Cheers, Francis, to all the mad stuff you are doing! On Sunday, March 8, 2015 at 10:34:26 PM UTC-4, frantheman wrote: > > Don't worry, Neil, I haven't sold out and swallowed the academic bait with > hook, line and sinker! There is, as you often and rightly point out, an > immense amount of waffle in the whole academic business, frequently > clothing platitudes, or very small ideas in pages of obfusticating > gobbledegook, all of it referenced with hundreds of footnotes to show > everyone how clever and diligent you are. > > But, as I mentioned earlier, I have - after a break of nearly 30 years - > once more formally engaged with the academic world, and am just finishing > the first semester of a Masters programme in cultural studies. However I'm > fortunate that I have no great ambitions to make a career out of it, nor am > I compelled to do so. I still work at an honest job to make a living, > though I have been able to cut down my working hours to the extent that I > now get by with doing eight night-shifts per month, looking after four > chronically seriously ill children. - - > > - - (short pause in writing this to detach a seven year hellion from her > respirator and monitor so that she can go to the bathroom, followed by a > discussion in sign-language (she's deaf), making it clear to her that she > must go back to sleep as it's only two thirty in the morning and she has to > go to school tomorrow. She may have many health issues, but for all that > she's a typical seven year old, with an infinite capacity for negotiation > about stuff she doesn't feel like doing) - - > > - - Furthermore, I am immensely fortunate to live in a country where third > level education - at state universities (and the *Fernuniversität Hagen > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FernUniversit%C3%A4t_Hagen> *is a fully > recognised state university on the Open University model) is nearly > completely free - it costs me € 300 per semester ... read it and weep, > American readers! Now that my daughters are independently earning their own > living,I've no one to look after except myself, which makes it all > financially possible without having to go into horrific debt or live on > bread and water in an unheated garret. > > Cultural Studies is an unusual beast. It was invented around thirty to > forty years ago by Literature Departments to stave off their widely > perceived danger of drifting into terminal irrelevance and extinction. In > Hagen it's organised jointly by the (German) Literature Department and the > History Department (which identifies strongly with a sociological approach > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bielefeld_School> to history and regards > Max Weber as being only marginally inferior to God). As someone embarking > on this intellectual journey, I do feel a certain need to try to identify > my own particular standpoint with respect to all the diverse > intellectual/academic directions, currents, schools and outlooks which one > encounters in this area. All the more so as the specific subject of the > Masters programme glories in the title "European Modernity." Sort of, > "everything you wanted to know about the past two hundred and fifty years > but were afraid to ask ... or answer." > > The more I read in this whole area, the more I find myself being > stimulated and excited by the various *turns *in postmodernist thinking. > Lyotard's scepticism regarding metanarratives (which you mentioned) echoes > with me, as does a lot of stuff that Frederic Jameson writes - his analyses > of particular works of modern architecture are great. Of course there's an > awful lot of pretentious academic wanking around too, but at the moment I'm > still at the stage of enjoying having my mind and concepts extended. If > only there weren't such annoying things such as exams and reaserch papers > (I'm currently trying to finish one on the protoindustrial development of > the textile industry in the Duchy of Berg > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bergisches_Land> from 1700 to 1820 ... > yawn!), but that's the price I have to pay for getting formally involved in > the academic business once more. > > Of course I'm not going to save the world with any of this, but there is a > great feeling of liberation in studying just for fun. And I can now once > more officially regard myself as a student, which means I don't have to get > up early in the morning if I don't feel like it. And maybe do all kinds of > other mad stuff ... > > Am Sonntag, 8. März 2015 13:07:42 UTC+1 schrieb archytas: > > I suppose the collected works of Habermas and Luhmann would be about the > size of a big wardrobe. I am not a believer, though find Habermas very > tempting, "Descartes" (thought of in a long line that might include Molly > and Orn) is about the pursuit of truth and this continues in social > epistemology, dropping the