style becomes sufficiently sophisticated, the >> collective divides itself into an esoteric circle (professionals) and an >> exoteric circle (laymen). A thought style consists of the active elements, >> which shape ways in which members of the collective see and think about the >> world, and of the passive elements, the sum of which is perceived as an >> “objective reality”. What we call “facts”, are social constructs: only what >> is true to culture is true to nature. Thought styles are often >> incommensurable: what is a fact to the members of a thought collective A >> sometimes does not exist to the members of a thought collective B, and a >> thought that is significant and true to the members of A may sometimes be >> false or meaningless for members of B. >> >> The story goes on and on. Most people get more or less no chance to >> learn any of it. Fleck's ideas in brief are in“Crisis in Science. Towards >> a Free and More Human Science”, in R. S. Cohen and Th. Schnelle (eds.), >> 1986, pp. 153–158. >> >> One of the big questions is how we can translate much of this into >> something that translates to quick understanding and doesn't lead to a >> bunch of Guardians replacing current control as in Soviet Paradise or >> neo-liberalism under the US military umbrella. >> >> >> On Saturday, March 7, 2015 at 7:06:31 AM UTC, Don Johnson wrote: >> >> Very much enjoying the commentary. Gabby, I have read that the divide >> between what is classical-liberalism and modern-liberalism in the States >> began during FDR's administration. Campiagn speeches by Hoover and >> Roosevelt were both peppered with classical-liberal rhetoric. Indeed, there >> was some competition to see who would be the most fiscally conservative. >> FDR won. Then came the New Deal and unprecedented goverment spending and >> involvement in everyday life. Thus changing the public's view on what >> "liberalism" was all about. Now we have a neoclassical liberalism called >> Libertarianism. It will be interesting to see how this will be perverted in >> the decades to come as no doubt it will be if we ever get a President >> elected on this ticket. >> >> Nice to see the old crew at it again. >> >> dj >> >> >> On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 7:03 PM, frantheman <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Habermas is fine with "herrschaftsfreier Diskurs" as long as he has the >> "Herrschaft"! :-) >> >> I came at Habermas sideways this semester; I was doing pretty intensive >> work on the historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans-Ulrich_Wehler>, in particular his >> monumental five-volume *Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1770-1989*, and you >> can't work on Wehler without having to look at Habermas. The two of them >> met as kids in the Hitler-Jugend in Gummersbach, where Habermas was >> Wehler's *Gruppenführer*, and remained friends and close associates all >> their lives - coming to each other's defence in many of those vicious >> intellectual fights German academics are so fond of (e.g. the Sonderweg >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonderweg> discussion, or the >> Historikerstreit <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historikerstreit>). >> >> Both Habermas and Wehler are proponents of what is called in German the >> *bürgerliche >> Gesellschaft*. To come back to a major theme of this thread, this is a >> term which it is very difficult to accurately translate into English >> without losing much of its meaning in German and adding things in English >> which are not there in German. There is, in fact, no real English word for >> *bürgerlich*; conventionally the French term *bourgeois *is used. But >> *bourgeois >> *has many negative connotations in English (particularly since the 60s, >> when it was almost exclusively used in a pejorative Marxist sense) - >> *bürgerlich >> *is used in German in a much more varied, and often matter-of-fact >> fashion. "Middle class" could also be used, but that's a term that can also >> be problematic. "Civil society" also captures some of its meaning in a more >> neutral sense. When I use the term "liberal democracy," or "western >> liberalism" in English, I think the German translation for what I am trying >> to describe is *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*. And when I speak of "New >> Deal, social-democratic, open, liberal (in the true sense) democracy," it's >> basically an attempt to describe what German much more concisely calls >> *soziale >> Marktwirtschaft*. >> >> Translation is difficult, because languages both define and are defined >> by culture. What's the German for leadership? *Führung. *So what's the >> German for leader? *Führer. *But because of German history, there are >> major difficulties with using that word, particularly in a German context. >> In English there's no problem with calling Angela Merkel the "German >> leader." But *deutsche Führer *or *Führerin? *Good luck