I suppose the collected works of Habermas and Luhmann would be about the size of a big wardrobe. I am not a believer, though find Habermas very tempting, "Descartes" (thought of in a long line that might include Molly and Orn) is about the pursuit of truth and this continues in social epistemology, dropping the solus ipse to a considerable extent - we certainly no longer hew to rigid introspectionism - though we can ask 'did we ever'? Molly and Orn don't work as people like that, though stand up well as examples of people trying for something I have deep respect for (there are some key epistemic issues in this - resolvable I think in terms of people who want peace and justice).
"Whereas Descartes thought that truth should be pursued only by the proper conduct of "reason," specifically, the doxastic agent's own reason, social epistemology acknowledges what everyone except a radical skeptic will admit, namely, that quests for truth are commonly influenced, for better or for worse, by institutional arrangements that massively affect what doxastic agents hear (or fail to hear) from others. To maximize prospects for successful pursuits of truth, this variable cannot sensibly be neglected." This paragraph could do with some Chris-style 'stripping for translation'! Doxastic agents! It is surely 'bleedin' obvious' we are people of cultures. At risk of Gabby's wrath, I will mention again these cultures are Bacon's Idols. Feminism is a good example of a social epistemology in bringing out the male domination of control fraud knowledge. The message, eventually, after reading several wardrobes,, is that we are largely being being had through culturally transmitted control frauds. The questions really concern how we could do something better and how we can tell people they are being conned (a very difficult matter). Debates on epistemology that people can't understand, framed in academic ways of making livings, involving complex literacy and numeracy, hardly form anything easily translatable - the ways of making academic livings also control frauds. If one looks at a small area like forensic science, where on might assume well understood science would produce easily translatable facts, we get a lot of human corruption. The proper function of forensic science is to extract the truth. This function, unfortunately, is not well served by current practice. Saks et al. (2001: 28) write: "As it is practised today, forensic science does not extract the truth reliably. Forensic science expert evidence that is erroneous (that is, honest mistakes) and fraudulent (deliberate misrepresentation) has been found to be one of the major causes, and perhaps the leading cause, of erroneous convictions of innocent persons." One rogue scientist engaged in rampant falsification for 15 years, and another faked more than 100 autopsies on unexamined bodies and falsified dozens of toxicology and blood reports (Kelly and Wearne 1998; Koppl 2006, Other Internet Resources). Shocking cases are found in more than one country. Kelly, J. F. and Wearne, P. (1998), Tainting Evidence: Inside the Scandals at the FBI Crime Lab, New York: The Free Press. Koppl, Roger (2005), "Epistemic Systems," Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, 2 (2): 91–106. We are affected by this in very practical ways. My contention is most of the problems could be brought to obvious light. We are 'allowed' the epistemological, but not practical action. Francis' hammock is in the right place, the metaphor replete with the quiescence involved in framing oneself as an academic (which Francis obviously isn't in the best sense I can mean that). I once 'fitted up' a paedophile for other crimes - he had committed them, so technically it wasn't a fit up. The institutional and legal barriers were too big to fight and still are. It got him off the streets for a couple of years, though he continued after release. Ugly Ray Terret has just been retrospectively convicted and given 25 years. One might think we could address the issues of social epistemology through practical examples everyone can grasp. Indeed, Kopl tries. Yet the ideologies of soaked-up knowledge, various COWDUNGS (conventional wisdoms of dominant groups) make this an act of heretic courage. There are still people who can't take the idea that, say, if born in the Muslim world they would be Muslim. In the West we are dominated by neo-liberalism and economic blather. Even if we vote to change this, as the Greeks just have, what can any politicians do confronted with the 'smoke filled rooms' they enter off the corridors of power with warnings that anything other than austerity will lead to disaster? Economics is largely a lie through which dominance is exerted and the West (now largely under the US military umbrella) 'stays ahead' - and who sensibly would not want this shield against even worse domination from elsewhere? There have been people talking about positive money, democratic foreign policy and radical democracy for more than 100 years. Yet in politics we get to vote for main parties making jawbs-groaf promises within neo-liberalism, corrupt banking and utterly false notions on how growth is achieved and what it should