solus ipse to a considerable extent - we > certainly no longer hew to rigid introspectionism - though we can ask 'did > we ever'? Molly and Orn don't work as people like that, though stand up > well as examples of people trying for something I have deep respect for > (there are some key epistemic issues in this - resolvable I think in terms > of people who want peace and justice). > > "Whereas Descartes thought that truth should be pursued only by the proper > conduct of "reason," specifically, the doxastic agent's own reason, social > epistemology acknowledges what everyone except a radical skeptic will > admit, namely, that quests for truth are commonly influenced, for better or > for worse, by institutional arrangements that massively affect what > doxastic agents hear (or fail to hear) from others. To maximize prospects > for successful pursuits of truth, this variable cannot sensibly be > neglected." > > This paragraph could do with some Chris-style 'stripping for translation'! > Doxastic agents! It is surely 'bleedin' obvious' we are people of > cultures. At risk of Gabby's wrath, I will mention again these cultures > are Bacon's Idols. Feminism is a good example of a social epistemology in > bringing out the male domination of control fraud knowledge. > > The message, eventually, after reading several wardrobes,, is that we are > largely being being had through culturally transmitted control frauds. The > questions really concern how we could do something better and how we can > tell people they are being conned (a very difficult matter). Debates on > epistemology that people can't understand, framed in academic ways of > making livings, involving complex literacy and numeracy, hardly form > anything easily translatable - the ways of making academic livings also > control frauds. > > If one looks at a small area like forensic science, where on might assume > well understood science would produce easily translatable facts, we get a > lot of human corruption. The proper function of forensic science is to > extract the truth. This function, unfortunately, is not well served by > current practice. Saks et al. (2001: 28) write: "As it is practised today, > forensic science does not extract the truth reliably. Forensic science > expert evidence that is erroneous (that is, honest mistakes) and fraudulent > (deliberate misrepresentation) has been found to be one of the major > causes, and perhaps the leading cause, of erroneous convictions of innocent > persons." One rogue scientist engaged in rampant falsification for 15 > years, and another faked more than 100 autopsies on unexamined bodies and > falsified dozens of toxicology and blood reports (Kelly and Wearne 1998; > Koppl 2006, Other Internet Resources). Shocking cases are found in more > than one country. > > Kelly, J. F. and Wearne, P. (1998), Tainting Evidence: Inside the Scandals > at the FBI Crime Lab, New York: The Free Press. > Koppl, Roger (2005), "Epistemic Systems," Episteme: A Journal of Social > Epistemology, 2 (2): 91–106. > > We are affected by this in very practical ways. My contention is most of > the problems could be brought to obvious light. We are 'allowed' the > epistemological, but not practical action. Francis' hammock is in the > right place, the metaphor replete with the quiescence involved in framing > oneself as an academic (which Francis obviously isn't in the best sense I > can mean that). I once 'fitted up' a paedophile for other crimes - he had > committed them, so technically it wasn't a fit up. The institutional and > legal barriers were too big to fight and still are. It got him off the > streets for a couple of years, though he continued after release. Ugly Ray > Terret has just been retrospectively convicted and given 25 years. One > might think we could address the issues of social epistemology through > practical examples everyone can grasp. Indeed, Kopl tries. Yet the > ideologies of soaked-up knowledge, various COWDUNGS (conventional wisdoms > of dominant groups) make this an act of heretic courage. There are still > people who can't take the idea that, say, if born in the Muslim world they > would be Muslim. > > In the West we are dominated by neo-liberalism and economic blather. Even > if we vote to change this, as the Greeks just have, what can any > politicians do confronted with the 'smoke filled rooms' they enter off the > corridors of power with warnings that anything other than austerity will > lead to disaster? Economics is largely a lie through which dominance is > exerted and the West (now largely under the US military umbrella) 'stays > ahead' - and who sensibly would not want this shield against even worse > domination from elsewhere? > > There have been people talking about positive money, democratic foreign > policy and radical democracy for more than 100 years. Yet in politics we > get to vote for main parties making jawbs-groaf