with that >> one! Or, taking a feminist turn - the most common German translation for >> authority (in the sense of *power/control*) is *Herrschaft. *How about >> *Frau-schaft? >> *Or even *Frau schafft*! >> >> Language is tricky - translation even more so. >> >> Am Mittwoch, 4. März 2015 23:16:47 UTC+1 schrieb Gabby: >> >> Much as I would like to see it, I find myself despairing more and more >> over the possibility of the kind of decent rational discourse Chris is >> pleading for. >> >> >> Hm? Chris was pleading for you and Habermas is pleading for >> "herrschaftsfreier Diskurs", so not all hope is lost. ;) >> >> *Western liberalism *is the concept that I find needs further >> problematization. This is what I would see you working on. I am often >> astounded how differently the idea of "liberal" is taken in English >> speaking countries. >> >> 2015-03-04 17:55 GMT+01:00 frantheman <[email protected]>: >> >> One of my professors has suggested that I do a research paper next >> semester on the reception of Habermas' thinking about society in the >> English-speaking (academic) world, Neil. I'm internally resisting because I >> find him so long-winded, obtuse, boring, and self-important (a typical >> German academic in other words). I can think of about a hundred things I'd >> rather do than immerse myself in his writings - like cleaning the windows >> in my flat for instance. >> >> Fundamentally, Habermas is also a typical German philosopher (like >> Leibnitz and Hegel) in that he believes he lives in the best possible world >> - that of centre-left North European liberal democracy (though, should he >> in his dotage find the way to this group, he would probably deny this and >> condemn us all from his self-appointed position as the doyen of German >> ivory-tower intellectuals). I would argue that there may have been a moment >> when he was perhaps partially right, but this moment has gone. >> >> In a longer historical context of the past 250 years, there was a moment >> when the rationalist liberal bourgeois spirit seemed to be reaching some >> kind of fruition in the West - between the end of WWII and the beginning of >> the 80s. Then came Reagan, Thatcher, and the religious orthodoxy of >> neo-liberal economics and the moment was lost. What I believe happened was >> that the old (and some new) elites had finally recovered enough power over >> the basic decency of New Deal, social-democratic, open, liberal (in the >> true sense) democracy to once more rearrange things to their own maximised >> benefit. This is the central point made by Piketty in *Capital in the >> Twenty-First Century. *No wonder he has been so viciously attacked by >> various acolytes of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy. Since then, Habermas' >> "unfinished project" of western liberalism has been continuously - and >> purposely - unravelled, often leaving the forms intact while killing the >> living substance. >> >> Much as I would like to see it, I find myself despairing more and more >> over the possibility of the kind of decent rational discourse Chris is >> pleading for. It's possible - sometimes - in microcosmic areas like this >> forum (though even here it can be easily sabotaged). There's one way of >> telling the narrative of the history of ideas in the past 250 years which >> goes like this: Once upon a time there was a dream of rational and reasoned >> discourse. It was called the Enlightenment. It soon became tainted by the >> virus of Romanticism and it turned into Modernity, which came with lots of >> unpleasant features like nationalism and fascism. It has now almost >> completely disappeared, constantly castigated by braying apologists of >> nationalist, ideological, or religious certainty before ultimately drowning >> in a sea of triviality. >> >> Of course, that's only one way of telling the story. I don't think I'd >> like to live in a platonic republic ruled by philosopher-kings and >> Robespierre, Saint-Just, and the Committee of Public Safety justified the >> Terror with an appeal to Reason. As humans we are more than just our >> rationality. This is what makes real communication so difficult - but also >> so rich and fascinating. What we need, perhaps, is less certainty and >> self-righteousness, more decency, respect, and listening. >> >> On Wednesday, March 4, 2015 at 10:10:37 AM UTC+1, archytas wrote: >> >> Interesting dictionaries Gabby. You actually sound a bit like Luhmann in >> this tense and grammar version. We could send all our messages to you in >> order to get the genuine and objective version of whatever we meant to say, >> though I'm sure you might resist the censorship implications of the new >> Gabbledegook. Understanding transitions from sensual to intellectual and >> various aspects of nuance has long been part of racist and classist >> presupposition in intelligence. >> >> The verstehen problematic includes the idea that we should not expect to >> treat language in our theoretical