be. The real dialogue is made invisible, and Francis' hammock, if right in immanent academic consideration, is part of bearing witness before the crash. I'm not suggesting Francis is doing this We need to think global and beyond. Yet look what globalisation has done so far and what we fear leaders will do whatever they spout. On Sunday, March 8, 2015 at 2:35:19 AM UTC, frantheman wrote: > > Sheldon Cooper of *The Big Bang Theory *justifies his claim always to be > right thus: "If I were wrong I would know it!" > > Am Sonntag, 8. März 2015 02:25:40 UTC+1 schrieb frantheman: >> >> What a wonderful overview, Neil! I envy your capacity to cook down the >> huge amount of controversy involving epistemology, sociology, ideology, >> modernism and post-modernism into a few comprehensible paragraphs. >> >> >> >> Personally, I find myself suspended between the kind of modernism >> proposed by Habermas and the various post-modernist critiques of it. Not >> always an easy (or consistent) position, I'm trying to figure out a way to >> construct a hammock on the basis of this suspension which allows me to >> comfortably swing from one to the other as I please. And didn't someone >> once comment that consistency is the privilege of small minds? >> >> >> >> If critical theory has established anything, it's that the old >> metaphysical arguments about ontology and "das Ding in sich" are just a >> waste of time. We can't ultimately get out of our skins; our knowledge is >> *human *knowledge, worked out and communicated in *human *terms, and as >> such it will always have a cultural and societal framework. Such frameworks >> are dynamic, interacting with each other, growing, changing ... organic >> really - which is no wonder, given that humans are organic beings. "Pure" >> rationality is a chimera, because as humans we can only think in human >> categories. Should we ever encounter aliens, I suspect that the >> intercommunication would be difficult, frustrating and endlessly >> fascinating, because they might very well structure their thinking >> according to other categories (that's why they can travel faster than >> light, by the way, their way of doing logic doesn't see the problem of >> *e=mc2 >> – *they just take the interdimensional back-way through their granny’s >> garden. That is if we don’t kill them first, or they run away from us in >> horror to call the inter-stellar exterminators to come and deal with us >> because we’re not fit to be let loose on civilized galactic society). And, >> of course, one of the major – perhaps *the *major characteristic of the >> inevitable human context of our knowledge is language. >> >> >> >> Habermas is wonderfully attractive in his appeal for reasonable and >> reasoned discourse on societal issues - this conviction that it is possible >> through dialogue and mutual understanding to reach conclusions which will >> actually make things better. In the end, of course, he's a good >> old-fashioned bourgeois liberal who believes in "progress". The problem >> with him is that he is convinced that his position (and the post-WWII >> western German society in which he lived in, and which he has worked on >> forming all his adult life) is the *superior *position (as I said before >> - typical German philosopher). I become ever more suspicious of people who >> *know *that they're right - and that everyone else is consequently less >> right - or to put it more bluntly, *wrong.* >> >> >> >> This is where the post-modernists gleefully point their fingers at him. >> Denying others absolute truth, he implicitly and pragmatically claims it >> for himself. (It’s also why he can’t stand them!) On the other hand, the >> various post-modernist *turns *run the risk (and are repeatedly accused) >> of falling into complete *laissez-faire *multi-culti, anything-goes >> relativism. If our truth-values – to which our moral values belong – are >> societally, historically and culturally conditioned, what right do I have >> to claim my moral values are better than yours? Weren’t the niggers better >> off as slaves on the plantation, being looked after by a kind and >> paternalistic massa, than being condemned to living a constant life of >> danger, deprivation, drugs and depression in some run-down project in >> contemporary decrepit Detroit? Or let’s not even bother with spurious >> justifications, let’s go all the way to social Darwinism; the strong do as >> they will, and the weak suffer as they must. As it was in the beginning, is >> now, and ever shall be, world without end, Amen. >> >> >> >> So, at the moment, this is where I find myself intellectually at the >> moment, gently swinging in my hammock between these two positions. >> Descartes may have found his answer to doubt in his own affirmation of his >> self-cognitive rationality (though Dan Dennett >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_Explained> believes he can >> define this out of existence), but it’s still a big step to the conviction >> of the ultimate *rightness *of the particular positions one espouses. >> Maybe the recognition of the conditionality of our own premises, and the >> openness to the possibility of their correctibility – while