promises within > neo-liberalism, corrupt banking and utterly false notions on how growth is > achieved and what it should be. The real dialogue is made invisible, and > Francis' hammock, if right in immanent academic consideration, is part of > bearing witness before the crash. I'm not suggesting Francis is doing this > > We need to think global and beyond. Yet look what globalisation has done > so far and what we fear leaders will do whatever they spout. > > On Sunday, March 8, 2015 at 2:35:19 AM UTC, frantheman wrote: > > Sheldon Cooper of *The Big Bang Theory *justifies his claim always to be > right thus: "If I were wrong I would know it!" > > Am Sonntag, 8. März 2015 02:25:40 UTC+1 schrieb frantheman: > > What a wonderful overview, Neil! I envy your capacity to cook down the > huge amount of controversy involving epistemology, sociology, ideology, > modernism and post-modernism into a few comprehensible paragraphs. > > > > Personally, I find myself suspended between the kind of modernism proposed > by Habermas and the various post-modernist critiques of it. Not always an > easy (or consistent) position, I'm trying to figure out a way to construct > a hammock on the basis of this suspension which allows me to comfortably > swing from one to the other as I please. And didn't someone once comment > that consistency is the privilege of small minds? > > > > If critical theory has established anything, it's that the old > metaphysical arguments about ontology and "das Ding in sich" are just a > waste of time. We can't ultimately get out of our skins; our knowledge is > *human *knowledge, worked out and communicated in *human *terms, and as > such it will always have a cultural and societal framework. Such frameworks > are dynamic, interacting with each other, growing, changing ... organic > really - which is no wonder, given that humans are organic beings. "Pure" > rationality is a chimera, because as humans we can only think in human > categories. Should we ever encounter aliens, I suspect that the > intercommunication would be difficult, frustrating and endlessly > fascinating, because they might very well structure their thinking > according to other categories (that's why they can travel faster than > light, by the way, their way of doing logic doesn't see the problem of *e=mc2 > – *they just take the interdimensional back-way through their granny’s > garden. That is if we don’t kill them first, or they run away from us in > horror to call the inter-stellar exterminators to come and deal with us > because we’re not fit to be let loose on civilized galactic society). And, > of course, one of the major – perhaps *the *major characteristic of the > inevitable human context of our knowledge is language. > > > > Habermas is wonderfully attractive in his appeal for reasonable and > reasoned discourse on societal issues - this conviction that it is possible > through dialogue and mutual understanding to reach conclusions which will > actually make things better. In the end, of course, he's a good > old-fashioned bourgeois liberal who believes in "progress". The problem > with him is that he is convinced that his position (and the post-WWII > western German society in which he lived in, and which he has worked on > forming all his adult life) is the *superior *position (as I said before > - typical German philosopher). I become ever more suspicious of people who > *know *that they're right - and that everyone else is consequently less > right - or to put it more bluntly, *wrong.* > > > > This is where the post-modernists gleefully point their fingers at him. > Denying others absolute truth, he implicitly and pragmatically claims it > for himself. (It’s also why he can’t stand them!) On the other hand, the > various post-modernist *turns *run the risk (and are repeatedly accused) > of falling into complete *laissez-faire *multi-culti, anything-goes > relativism. If our truth-values – to which our moral values belong – are > societally, historically and culturally conditioned, what right do I have > to claim my moral values are better than yours? Weren’t the niggers better > off as slaves on the plantation, being looked after by a kind and > paternalistic massa, than being condemned to living a constant life of > danger, deprivation, drugs and depression in some run-down project in > contemporary decrepit Detroit? Or let’s not even bother with spurious > justifications, let’s go all the way to social Darwinism; the strong do as > they will, and the weak suffer as they must. As it was in the beginning, is > now, and ever shall be, world without end, Amen. > > > > So, at the moment, this is where I find myself intellectually at the > moment, gently swinging in my hammock between these two positions. > Descartes may have found his answer to doubt in his own affirmation of his > self-cognitive rationality (though Dan Dennett > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_Explained> believes he can > define this out of existence), but it’s still a big step to the conviction > of the ultimate *rightness *of the particular positions one espouses. > Maybe the recognition of the conditionality of our own premises, and the > openness to the possibility of their correctibility – while not > automatically offering them up as being completely conjectural and relative > - is the real prerequisite for meaningful discourse. Or as Oliver Cromwell > (normally not someone over-inclined to questioning his own righteousness) > once asked the Assembly of the Church of Scotland, “I beseech you, in the > bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken!” Of course, that > still leaves the question open; how can you even begin to discuss with > people who *know *they’re right? > > > Am Samstag, 7. März 2015 12:54:02 UTC+1 schrieb archytas: > > Good to see you too Don. I'm not much into the nuances of translation > stuff, partly because I lack Gabby's skills and Francis' patience. There > are many versions of Chris' 'make the language simple enough for > translation' angle - one here is called the 'Crystal Method' and is taught > to our bullshit bureaucrats, so they can confuse us with smaller words. We > scientists got the 'Fog Index', screwed as soon as you use an equation or > start talking about attribution tests and extreme value analysis. > > I see another kind of 'translation'. Habermas is actually quite easy > compared with other Germans like Gunter Ludwig on how scientific theories > come about. Russell and Whitehead wrote three volumes on why one and one > make two and, eventually, were wrong. Things get relative when we try to > ground stuff in origin (I was told to remove the word 'stuff' from my > thesis as it was too common a word). I translate this complex social stuff > into a long line of philosophical effort. > > There is no 'start' or 'origin'. If I mention the pre-Socratics and > the pyrrhonists, I know they were much influenced from Persia and India. > They at least knew argument can nearly always be made in several different > ways that are very difficult to choose between. One gets a line from this > stuff to Descartes and that 'I am thinking therefore I am' stuff - I'm more > of an I woke up and am still here bloke. Socrates and Bacon more or less > said public opinion ain't worth shit and Descartes continued this in > radical doubt, supposedly grounded on not being able to deny one's own > presence. Actually, there being thoughts does not imply a thinker, and if > you doubt everything you are, in fact, doubting nothing and have made doubt > into something that can't ground itself. Wittgenstein eventually says we > have been arguing over the same terrain for centuries, not resolved > anything and thus must be bewitched by the language we are using. So we > should know more about language. > > This turns into what we now call social epistemology, away from the > individual introspective sole thinker to something more social. Marx is a > classic example and the discipline of sociology. One can split this in > many ways, though the standard differences are as follows: > " The classical approach could be realized in at least two forms. One > would emphasize the traditional epistemic goal of acquiring true beliefs. > It would study social practices in terms of their impact on the > truth-values of agents' beliefs. A second version of the classical approach > would focus on the epistemic goal of having justified or rational beliefs. > Applied to the social realm, it might concentrate, for example, on when a > cognitive agent is justified or warranted in accepting the statements and > opinions of others. Proponents of the anti-classical approach have little > or no use for concepts like truth and justification. In addressing the > social dimensions of knowledge, they understand "knowledge" as simply what > is believed, or what beliefs are "institutionalized" in this or that > community, culture, or context. They seek to identify the social forces and > influences responsible for knowledge production so conceived. Social > epistemology is theoretically significant because of the central role of > society in the knowledge-forming process. It also has practical importance > because of its possible role in the redesign of information-related social > institutions." > > Karl Marx's theory of ideology could well be considered a type of social > epistemology. On one interpretation of Marx's conception of "ideology", an > ideology is a set of beliefs, a world-view, or a form of consciousness that > is in some fashion false or delusive. The cause of these beliefs, and > perhaps of their delusiveness, is the social situation and interests of the > believers. Since the theory of ideology, so described, is concerned with > the truth and falsity of beliefs, it might even