expectations, as 'naive' participants >> have their own assumptions and hypotheses of which researchers themselves >> may be ignorant. One thus goes for more 'ethno' approaches such as >> ethnomethodology. The literature is generally boring, not unlike >> dictionaries. I suppose we enter the learning hoping to stand on the >> shoulders of giants, but few enter these educational processes on a >> voluntary basis. Science, with its objective outcomes, should be easy to >> teach, yet is not. In Chris' 'strip the language for easy interpretation' >> terms, what could be easier than teaching people simple standardisation >> like "measuring a meniscus"? You can demonstrate the doing to explain the >> word and necessary actions. Now send the little dears off to do some >> titration. Simples! Yet much gets in the way even of this kind of simple >> instruction. Many kids aren't even considered fit to enter the laboratory >> and, indeed, even fit to have such simple pointed instruments as a compass >> to learn a bit of geometry (owing to stabbings, self-harm and so on). >> >> Gabby's spin is a delight, even if I get a vision of her standing with >> two feet in a rabbit hole, and was waiting for the barb at the end, which >> came here with a smile. AI can catch these patterns. Most of us in this >> game have noticed we are after machine intelligence because we despair of >> the glib internet world Francis describes.and that defeasible logic loses >> all beauty contests with Chris holding up a craft beer. The despair on >> human rationality and the libidinal biologically bound trivial is a >> motivator, perhaps once found in science cutting out the Idols Gabby has an >> undeclared better version of she has forgotten, in trying to get machines >> to do what humans have always failed at - argument properly informed by >> Reason and 'big data' approaches not constrained to selling us another >> planet-burning widget. One thing I think we have been very bad at is >> grasping frames of ideology, including why people generally act in them. >> This was the big theme in both Luhmann and Habermas, who did nothing on how >> we might live without the violence of poverty and needing to make livings. >> There is no grasp of Gabby as the existential cash girl she described >> herself as. One can model all of us in fuzzy sets on such lines, not >> unlike her idea of the trace of people's histories to the 'moment'. >> Socrates was described by his wife as a good-looking waster, not much good >> at putting food on the family table and helping with childcare. We neglect >> what argument is and why anyone else would want to listen to it. The dogs >> watch me, concerned only that I finish and enter their rationality of being >> off the lead along the riverbank. >> >> There is an old joke about standing in something on both feet. This is a >> punishment in hell, standing in excrement up to one's neck. This, of >> course, is for the tea break. One spends the rest of the day standing on >> one's hands. >> >> >> On Wednesday, March 4, 2015 at 12:54:25 AM UTC, Gabby wrote: >> >> What a question, Francis! Here is basically everything you can get about >> "verstehen" in ist linguistic context: >> >> http://www.dwds.de/?view=1&qu=verstehen >> >> I guess you are interested in the tipping point when the sensuous >> meaning "I am standing in this with both my feet" transgressed to the field >> where it became an expression for the process of intellectual comprehension: >> >> in-stân besagt 'in einem gegenstande stehen, fuszen, zuhause sein', >> under-standen, under-stân 'dazwischen d. h. mitten darin stehen'. wenn nun >> noch, ob auch ganz vereinzelt, ein nhd. bestehen (th. 1, 1672) in demselben >> sinne gebraucht wird, so würde es die anschauung vertreten 'einen >> gegenstand umstehen, bestehen, in seiner gewalt haben' (ahd. bi-standan >> vgl. umbi-: griech. ἀμφι-). von diesem ausgangspunkte läszt sich der >> übergang von dem sinnlichen auf das geistige gebiet verstehen, wie uns die >> ähnlich entwickelten bildungen be-greifen und ver-nehmen noch heute >> semasiologisch durchsichtig sind. >> >> >> >> You can also see what the "ver"-prefix can do and has done to the root >> words and vice versa: http://www.dwds.de/?view=1&qu=ver >> >> >> And to do something "aus Versehen" would be an example of how an educated >> Minds Eyer would justify their mistake. ;) >> >> 2015-03-03 18:56 GMT+01:00 frantheman <[email protected]>: >> >> I and I sometimes overstand. Sometimes don't! And does *ver-stehen *have >> the same relationship to standing as *sich vertun *has to doing? >> >> On Tuesday, March 3, 2015 at 6:36:22 PM UTC+1, Gabby wrote: >> >> Cheers Francis! >> >> Schonhaltung or schon Haltung. The break makes the difference. And your >> medical knowledge bridges the gap. >> >> Actually "overs", short form of "overstand", was my initial key word that >> got me looking deeper/higher into language construction long time ago. I >> was deeply impressed by what I had