Warrington won today Francis - still gives me a lift, though the game is trivial. I know you are a man of action old friend. I was once Chair of the Textiles Institute special interest group on personnel and yawn easily on mention of thread. Shall I treat you to the link between statistical work on yarn snapping and climate change? Definitely a yawn yarn to most. Attribution studies and on to extreme value analysis.
The academic game has many flaws, yet can still be a place free of the tour of instruments of torture. I remember being in an exam board that had just decided to fail a student called Tony. He was a fairly heavy drug user and Hell's Angel - nice enough guy. I had to protest on the grounds he was the only candidate who had got the answer right. He hadn't done the linear program and his answer was a sketch on one side of A4. The linear program couldn't give an answer in real world conditions, whereas Tony's system did. It was a '12 Angry Men' situation and everyone hated me for bringing them around to my point of view, which was that failing our brightest student on the grounds of thinking for himself and getting the right answer was miserably pathetic. Actual business history is pretty much a no no in managerial teaching. The history of Microsoft and Apple starts in entrepreneurial garages, not the years of military research and who got privileged to develop it commercially. The American writer Steve Fraser is quite good at pointing to the State in so-called US free trade. In Britain we might examine the Indian and now Afghan drug trade and the money trails, the abolition of slavery and vast payments to the owners, trackable to the likes of the Cameron family. The non-neutrality of money-capital is fascinating, though one must forget this to teach economics as though no human interests are involved. There are some old seminary tales related to this concerning what the public can be allowed to know. There are many comforts in scholarship, not unlike the thrill of finding the bad guys and bringing them to book - yet also tinged with the realization much worse than one is allowed to investigate is present. Quite how we come to be existential wage-serfs and allow global arbitrage to play us off one against the other, and what libidinal economy might be behind this is a fascinating study. Not much training for the world of bullshit jobs though. And not without irony when one considers the use of The Road to Serfdom by vile neo-liberalism and neo-classical economics. The world, needing big answers, is chronically petty. Yet big solutions are often fascist, the most petty ideology of all. Science blundered into the atom and destructive energy we were otherwise shielded from. We have no fusion reactor, just 'better' bombs and probably light-speed weaponry. Biology now allows us to remove harmful elements through techniques like the three parent baby (removing problems in mitochondrial DNA) - we select eggs without obvious disability problems for fertilisation - yet moral problems remain. Epistemologies can have tolerance built-in, yet will still reach points of decision on what is the best option. My own view now is that much argument takes place by excluding notions of data - and it is very difficult to pin down what data is. Is Habermas 'theoretical' and Piketty 'empirical'? I can advance some pretty complex arguments on empirical adequacy, but for now would say the evidence for Habermas is more or less all around us and Piketty is restricted to a few old archives. The assertion that we must be empirical generally comes from people who cannot explain what this means and are unaware how they have come to theoretically construct the assertion. I came across the social model of disability years ago. I don't see it as a viable model for disability, though get the point. It makes a great deal of sense in terms of wider society and how a few disable so many others. What is not present in our vapid, cooing newsrooms seems good data on this. Economics with no idea how much work needs doing and the planet can support would be data in an analysis of the disabling of rationality. Gabby is now barred from career progression as this ends at 45 for women (newsroom droning in background). But what is such career progress anyway - to become the Director responsible for not investigating child sexual abuse? I'm reading David Graeber's 'The Utopia of Rules: on technology, stupidity and the secret joys of bureaucracy' at the moment, solely to get some relief from GabbyAllanGate. The academy still offers similar relief from three of Bacon's main Idols, though one is on stage in the Idol of the Theatre. At least one is guaranteed some reasonable feedback, which partly comes from the literature itself and someone bothered to articulate her protocols of experience. Chris' point is lost in translation here. I would prescribe a week drinking with Geordies, who sound like Scots with their heads bashed in. I never understand a word, but seem to fit in. Habermas translates to technological solutions, odd as he had it that technology is ideology. This would involve the removal of the allocation class, positive money, new forms of