be considered a form of > classical social epistemology. > Karl Mannheim (1936) extended Marx's theory of ideology into a sociology > of knowledge. He classed forms of consciousness as ideological when the > thoughts of a social group can be traced to the group's social situation or > "life conditions". Critical theory aims at emancipation and enlightenment > by making agents aware of hidden coercion in their environment, enabling > them to determine where their true interests lie. Beliefs that agents would > agree upon in the ideal speech situation are ipso facto true beliefs > (Habermas and Luhmann 1971: 139, 224). Here a social communicational device > is treated as a type of epistemic standard. > Habermas, Jurgen and Luhmann, Niklas (1971), Theorie der Gesellschaft oder > Sozialtechnologie – Was Leistet die Systemforschung? Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. > > I could easily extend this to a book so tedious that Francis would be > smashing windows rather than cleaning them. I have read loads of this > stuff, only to conclude the mechanisms involved more or less avoid the > human condition. In the 1930s, Ludwik Fleck (1896–1961), a Polish-Jewish > microbiologist, developed the first system of the historical philosophy and > sociology of science. Fleck claimed that cognition is a collective > activity, since it is only possible on the basis of a certain body of > knowledge acquired from other people. When people begin to exchange ideas, > a thought collective arises, bonded by a specific mood, and as a result of > a series of understandings and misunderstandings a peculiar thought style > is developed. When a thought style becomes sufficiently sophisticated, the > collective divides itself into an esoteric circle (professionals) and an > exoteric circle (laymen). A thought style consists of the active elements, > which shape ways in which members of the collective see and think about the > world, and of the passive elements, the sum of which is perceived as an > “objective reality”. What we call “facts”, are social constructs: only what > is true to culture is true to nature. Thought styles are often > incommensurable: what is a fact to the members of a thought collective A > sometimes does not exist to the members of a thought collective B, and a > thought that is significant and true to the members of A may sometimes be > false or meaningless for members of B. > > The story goes on and on. Most people get more or less no chance to learn > any of it. Fleck's ideas in brief are in“Crisis in Science. Towards a Free > and More Human Science”, in R. S. Cohen and Th. Schnelle (eds.), 1986, pp. > 153–158. > > One of the big questions is how we can translate much of this into > something that translates to quick understanding and doesn't lead to a > bunch of Guardians replacing current control as in Soviet Paradise or > neo-liberalism under the US military umbrella. > > > On Saturday, March 7, 2015 at 7:06:31 AM UTC, Don Johnson wrote: > > Very much enjoying the commentary. Gabby, I have read that the divide > between what is classical-liberalism and modern-liberalism in the States > began during FDR's administration. Campiagn speeches by Hoover and > Roosevelt were both peppered with classical-liberal rhetoric. Indeed, there > was some competition to see who would be the most fiscally conservative. > FDR won. Then came the New Deal and unprecedented goverment spending and > involvement in everyday life. Thus changing the public's view on what > "liberalism" was all about. Now we have a neoclassical liberalism called > Libertarianism. It will be interesting to see how this will be perverted in > the decades to come as no doubt it will be if we ever get a President > elected on this ticket. > > Nice to see the old crew at it again. > > dj > > > On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 7:03 PM, frantheman <[email protected]> wrote: > > Habermas is fine with "herrschaftsfreier Diskurs" as long as he has the > "Herrschaft"! :-) > > I came at Habermas sideways this semester; I was doing pretty intensive > work on the historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans-Ulrich_Wehler>, in particular his > monumental five-volume *Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1770-1989*, and you > can't work on Wehler without having to look at Habermas. The two of them > met as kids in the Hitler-Jugend in Gummersbach, where Habermas was > Wehler's *Gruppenführer*, and remained friends and close associates all > their lives - coming to each other's defence in many of those vicious > intellectual fights German academics are so fond of (e.g. the Sonderweg > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonderweg> discussion, or the > Historikerstreit <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historikerstreit>). > > Both Habermas and Wehler are proponents of what is called in