not >> automatically offering them up as being completely conjectural and relative >> - is the real prerequisite for meaningful discourse. Or as Oliver Cromwell >> (normally not someone over-inclined to questioning his own righteousness) >> once asked the Assembly of the Church of Scotland, “I beseech you, in the >> bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken!” Of course, that >> still leaves the question open; how can you even begin to discuss with >> people who *know *they’re right? >> >> >> Am Samstag, 7. März 2015 12:54:02 UTC+1 schrieb archytas: >> >> Good to see you too Don. I'm not much into the nuances of translation >> stuff, partly because I lack Gabby's skills and Francis' patience. There >> are many versions of Chris' 'make the language simple enough for >> translation' angle - one here is called the 'Crystal Method' and is taught >> to our bullshit bureaucrats, so they can confuse us with smaller words. We >> scientists got the 'Fog Index', screwed as soon as you use an equation or >> start talking about attribution tests and extreme value analysis. >> >> I see another kind of 'translation'. Habermas is actually quite easy >> compared with other Germans like Gunter Ludwig on how scientific theories >> come about. Russell and Whitehead wrote three volumes on why one and one >> make two and, eventually, were wrong. Things get relative when we try to >> ground stuff in origin (I was told to remove the word 'stuff' from my >> thesis as it was too common a word). I translate this complex social stuff >> into a long line of philosophical effort. >> >> There is no 'start' or 'origin'. If I mention the pre-Socratics and >> the pyrrhonists, I know they were much influenced from Persia and India. >> They at least knew argument can nearly always be made in several different >> ways that are very difficult to choose between. One gets a line from this >> stuff to Descartes and that 'I am thinking therefore I am' stuff - I'm more >> of an I woke up and am still here bloke. Socrates and Bacon more or less >> said public opinion ain't worth shit and Descartes continued this in >> radical doubt, supposedly grounded on not being able to deny one's own >> presence. Actually, there being thoughts does not imply a thinker, and if >> you doubt everything you are, in fact, doubting nothing and have made doubt >> into something that can't ground itself. Wittgenstein eventually says we >> have been arguing over the same terrain for centuries, not resolved >> anything and thus must be bewitched by the language we are using. So we >> should know more about language. >> >> This turns into what we now call social epistemology, away from the >> individual introspective sole thinker to something more social. Marx is a >> classic example and the discipline of sociology. One can split this in >> many ways, though the standard differences are as follows: >> " The classical approach could be realized in at least two forms. One >> would emphasize the traditional epistemic goal of acquiring true beliefs. >> It would study social practices in terms of their impact on the >> truth-values of agents' beliefs. A second version of the classical approach >> would focus on the epistemic goal of having justified or rational beliefs. >> Applied to the social realm, it might concentrate, for example, on when a >> cognitive agent is justified or warranted in accepting the statements and >> opinions of others. Proponents of the anti-classical approach have little >> or no use for concepts like truth and justification. In addressing the >> social dimensions of knowledge, they understand "knowledge" as simply what >> is believed, or what beliefs are "institutionalized" in this or that >> community, culture, or context. They seek to identify the social forces and >> influences responsible for knowledge production so conceived. Social >> epistemology is theoretically significant because of the central role of >> society in the knowledge-forming process. It also has practical importance >> because of its possible role in the redesign of information-related social >> institutions." >> >> Karl Marx's theory of ideology could well be considered a type of social >> epistemology. On one interpretation of Marx's conception of "ideology", an >> ideology is a set of beliefs, a world-view, or a form of consciousness that >> is in some fashion false or delusive. The cause of these beliefs, and >> perhaps of their delusiveness, is the social situation and interests of the >> believers. Since the theory of ideology, so described, is concerned with >> the truth and falsity of beliefs, it might even be considered a form of >> classical social epistemology. >> Karl Mannheim (1936) extended Marx's theory of ideology into a sociology >> of knowledge. He classed forms of consciousness as ideological when the >> thoughts of a social group can be traced to the group's social situation or >> "life conditions". Critical theory aims at emancipation and enlightenment >> by making agents aware of hidden coercion in their environment, enabling >> them to determine where their true interests lie. Beliefs that agents would >> agree upon in the ideal speech situation are