work not forced on us by poverty fears-reality and the embodiment of expert knowledge in machines. Religion creeps in here, as this would be a jubilee event on debt and debt peonage. We might even be able to move on from 'another brick in the wall' education and economics as war by other means. Meanwhile, Dan Sperber writes on how argument actually prevents argument. Part of the data here is most people can't even hack what is on offer in schools or that social epistemology is telling them they live in delusion. On Monday, March 9, 2015 at 2:34:26 AM UTC, frantheman wrote: > > Don't worry, Neil, I haven't sold out and swallowed the academic bait with > hook, line and sinker! There is, as you often and rightly point out, an > immense amount of waffle in the whole academic business, frequently > clothing platitudes, or very small ideas in pages of obfusticating > gobbledegook, all of it referenced with hundreds of footnotes to show > everyone how clever and diligent you are. > > But, as I mentioned earlier, I have - after a break of nearly 30 years - > once more formally engaged with the academic world, and am just finishing > the first semester of a Masters programme in cultural studies. However I'm > fortunate that I have no great ambitions to make a career out of it, nor am > I compelled to do so. I still work at an honest job to make a living, > though I have been able to cut down my working hours to the extent that I > now get by with doing eight night-shifts per month, looking after four > chronically seriously ill children. - - > > - - (short pause in writing this to detach a seven year hellion from her > respirator and monitor so that she can go to the bathroom, followed by a > discussion in sign-language (she's deaf), making it clear to her that she > must go back to sleep as it's only two thirty in the morning and she has to > go to school tomorrow. She may have many health issues, but for all that > she's a typical seven year old, with an infinite capacity for negotiation > about stuff she doesn't feel like doing) - - > > - - Furthermore, I am immensely fortunate to live in a country where third > level education - at state universities (and the *Fernuniversität Hagen > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FernUniversit%C3%A4t_Hagen> *is a fully > recognised state university on the Open University model) is nearly > completely free - it costs me € 300 per semester ... read it and weep, > American readers! Now that my daughters are independently earning their own > living,I've no one to look after except myself, which makes it all > financially possible without having to go into horrific debt or live on > bread and water in an unheated garret. > > Cultural Studies is an unusual beast. It was invented around thirty to > forty years ago by Literature Departments to stave off their widely > perceived danger of drifting into terminal irrelevance and extinction. In > Hagen it's organised jointly by the (German) Literature Department and the > History Department (which identifies strongly with a sociological approach > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bielefeld_School> to history and regards > Max Weber as being only marginally inferior to God). As someone embarking > on this intellectual journey, I do feel a certain need to try to identify > my own particular standpoint with respect to all the diverse > intellectual/academic directions, currents, schools and outlooks which one > encounters in this area. All the more so as the specific subject of the > Masters programme glories in the title "European Modernity." Sort of, > "everything you wanted to know about the past two hundred and fifty years > but were afraid to ask ... or answer." > > The more I read in this whole area, the more I find myself being > stimulated and excited by the various *turns *in postmodernist thinking. > Lyotard's scepticism regarding metanarratives (which you mentioned) echoes > with me, as does a lot of stuff that Frederic Jameson writes - his analyses > of particular works of modern architecture are great. Of course there's an > awful lot of pretentious academic wanking around too, but at the moment I'm > still at the stage of enjoying having my mind and concepts extended. If > only there weren't such annoying things such as exams and reaserch papers > (I'm currently trying to finish one on the protoindustrial development of > the textile industry in the Duchy of Berg > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bergisches_Land> from 1700 to 1820 ... > yawn!), but that's the price I have to pay for getting formally involved in > the academic business once more. > > Of course I'm not going to save the world with any of this, but there is a > great feeling of liberation in studying just for fun. And I can now once > more officially regard myself as a student, which means I don't have to get > up early in the morning if I don't feel like it. And maybe do all kinds of > other mad stuff ... > > Am Sonntag, 8. März 2015 13:07:42 UTC+1 schrieb archytas: > > I suppose the collected works of Habermas and Luhmann would be about the > size of a big wardrobe. I am not a believer, though find Habermas