learned about Jamaican itations and >> Rastafari poltitical poetry. In your case the ability to do religious >> contextualization of language items certainly helps when studying >> Kulturwissenschaften. Viel Erfolg! >> >> 2015-03-03 17:15 GMT+01:00 frantheman <[email protected]>: >> >> I'm still here - in some sense anyway. More passive, thoughtful, >> watching, listening and thinking. As they say on Facebook; it's >> complicated. There's such a volume of *stuff *out on the web now that I >> find my reluctance to contribute to it growing ever stronger in the past >> years. Do I have anything to say that thousands are others aren't saying? >> Is any attempt we make to say something not drowned out in a cacophony of >> of puppies, selfies, mindless chatter and incivility? In a world where >> significance seems to have become dependent on reduction to a viral >> hash-tagged tweet, or a five-second video on Vine, what happens to depth, >> complexity, the possibility of real interaction? Has communication finally >> reduced itself to atomic brevity and superficiality? Otherwise - tl;dr. >> >> "There is always an easy solution to every human problem -- neat, >> plausible, and wrong." What Menken actually said was a little different; >> "Explanations exist; they have existed for all time; there is always a >> well-known solution to every human problem — neat, plausible, and wrong" >> (*The >> Divine Afflatus*, 1917). Even within the same language quotational drift >> occurs. Interpretative drift is a constitutive element of discourse. Our >> communication is always a hit-and-miss thing, or maybe, better, a >> constantly creative process. What you say, what I understand. Each of us >> culturally in our own particular place, but sharing enough to bring some >> kind of communication into being - a wonderful, organic, continually >> self-creating kind of thing, with all sorts of levels, eddies, >> side-effects. An orchestral symphonic symbolic performance of memes and >> tropes. And that's just when it's carried out between people who "share" a >> common language. >> >> Accurate, one-to-one translation/conveyance of meaning is impossible; >> even between two speakers of the same language. Communication becomes >> something else, something independent. The German theorist, Niklas >> Luhmann <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niklas_Luhmann>, has some >> interesting ideas in this area. It's a deeply counter-intuitive way of >> seeing things - and useful as an instrument to challenge one's own >> assumptions, even if you don't go all the way with him. >> >> Nobody - as far as I know - has translated Luhmann's major works from >> German into English. Understandably - it's hard enough trying to figure out >> what exactly he's saying in one language without trying to express it in >> another, and when you move to his discussions and arguments with Habermas >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J%C3%BCrgen_Habermas> (another German >> master of the complicated obtuse) ... forgeddaboudit! >> >> Though translation programmes have improved in the past decade, they're >> still a long way from being good. Because "meaning"/"sense" is always >> contextual (human subjective contextual), therefore always fluid and >> shifting. This is more than just "fuzzy logic." I suspect we will need >> genuine AI as the basis of operating systems to make them really work. Two >> people from different lingusitic backrounds with very limited vocabularies >> can communicate better - agree that they have achieved some kind of >> understanding - than a programme which has access to comprehensive >> dictionaries. >> >> For the past months I've been formally studying - in the academic sense - >> in German. *Kulturwissenschaft *at that. It's a weird experience - >> there's stuff I can understand better in English, other stuff works better >> in German. There isn't even a good translation of the subject I'm doing my >> Masters in. A literal English translation of *Kulturwissenschaft *would >> be "cultural science" but English academia generally calls it "cultural >> studies." Which, when you think about it, means something else. Well, it's >> a post-modernist phenomenon anyway, which, arguably, allows one to be >> multidimensional with reference to meaning! >> >> And sometimes it can be enormously productive to take an ordinary, >> everyday word in a particular language and twist it, mine it, pummel it, >> *rape >> *it, alienate it. Poets do this all the time. Sometimes even academics >> (a pretty mediocre lot for the most part) manage it. >> >> ... > > -- > > --- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups ""Minds Eye"" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/minds-eye/wo_ToDMnO4s/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','minds-eye%[email protected]');> > . > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups ""Minds Eye"" group. 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