ipso facto true beliefs >> (Habermas and Luhmann 1971: 139, 224). Here a social communicational device >> is treated as a type of epistemic standard. >> Habermas, Jurgen and Luhmann, Niklas (1971), Theorie der Gesellschaft >> oder Sozialtechnologie – Was Leistet die Systemforschung? Frankfurt: >> Suhrkamp. >> >> I could easily extend this to a book so tedious that Francis would be >> smashing windows rather than cleaning them. I have read loads of this >> stuff, only to conclude the mechanisms involved more or less avoid the >> human condition. In the 1930s, Ludwik Fleck (1896–1961), a Polish-Jewish >> microbiologist, developed the first system of the historical philosophy and >> sociology of science. Fleck claimed that cognition is a collective >> activity, since it is only possible on the basis of a certain body of >> knowledge acquired from other people. When people begin to exchange ideas, >> a thought collective arises, bonded by a specific mood, and as a result of >> a series of understandings and misunderstandings a peculiar thought style >> is developed. When a thought style becomes sufficiently sophisticated, the >> collective divides itself into an esoteric circle (professionals) and an >> exoteric circle (laymen). A thought style consists of the active elements, >> which shape ways in which members of the collective see and think about the >> world, and of the passive elements, the sum of which is perceived as an >> “objective reality”. What we call “facts”, are social constructs: only what >> is true to culture is true to nature. Thought styles are often >> incommensurable: what is a fact to the members of a thought collective A >> sometimes does not exist to the members of a thought collective B, and a >> thought that is significant and true to the members of A may sometimes be >> false or meaningless for members of B. >> >> The story goes on and on. Most people get more or less no chance to >> learn any of it. Fleck's ideas in brief are in“Crisis in Science. Towards >> a Free and More Human Science”, in R. S. Cohen and Th. Schnelle (eds.), >> 1986, pp. 153–158. >> >> One of the big questions is how we can translate much of this into >> something that translates to quick understanding and doesn't lead to a >> bunch of Guardians replacing current control as in Soviet Paradise or >> neo-liberalism under the US military umbrella. >> >> >> On Saturday, March 7, 2015 at 7:06:31 AM UTC, Don Johnson wrote: >> >> Very much enjoying the commentary. Gabby, I have read that the divide >> between what is classical-liberalism and modern-liberalism in the States >> began during FDR's administration. Campiagn speeches by Hoover and >> Roosevelt were both peppered with classical-liberal rhetoric. Indeed, there >> was some competition to see who would be the most fiscally conservative. >> FDR won. Then came the New Deal and unprecedented goverment spending and >> involvement in everyday life. Thus changing the public's view on what >> "liberalism" was all about. Now we have a neoclassical liberalism called >> Libertarianism. It will be interesting to see how this will be perverted in >> the decades to come as no doubt it will be if we ever get a President >> elected on this ticket. >> >> Nice to see the old crew at it again. >> >> dj >> >> >> On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 7:03 PM, frantheman <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Habermas is fine with "herrschaftsfreier Diskurs" as long as he has the >> "Herrschaft"! :-) >> >> I came at Habermas sideways this semester; I was doing pretty intensive >> work on the historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans-Ulrich_Wehler>, in particular his >> monumental five-volume *Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1770-1989*, and you >> can't work on Wehler without having to look at Habermas. The two of them >> met as kids in the Hitler-Jugend in Gummersbach, where Habermas was >> Wehler's *Gruppenführer*, and remained friends and close associates all >> their lives - coming to each other's defence in many of those vicious >> intellectual fights German academics are so fond of (e.g. the Sonderweg >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonderweg> discussion, or the >> Historikerstreit <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historikerstreit>). >> >> Both Habermas and Wehler are proponents of what is called in German the >> *bürgerliche >> Gesellschaft*. To come back to a major theme of this thread, this is a >> term which it is very difficult to accurately translate into English >> without losing much of its meaning in German and adding things in English >> which are not there in German. There is, in fact, no real English word for >> *bürgerlich*; conventionally the French term *bourgeois *is used. But >> *bourgeois >> *has many negative connotations in English (particularly since the 60s, >> when it was almost exclusively used in a pejorative Marxist sense) - >> *bürgerlich >> *is used in German in a much more varied, and often matter-of-fact >> fashion. "Middle class" could also be used, but that's a term that can also >> be problematic. "Civil society" also captures some of its meaning