very > tempting, "Descartes" (thought of in a long line that might include Molly > and Orn) is about the pursuit of truth and this continues in social > epistemology, dropping the solus ipse to a considerable extent - we > certainly no longer hew to rigid introspectionism - though we can ask 'did > we ever'? Molly and Orn don't work as people like that, though stand up > well as examples of people trying for something I have deep respect for > (there are some key epistemic issues in this - resolvable I think in terms > of people who want peace and justice). > > "Whereas Descartes thought that truth should be pursued only by the proper > conduct of "reason," specifically, the doxastic agent's own reason, social > epistemology acknowledges what everyone except a radical skeptic will > admit, namely, that quests for truth are commonly influenced, for better or > for worse, by institutional arrangements that massively affect what > doxastic agents hear (or fail to hear) from others. To maximize prospects > for successful pursuits of truth, this variable cannot sensibly be > neglected." > > This paragraph could do with some Chris-style 'stripping for translation'! > Doxastic agents! It is surely 'bleedin' obvious' we are people of > cultures. At risk of Gabby's wrath, I will mention again these cultures > are Bacon's Idols. Feminism is a good example of a social epistemology in > bringing out the male domination of control fraud knowledge. > > The message, eventually, after reading several wardrobes,, is that we are > largely being being had through culturally transmitted control frauds. The > questions really concern how we could do something better and how we can > tell people they are being conned (a very difficult matter). Debates on > epistemology that people can't understand, framed in academic ways of > making livings, involving complex literacy and numeracy, hardly form > anything easily translatable - the ways of making academic livings also > control frauds. > > If one looks at a small area like forensic science, where on might assume > well understood science would produce easily translatable facts, we get a > lot of human corruption. The proper function of forensic science is to > extract the truth. This function, unfortunately, is not well served by > current practice. Saks et al. (2001: 28) write: "As it is practised today, > forensic science does not extract the truth reliably. Forensic science > expert evidence that is erroneous (that is, honest mistakes) and fraudulent > (deliberate misrepresentation) has been found to be one of the major > causes, and perhaps the leading cause, of erroneous convictions of innocent > persons." One rogue scientist engaged in rampant falsification for 15 > years, and another faked more than 100 autopsies on unexamined bodies and > falsified dozens of toxicology and blood reports (Kelly and Wearne 1998; > Koppl 2006, Other Internet Resources). Shocking cases are found in more > than one country. > > Kelly, J. F. and Wearne, P. (1998), Tainting Evidence: Inside the Scandals > at the FBI Crime Lab, New York: The Free Press. > Koppl, Roger (2005), "Epistemic Systems," Episteme: A Journal of Social > Epistemology, 2 (2): 91–106. > > We are affected by this in very practical ways. My contention is most of > the problems could be brought to obvious light. We are 'allowed' the > epistemological, but not practical action. Francis' hammock is in the > right place, the metaphor replete with the quiescence involved in framing > oneself as an academic (which Francis obviously isn't in the best sense I > can mean that). I once 'fitted up' a paedophile for other crimes - he had > committed them, so technically it wasn't a fit up. The institutional and > legal barriers were too big to fight and still are. It got him off the > streets for a couple of years, though he continued after release. Ugly Ray > Terret has just been retrospectively convicted and given 25 years. One > might think we could address the issues of social epistemology through > practical examples everyone can grasp. Indeed, Kopl tries. Yet the > ideologies of soaked-up knowledge, various COWDUNGS (conventional wisdoms > of dominant groups) make this an act of heretic courage. There are still > people who can't take the idea that, say, if born in the Muslim world they > would be Muslim. > > In the West we are dominated by neo-liberalism and economic blather. Even > if we vote to change this, as the Greeks just have, what can any > politicians do confronted with the 'smoke filled rooms' they enter off the > corridors of power with warnings that anything other than austerity will > lead to disaster? Economics is largely a lie through which dominance is > exerted and the West (now largely under the US military umbrella) 'stays > ahead' - and who sensibly would not want this shield against even worse > domination from elsewhere? > > There have been people talking about positive money, democratic foreign > policy and radical democracy for more than 100 years. Yet in politics we > get to vote for main parties making jawbs-groaf promises within > neo-liberalism, corrupt banking and utterly false notions on how growth is > achieved and what it should be. The real dialogue is made invisible, and > Francis' hammock, if right in immanent academic consideration, is part of > bearing witness before the crash. I'm not suggesting Francis is doing this > > We need to think global and beyond. Yet look what globalisation has done > so far and what we fear leaders will do whatever they spout. > > On Sunday, March 8, 2015 at 2:35:19 AM UTC, frantheman wrote: > > Sheldon Cooper of *The Big Bang Theory *justifies his claim always to be > right thus: "If I were wrong I would know it!" > > Am Sonntag, 8. März 2015 02:25:40 UTC+1 schrieb frantheman: > > What a wonderful overview, Neil! I envy your capacity to cook down the > huge amount of controversy involving epistemology, sociology, ideology, > modernism and post-modernism into a few comprehensible paragraphs. > > > > Personally, I find myself suspended between the kind of modernism proposed > by Habermas and the various post-modernist critiques of it. Not always an > easy (or consistent) position, I'm trying to figure out a way to construct > a hammock on the basis of this suspension which allows me to comfortably > swing from one to the other as I please. And didn't someone once comment > that consistency is the privilege of small minds? > > > > If critical theory has established anything, it's that the old > metaphysical arguments about ontology and "das Ding in sich" are just a > waste of time. We can't ultimately get out of our skins; our knowledge is > *human *knowledge, worked out and communicated in *human *terms, and as > such it will always have a cultural and societal framework. Such frameworks > are dynamic, interacting with each other, growing, changing ... organic > really - which is no wonder, given that humans are organic beings. "Pure" > rationality is a chimera, because as humans we can only think in human > categories. Should we ever encounter aliens, I suspect that the > intercommunication would be difficult, frustrating and endlessly > fascinating, because they might very well structure their thinking > according to other categories (that's why they can travel faster than > light, by the way, their way of doing logic doesn't see the problem of *e=mc2 > – *they just take the interdimensional back-way through their granny’s > garden. That is if we don’t kill them first, or they run away from us in > horror to call the inter-stellar exterminators to come and deal with us > because we’re not fit to be let loose on civilized galactic society). And, > of course, one of the major – perhaps *the *major characteristic of the > inevitable human context of our knowledge is language. > > > > Habermas is wonderfully attractive in his appeal for reasonable and > reasoned discourse on societal issues - this conviction that it is possible > through dialogue and mutual understanding to reach conclusions which will > actually make things better. In the end, of course, he's a good > old-fashioned bourgeois liberal who believes in "progress". The problem > with him is that he is convinced that his position (and the post-WWII > western German society in which he lived in, and which he has worked on > forming all his adult life) is the *superior *position (as I said before > - typical German philosopher). I become ever more suspicious of people who > *know *that they're right - and that everyone else is consequently less > right - or to put it more bluntly, *wrong.* > > > > This is where the post-modernists gleefully point their fingers at him. > Denying others absolute truth, he implicitly and pragmatically claims it > for himself. (It’s also why he can’t stand them!) On the other hand, the > various post-modernist *turns *run the risk (and are repeatedly accused) > of falling into complete *laissez-faire *multi-culti, anything-goes > relativism. If our truth-values – to which our moral values belong – are > societally, historically and culturally conditioned, what right do I have > to claim my moral values are better than yours? Weren’t the niggers better > off as slaves on the plantation, being looked after by a kind and > paternalistic massa, than being condemned to living a constant life of > danger, deprivation, drugs and depression in some run-down project in > contemporary decrepit Detroit? Or let’s not even bother with spurious > justifications, let’s go all the way to social Darwinism; the strong do as > they will, and the weak suffer as they must. As it was in the beginning, is > now, and ever shall be, world without end, Amen. > > > > So, at the moment, this is where I find myself intellectually at the > moment, gently swinging in my hammock between these two positions. > Descartes may have found his answer to doubt in his own affirmation of his > self-cognitive rationality (though Dan Dennett > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_Explained> believes he can > define this out of existence), but it’s still a big step to the conviction > of the ultimate *rightness *of the particular positions one espouses. > Maybe the recognition of the conditionality of our own premises, and the > openness to the possibility of their correctibility – while not > automatically