German the > *bürgerliche > Gesellschaft*. To come back to a major theme of this thread, this is a > term which it is very difficult to accurately translate into English > without losing much of its meaning in German and adding things in English > which are not there in German. There is, in fact, no real English word for > *bürgerlich*; conventionally the French term *bourgeois *is used. But > *bourgeois > *has many negative connotations in English (particularly since the 60s, > when it was almost exclusively used in a pejorative Marxist sense) - > *bürgerlich > *is used in German in a much more varied, and often matter-of-fact > fashion. "Middle class" could also be used, but that's a term that can also > be problematic. "Civil society" also captures some of its meaning in a more > neutral sense. When I use the term "liberal democracy," or "western > liberalism" in English, I think the German translation for what I am trying > to describe is *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*. And when I speak of "New Deal, > social-democratic, open, liberal (in the true sense) democracy," it's > basically an attempt to describe what German much more concisely calls > *soziale > Marktwirtschaft*. > > Translation is difficult, because languages both define and are defined by > culture. What's the German for leadership? *Führung. *So what's the > German for leader? *Führer. *But because of German history, there are > major difficulties with using that word, particularly in a German context. > In English there's no problem with calling Angela Merkel the "German > leader." But *deutsche Führer *or *Führerin? *Good luck with that > one! Or, taking a feminist turn - the most common German translation for > authority (in the sense of *power/control*) is *Herrschaft. *How about > *Frau-schaft? > *Or even *Frau schafft*! > > Language is tricky - translation even more so. > > Am Mittwoch, 4. März 2015 23:16:47 UTC+1 schrieb Gabby: > > Much as I would like to see it, I find myself despairing more and more > over the possibility of the kind of decent rational discourse Chris is > pleading for. > > > Hm? Chris was pleading for you and Habermas is pleading for > "herrschaftsfreier Diskurs", so not all hope is lost. ;) > > *Western liberalism *is the concept that I find needs further > problematization. This is what I would see you working on. I am often > astounded how differently the idea of "liberal" is taken in English > speaking countries. > > 2015-03-04 17:55 GMT+01:00 frantheman <[email protected]>: > > One of my professors has suggested that I do a research paper next > semester on the reception of Habermas' thinking about society in the > English-speaking (academic) world, Neil. I'm internally resisting because I > find him so long-winded, obtuse, boring, and self-important (a typical > German academic in other words). I can think of about a hundred things I'd > rather do than immerse myself in his writings - like cleaning the windows > in my flat for instance. > > Fundamentally, Habermas is also a typical German philosopher (like > Leibnitz and Hegel) in that he believes he lives in the best possible world > - that of centre-left North European liberal democracy (though, should he > in his dotage find the way to this group, he would probably deny this and > condemn us all from his self-appointed position as the doyen of German > ivory-tower intellectuals). I would argue that there may have been a moment > when he was perhaps partially right, but this moment has gone. > > In a longer historical context of the past 250 years, there was a moment > when the rationalist liberal bourgeois spirit seemed to be reaching some > kind of fruition in the West - between the end of WWII and the beginning of > the 80s. Then came Reagan, Thatcher, and the religious orthodoxy of > neo-liberal economics and the moment was lost. What I believe happened was > that the old (and some new) elites had finally recovered enough power over > the basic decency of New Deal, social-democratic, open, liberal (in the > true sense) democracy to once more rearrange things to their own maximised > benefit. This is the central point made by Piketty in *Capital in the > Twenty-First Century. *No wonder he has been so viciously attacked by > various acolytes of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy. Since then, Habermas' > "unfinished project" of western liberalism has been continuously - and > purposely - unravelled, often leaving the forms intact while killing the > living substance. > > Much as I would like to see it, I find myself despairing more and more > over the possibility of the kind of decent rational discourse Chris is > pleading for. It's possible - sometimes - in microcosmic areas like this > forum (though even here it can be easily sabotaged). There's one way of > telling the narrati > > ...
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