in a more >> neutral sense. When I use the term "liberal democracy," or "western >> liberalism" in English, I think the German translation for what I am trying >> to describe is *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*. And when I speak of "New >> Deal, social-democratic, open, liberal (in the true sense) democracy," it's >> basically an attempt to describe what German much more concisely calls >> *soziale >> Marktwirtschaft*. >> >> Translation is difficult, because languages both define and are defined >> by culture. What's the German for leadership? *Führung. *So what's the >> German for leader? *Führer. *But because of German history, there are >> major difficulties with using that word, particularly in a German context. >> In English there's no problem with calling Angela Merkel the "German >> leader." But *deutsche Führer *or *Führerin? *Good luck with that >> one! Or, taking a feminist turn - the most common German translation for >> authority (in the sense of *power/control*) is *Herrschaft. *How about >> *Frau-schaft? >> *Or even *Frau schafft*! >> >> Language is tricky - translation even more so. >> >> Am Mittwoch, 4. März 2015 23:16:47 UTC+1 schrieb Gabby: >> >> Much as I would like to see it, I find myself despairing more and more >> over the possibility of the kind of decent rational discourse Chris is >> pleading for. >> >> >> Hm? Chris was pleading for you and Habermas is pleading for >> "herrschaftsfreier Diskurs", so not all hope is lost. ;) >> >> *Western liberalism *is the concept that I find needs further >> problematization. This is what I would see you working on. I am often >> astounded how differently the idea of "liberal" is taken in English >> speaking countries. >> >> 2015-03-04 17:55 GMT+01:00 frantheman <[email protected]>: >> >> One of my professors has suggested that I do a research paper next >> semester on the reception of Habermas' thinking about society in the >> English-speaking (academic) world, Neil. I'm internally resisting because I >> find him so long-winded, obtuse, boring, and self-important (a typical >> German academic in other words). I can think of about a hundred things I'd >> rather do than immerse myself in his writings - like cleaning the windows >> in my flat for instance. >> >> Fundamentally, Habermas is also a typical German philosopher (like >> Leibnitz and Hegel) in that he believes he lives in the best possible world >> - that of centre-left North European liberal democracy (though, should he >> in his dotage find the way to this group, he would probably deny this and >> condemn us all from his self-appointed position as the doyen of German >> ivory-tower intellectuals). I would argue that there may have been a moment >> when he was perhaps partially right, but this moment has gone. >> >> In a longer historical context of the past 250 years, there was a moment >> when the rationalist liberal bourgeois spirit seemed to be reaching some >> kind of fruition in the West - between the end of WWII and the beginning of >> the 80s. Then came Reagan, Thatcher, and the religious orthodoxy of >> neo-liberal economics and the moment was lost. What I believe happened was >> that the old (and some new) elites had finally recovered enough power over >> the basic decency of New Deal, social-democratic, open, liberal (in the >> true sense) democracy to once more rearrange things to their own maximised >> benefit. This is the central point made by Piketty in *Capital in the >> Twenty-First Century. *No wonder he has been so viciously attacked by >> various acolytes of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy. Since then, Habermas' >> "unfinished project" of western liberalism has been continuously - and >> purposely - unravelled, often leaving the forms intact while killing the >> living substance. >> >> Much as I would like to see it, I find myself despairing more and more >> over the possibility of the kind of decent rational discourse Chris is >> pleading for. It's possible - sometimes - in microcosmic areas like this >> forum (though even here it can be easily sabotaged). There's one way of >> telling the narrative of the history of ideas in the past 250 years which >> goes like this: Once upon a time there was a dream of rational and reasoned >> discourse. It was called the Enlightenment. It soon became tainted by the >> virus of Romanticism and it turned into Modernity, which came with lots of >> unpleasant features like nationalism and fascism. It has now almost >> completely disappeared, constantly castigated by braying apologists of >> nationalist, ideological, or religious certainty before ultimately drowning >> in a sea of triviality. >> >> Of course, that's only one way of telling the story. I don't think I'd >> like to live in a platonic republic ruled by philosopher-kings and >> Robespierre, Saint-Just, and the Committee of Public Safety justified the >> Terror with an appeal to Reason. As humans we are more than just our >> rationality. This is what makes real communication so difficult - but also >> so rich and fascinating. What we need, perhaps, is less certainty and >> self-righteousness, more decency, respect, and listening. >> >> On