offering them up as being completely conjectural and relative > - is the real prerequisite for meaningful discourse. Or as Oliver Cromwell > (normally not someone over-inclined to questioning his own righteousness) > once asked the Assembly of the Church of Scotland, “I beseech you, in the > bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken!” Of course, that > still leaves the question open; how can you even begin to discuss with > people who *know *they’re right? > > > Am Samstag, 7. März 2015 12:54:02 UTC+1 schrieb archytas: > > Good to see you too Don. I'm not much into the nuances of translation > stuff, partly because I lack Gabby's skills and Francis' patience. There > are many versions of Chris' 'make the language simple enough for > translation' angle - one here is called the 'Crystal Method' and is taught > to our bullshit bureaucrats, so they can confuse us with smaller words. We > scientists got the 'Fog Index', screwed as soon as you use an equation or > start talking about attribution tests and extreme value analysis. > > I see another kind of 'translation'. Habermas is actually quite easy > compared with other Germans like Gunter Ludwig on how scientific theories > come about. Russell and Whitehead wrote three volumes on why one and one > make two and, eventually, were wrong. Things get relative when we try to > ground stuff in origin (I was told to remove the word 'stuff' from my > thesis as it was too common a word). I translate this complex social stuff > into a long line of philosophical effort. > > There is no 'start' or 'origin'. If I mention the pre-Socratics and > the pyrrhonists, I know they were much influenced from Persia and India. > They at least knew argument can nearly always be made in several different > ways that are very difficult to choose between. One gets a line from this > stuff to Descartes and that 'I am thinking therefore I am' stuff - I'm more > of an I woke up and am still here bloke. Socrates and Bacon more or less > said public opinion ain't worth shit and Descartes continued this in > radical doubt, supposedly grounded on not being able to deny one's own > presence. Actually, there being thoughts does not imply a thinker, and if > you doubt everything you are, in fact, doubting nothing and have made doubt > into something that can't ground itself. Wittgenstein eventually says we > have been arguing over the same terrain for centuries, not resolved > anything and thus must be bewitched by the language we are using. So we > should know more about language. > > This turns into what we now call social epistemology, away from the > individual introspective sole thinker to something more social. Marx is a > classic example and the discipline of sociology. One can split this in > many ways, though the standard differences are as follows: > " The classical approach could be realized in at least two forms. One > would emphasize the traditional epistemic goal of acquiring true beliefs. > It would study social practices in terms of their impact on the > truth-values of agents' beliefs. A second version of the classical approach > would focus on the epistemic goal of having justified or rational beliefs. > Applied to the social realm, it might concentrate, for example, on when a > cognitive agent is justified or warranted in accepting the statements and > opinions of others. Proponents of the anti-classical approach have little > or no use for concepts like truth and justification. In addressing the > social dimensions of knowledge, they understand "knowledge" as simply what > is believed, or what beliefs are "institutionalized" in this or that > community, culture, or context. They seek to identify the social forces and > influences responsible for knowledge production so conceived. Social > epistemology is theoretically significant because of the central role of > society in the knowledge-forming process. It also has practical importance > because of its possible role in the redesign of information-related social > institutions." > > Karl Marx's theory of ideology could well be considered a type of social > epistemology. On one interpretation of Marx's conception of "ideology", an > ideology is a set of beliefs, a world-view, or a form of consciousness that > is in some fashion false or delusive. The cause of these beliefs, and > perhaps of their delusiveness, is the social situation and interests of the > believers. Since the theory of ideology, so described, is concerned with > the truth and falsity of beliefs, it might even be considered a form of > classical social epistemology. > Karl Mannheim (1936) extended Marx's theory of ideology into a sociology > of knowledge. He classed forms of consciousness as ideological when the > thoughts of a social group can be traced to the group's social situation or > "life conditions". Critical theory aims at emancipation and enlightenment > by making agents aware of hidden coercion in their environment, enabling > them to determine where their true interests lie. Beliefs that agents would > agree upon in the ideal speech situation are ipso facto true beliefs > (Habermas and Luhmann 1971: 139, 224). Here a social communicational device > is treated as a type of epistemic standard. > Habermas, Jurgen and Luhmann, Niklas (1971), Theorie der Gesellschaft oder > Sozialtechnologie – Was Leistet die Systemforschung? Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. > > I could easily extend this to a book so tedious that Francis would be > smashing windows rather than cleaning them. I have read loads of this > stuff, only to conclude the mechanisms involved more or less avoid the > human condition. In the 1930s, Ludwik Fleck (1896–1961), a Polish-Jewish > microbiologist, developed the first system of the historical philosophy and > sociology of science. Fleck claimed that cognition is a collective > activity, since it is only possible on the basis of a certain body of > knowledge acquired from other people. When people begin to exchange ideas, > a thought collective arises, bonded by a specific mood, and as a result of > a series of understandings and misunderstandings a peculiar thought style > is developed. When a thought style becomes sufficiently sophisticated, the > collective divides itself into an esoteric circle (professionals) and an > exoteric circle (laymen). A thought style consists of the active elements, > which shape ways in which members of the collective see and think about the > world, and of the passive elements, the sum of which is perceived as an > “objective reality”. What we call “facts”, are social constructs: only what > is true to culture is true to nature. Thought styles are often > incommensurable: what is a fact to the members of a thought collective A > sometimes does not exist to the members of a thought collective B, and a > thought that is significant and true to the members of A may sometimes be > false or meaningless for members of B. > > The story goes on and on. Most people get more or less no chance to learn > any of it. Fleck's ideas in brief are in“Crisis in Science. Towards a Free > and More Human Science”, in R. S. Cohen and Th. Schnelle (eds.), 1986, pp. > 153–158. > > One of the big questions is how we can translate much of this into > something that translates to quick understanding and doesn't lead to a > bunch of Guardians replacing current control as in Soviet Paradise or > neo-liberalism under the US military umbrella. > > > On Saturday, March 7, 2015 at 7:06:31 AM UTC, Don Johnson wrote: > > Very much enjoying the commentary. Gabby, I have read that the divide > between what is classical-liberalism and modern-liberalism in the States > began during FDR's administration. Campiagn speeches by Hoover and > Roosevelt were both peppered with classical-liberal rhetoric. Indeed, there > was some competition to see who would be the most fiscally conservative. > FDR won. Then came the New Deal and unprecedented goverment spending and > involvement in everyday life. Thus changing the public's view on what > "liberalism" was all about. Now we have a neoclassical liberalism called > Libertarianism. It will be interesting to see how this will be perverted in > the decades to come as no doubt it will be if we ever get a President > elected on this ticket. > > Nice to see the old crew at it again. > > dj > > > On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 7:03 PM, frantheman <[email protected]> wrote: > > Habermas is fine with "herrschaftsfreier Diskurs" as long as he has the > "Herrschaft"! :-) > > I came at Habermas sideways this semester; I was doing pretty intensive > work on the historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans-Ulrich_Wehler>, in particular his > monumental five-volume *Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1770-1989*, and you > can't work on Wehler without having to look at Habermas. The two of them > met as kids in the Hitler-Jugend in Gummersbach, where Habermas was > Wehler's *Gruppenführer*, and remained friends and close associates all > their lives - coming to each other's defence in many of those vicious > intellectual fights German academics are so fond of (e.g. the Sonderweg > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonderweg> discussion, or the > Historikerstreit <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historikerstreit>). > > Both Habermas and Wehler are proponents of what is called in German the > *bürgerliche > Gesellschaft*. To come back to a major theme of this thread, this is a > term which it is very difficult to accurately translate into English > without losing much of its meaning in German and adding things in English > which are not there in German. There is, in fact, no real English word for > *bürgerlich*; conventionally the French term *bourgeois *is used. But > *bourgeois > *has many negative connotations in English (particularly since the 60s, > when it was almost exclusively used in a pejorative Marxist sense) - > *bürgerlich > *is used in German in a much more varied, and often matter-of-fact > fashion. "Middle class" could also be used, but that's a term that can also > be problematic. "Civil society" also captures some of its meaning in a more > neutral sense. When I use the term "liberal democracy," or "western > liberalism" in English, I think the German translation for what I am trying > to describe is *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*. And when I speak of "New Deal, > social-democratic, open, liberal (in the true sense) democracy," it's > basically an attempt to describe what German much more concisely calls > *soziale > Marktwirtschaft*. > > Translation is difficult, because languages both define and are defined by > culture. What's the German for leadership? *Führung. *So what's the > German for leader? *Führer. *But because of German history, there are > major difficulties with using that word, particularly in a German context. > In English there's no problem with calling Angela Merkel the "German > leader." But *deutsche Führer *or *Führerin? *Good luck with that > one! Or, taking a feminist turn - the most common German translation for > authority (in the sense of *power/control*) is *Herrschaft. *How about > *Frau-schaft? > *Or even *Frau schafft*! > > Language is tricky - translation even more so. > > Am Mittwoch, 4. März 2015 23:16:47 UTC+1 schrieb Gabby: > > Much as I would like to see it, I find myself despairing more and more > over the possibility of the kind of decent rational discourse Chris is > pleading for. > > > Hm? Chris was pleading for you and Habermas is pleading for > "herrschaftsfreier Diskurs", so not all hope is lost. ;) > > *Western liberalism *is the concept that I find needs further > problematization. This is what I would see you working on. I am often > astounded how differently the idea of "liberal" is taken in English > speaking countries. > > 2015-03-04 17:55 GMT+01:00 frantheman <[email protected]>: > > One of my professors has suggested that I do a research paper next > semester on the reception of Habermas' thinking about society in the > English-speaking (academic) world, Neil. I'm internally resisting because I > find him so long-winded, obtuse, boring, and self-important (a typical > German academic in other words). I can think of about a hundred things I'd > rather do than immerse myself in his writings - like cleaning the windows > in my flat for instance. > > Fundamentally, Habermas is also a typical German philosopher (like > Leibnitz and Hegel) in that he believes he lives in the best possible world > - that of centre-left North European liberal democracy (though, should he > in his dotage find the way to this group, he would probably deny this and > condemn us all from his self-appointed position as the doyen of German > ivory-tower intellectuals). I would argue that there may have been a moment > when he was perhaps partially right, but this moment has gone. > > In a longer historical context of the past 250 years, there was a moment > when the rationalist liberal bourgeois spirit seemed to be reaching some > kind of fruition in the West - between the end of WWII and the beginning of > the 80s. Then came Reagan, Thatcher, and the religious orthodoxy of > neo-liberal economics and the moment was lost. What I believe happened was > that the old (and some new) elites had finally recovered enough power over > the basic decency of New Deal, social-democratic, open, liberal (in the > true sense) democracy to once more rearrange things to their own maximised > benefit. This is the central point made by Piketty in *Capital in the > Twenty-First Century. *No wonder he has been so viciously attacked by > various acolytes of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy. Since then, Habermas' > "unfinished project" of western liberalism has been continuously - and > purposely - unravelled, often leaving the forms intact while killing the > living substance. > > Much as I would like to see it, I find myself despairing more and more > over the possibility of the kind of decent rational discourse Chris is > pleading for. It's possible - sometimes - in microcosmic areas like this > forum (though even here it can be easily sabotaged). There's one way of > telling the narrative of the history of ideas in the past 250 years which > goes like this: Once upon a time there was a dream of rational and reasoned > discourse. It was called the Enlightenment. It soon became tainted by the > virus of Romanticism and it turned into Modernity, which came with lots of > unpleasant features like nationalism and fascism. It has now almost > completely disappeared, constantly castigated by braying apologists of > nationalist, ideological, or religious certainty before ultimately drowning > in a sea of triviality. > > Of course, that's only one way of telling the story. I don't think I'd > like to live in a platonic republic ruled by philosopher-kings and > Robespierre, Saint-Just, and the Committee of Public Safety justified the > Terror with an appeal to Reason. As humans we are more than just our > rationality. This is what makes real communication so difficult - but also > so rich and fascinating. What we need, perhaps, is less certainty and > self-righteousness, more decency, respect, and listening. > > On Wednesday, March 4, 2015 at 10:10:37 AM UTC+1, archytas wrote: > > Interesting dictionaries Gabby. Y > > ... -- --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups ""Minds Eye"" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