Wednesday, March 4, 2015 at 10:10:37 AM UTC+1, archytas wrote: >> >> Interesting dictionaries Gabby. You actually sound a bit like Luhmann in >> this tense and grammar version. We could send all our messages to you in >> order to get the genuine and objective version of whatever we meant to say, >> though I'm sure you might resist the censorship implications of the new >> Gabbledegook. Understanding transitions from sensual to intellectual and >> various aspects of nuance has long been part of racist and classist >> presupposition in intelligence. >> >> The verstehen problematic includes the idea that we should not expect to >> treat language in our theoretical expectations, as 'naive' participants >> have their own assumptions and hypotheses of which researchers themselves >> may be ignorant. One thus goes for more 'ethno' approaches such as >> ethnomethodology. The literature is generally boring, not unlike >> dictionaries. I suppose we enter the learning hoping to stand on the >> shoulders of giants, but few enter these educational processes on a >> voluntary basis. Science, with its objective outcomes, should be easy to >> teach, yet is not. In Chris' 'strip the language for easy interpretation' >> terms, what could be easier than teaching people simple standardisation >> like "measuring a meniscus"? You can demonstrate the doing to explain the >> word and necessary actions. Now send the little dears off to do some >> titration. Simples! Yet much gets in the way even of this kind of simple >> instruction. Many kids aren't even considered fit to enter the laboratory >> and, indeed, even fit to have such simple pointed instruments as a compass >> to learn a bit of geometry (owing to stabbings, self-harm and so on). >> >> Gabby's spin is a delight, even if I get a vision of her standing with >> two feet in a rabbit hole, and was waiting for the barb at the end, which >> came here with a smile. AI can catch these patterns. Most of us in this >> game have noticed we are after machine intelligence because we despair of >> the glib internet world Francis describes.and that defeasible logic loses >> all beauty contests with Chris holding up a craft beer. The despair on >> human rationality and the libidinal biologically bound trivial is a >> motivator, perhaps once found in science cutting out the Idols Gabby has an >> undeclared better version of she has forgotten, in trying to get machines >> to do what humans have always failed at - argument properly informed by >> Reason and 'big data' approaches not constrained to selling us another >> planet-burning widget. One thing I think we have been very bad at is >> grasping frames of ideology, including why people generally act in them. >> This was the big theme in both Luhmann and Habermas, who did nothing on how >> we might live without the violence of poverty and needing to make livings. >> There is no grasp of Gabby as the existential cash girl she described >> herself as. One can model all of us in fuzzy sets on such lines, not >> unlike her idea of the trace of people's histories to the 'moment'. >> Socrates was described by his wife as a good-looking waster, not much good >> at putting food on the family table and helping with childcare. We neglect >> what argument is and why anyone else would want to listen to it. The dogs >> watch me, concerned only that I finish and enter their rationality of being >> off the lead along the riverbank. >> >> There is an old joke about standing in something on both feet. This is a >> punishment in hell, standing in excrement up to one's neck. This, of >> course, is for the tea break. One spends the rest of the day standing on >> one's hands. >> >> >> On Wednesday, March 4, 2015 at 12:54:25 AM UTC, Gabby wrote: >> >> What a question, Francis! Here is basically everything you can get about >> "verstehen" in ist linguistic context: >> >> http://www.dwds.de/?view=1&qu=verstehen >> >> I guess you are interested in the tipping point when the sensuous >> meaning "I am standing in this with both my feet" transgressed to the field >> where it became an expression for the process of intellectual comprehension: >> >> in-stân besagt 'in einem gegenstande stehen, fuszen, zuhause sein', >> under-standen, under-stân 'dazwischen d. h. mitten darin stehen'. wenn nun >> noch, ob auch ganz vereinzelt, ein nhd. bestehen (th. 1, 1672) in demselben >> sinne gebraucht wird, so würde es die anschauung vertreten 'einen >> gegenstand umstehen, bestehen, in seiner gewalt haben' (ahd. bi-standan >> vgl. umbi-: griech. ἀμφι-). von diesem ausgangspunkte läszt sich der >> übergang von dem sinnlichen auf das geistige gebiet verstehen, wie uns die >> ähnlich entwickelten bildungen be-greifen und ver-nehmen noch heute >> semasiologisch durchsichtig sind. >> >> >> >> You can also see what the "ver"-prefix can do and has done to the root >> words and vice versa: http://www.dwds.de/?view=1&qu=ver >> >> >> And to do something "aus Versehen" would be an example of how an educated >> Minds Eyer would justify their mistake. ;) >> >> 2015-03-03 18:56 GMT+01:00 frantheman <[email protected]>: >> >> I and I sometimes overstand. Sometimes don't! And does *ver-stehen *have >> the same relationship to standing as *sich vertun *has to doing? >> >> On Tuesday, March 3, 2015 at 6:36:22 PM UTC+1, Gabby wrote: >> >> Cheers Francis! >> >> Schonhaltung or schon Haltung. The break makes the difference. And your >> medical knowledge bridges the gap. >> >> Actually "overs", short form of "overstand", was my initial key word that >> got me looking deeper/higher into language construction long time ago. I >> was deeply impressed by what I had learned about Jamaican itations and >> Rastafari poltitical poetry. In your case the ability to do religious >> contextualization of language items certainly helps when studying >> Kulturwissenschaften. Viel Erfolg! >> >> 2015-03-03 17:15 GMT+01:00 frantheman <[email protected]>: >> >> I'm still here - in some sense anyway. More passive, thoughtful, >> watching, listening and thinking. As they say on Facebook; it's >> complicated. There's such a volume of *stuff *out on the web now that I >> find my reluctance to contribute to it growing ever stronger in the past >> years. Do I have anything to say that thousands are others aren't saying? >> Is any attempt we make to say something not drowned out in a cacophony of >> of puppies, selfies, mindless chatter and incivility? In a world where >> significance seems to have become dependent on reduction to a viral >> hash-tagged tweet, or a five-second video on Vine, what happens to depth, >> complexity, the possibility of real interaction? Has communication finally >> reduced itself to atomic brevity and superficiality? Otherwise - tl;dr. >> >> "There is always an easy solution to every human problem -- neat, >> plausible, and wrong." What Menken actually said was a little different; >> "Explanations exist; they have existed for all time; there is always a >> well-known solution to every human problem — neat, plausible, and wrong" >> (*The >> Divine Afflatus*, 1917). Even within the same language quotational drift >> occurs. Interpretative drift is a constitutive element of discourse. Our >> communication is always a hit-and-miss thing, or maybe, better, a >> constantly creative process. What you say, what I understand. Each of us >> culturally in our own particular place, but sharing enough to bring some >> kind of communication into being - a wonderful, organic, continually >> self-creating kind of thing, with all sorts of levels, eddies, >> side-effects. An orchestral symphonic symbolic performance of memes and >> tropes. And that's just when it's carried out between people who "share" a >> common language. >> >> Accurate, one-to-one translation/conveyance of meaning is impossible; >> even between two speakers of the same language. Communication becomes >> something else, something independent. The German theorist, Niklas >> Luhmann <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niklas_Luhmann>, has some >> interesting ideas in this area. It's a deeply counter-intuitive way of >> seeing things - and useful as an instrument to challenge one's own >> assumptions, even if you don't go all the way with him. >> >> Nobody - as far as I know - has translated Luhmann's major works from >> German into English. Understandably - it's hard enough trying to figure out >> what exactly he's saying in one language without trying to express it in >> another, and when you move to his discussions and arguments with Habermas >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J%C3%BCrgen_Habermas> (another German >> master of the complicated obtuse) ... forgeddaboudit! >> >> Though translation programmes have improved in the past decade, they're >> still a long way from being good. Because "meaning"/"sense" is always >> contextual (human subjective contextual), therefore always fluid and >> shifting. This is more than just "fuzzy logic." I suspect we will need >> genuine AI as the basis of operating systems to make them really work. Two >> people from different lingusitic backrounds with very limited vocabularies >> can communicate better - agree that they have achieved some kind of >> understanding - than a programme which has access to comprehensive >> dictionaries. >> >> For the past months I've been formally studying - in the academic sense - >> in German. *Kulturwissenschaft *at that. It's a weird experience - >> there's stuff I can understand better in English, other stuff works better >> in German. There isn't even a good translation of the subject I'm doing my >> Masters in. A literal English translation of *Kulturwissenschaft *would >> be "cultural science" but English academia generally calls it "cultural >> studies." Which, when you think about it, means something else. Well, it's >> a post-modernist phenomenon anyway, which, arguably, allows one to be >> multidimensional with reference to meaning! >> >> And sometimes it can be enormously productive to take an ordinary, >> everyday word in a particular language and twist it, mine it, pummel it, >> *rape >> *it, alienate it. Poets do this all the time. Sometimes even academics >> (a pretty mediocre lot for the most part) manage it. >> >> ... > > -- --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups ""Minds Eye"" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
