But you could help to build a repository of meaningful content for the soul, at least in our context here. This is what I suggested before. If you want to, I can go back and find that posting for you.
Am Montag, 9. März 2015 schrieb : > Primate chatter makes more sense. > > I have little to no doubt that you can create a program or programs to > mimic human behavior. Hopefully eliminating poor behavior in getting hung > up in endless loops . .. which can be of great advantage.. at the same time > it can get trapped in loops from which it can not escape making the same > error endlessly.. another human trait. > > Just because you can mimic human thinking and logic flawlessly. The real > problem is is logic can not create a soul.. probably because so little is > known or understood.. to me that is the major problem with Artificial > intelligence. > > > تجنب. القتل والاغتصاب واستعباد الآخرين > Avoid; murder, rape and enslavement of others > > -----Original Message----- > From: archytas <[email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> > To: [email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');> > Sent: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 1:58 PM > Subject: Re: Mind's Eye Re: Götterdämmerung > > One of the missing themes in social epistemology is that people might have > already worked out the 'great theory of coerced oppression' themselves. > The theory then just tells everyone what they knew from experience. Huge > numbers of people think the stuff naive in the face of obvious power. We > then kow-tow like dogs in a pack or chimps under the alpha (a 'political > appointee'). Teaching is a kind of suppressing fire in this view. A lot > of biological metaphors make sense here. Insect consensus, the ability of > parasites in control, leadership bringing sex and huge biological change - > and I defy anyone to listen to primate chatter without recognizing > Parliament. > > Windows 7 comes in home, professional and ultimate. Any disk version you > buy actually has all the versions on it and a small bit of program gives > you access to all versions (but you still need the MS product key to > activate). Humans may be held in something like this condition, switched > off from Molly's higher planes. One sees this all over the plant and > animal world, plus cascade genetics and the managing HOX genes (snakes > could have legs etc) - some developmental switch makes most of the > difference, not the actual genes. Bees can actually reprogram themselves > between nurse and forager. > > I do sometimes wonder if we could bring human change by identifying the > micro-organism that rules us, like drunken ants staggering to their doom at > lunar noon under fungal influence! Habermas ain't the antidote, though he > does tell us someone else has thought some of it through as we might have > guessed. I think machines can help much more than we admit. Though we > also separate the machines from matters like love and caring for a deaf > child. > > On Monday, March 9, 2015 at 11:18:21 AM UTC, Molly wrote: >> >> Cheers, Francis, to all the mad stuff you are doing! >> >> On Sunday, March 8, 2015 at 10:34:26 PM UTC-4, frantheman wrote: >> >> Don't worry, Neil, I haven't sold out and swallowed the academic bait >> with hook, line and sinker! There is, as you often and rightly point out, >> an immense amount of waffle in the whole academic business, frequently >> clothing platitudes, or very small ideas in pages of obfusticating >> gobbledegook, all of it referenced with hundreds of footnotes to show >> everyone how clever and diligent you are. >> >> But, as I mentioned earlier, I have - after a break of nearly 30 years - >> once more formally engaged with the academic world, and am just finishing >> the first semester of a Masters programme in cultural studies. However I'm >> fortunate that I have no great ambitions to make a career out of it, nor am >> I compelled to do so. I still work at an honest job to make a living, >> though I have been able to cut down my working hours to the extent that I >> now get by with doing eight night-shifts per month, looking after four >> chronically seriously ill children. - - >> >> - - (short pause in writing this to detach a seven year hellion from her >> respirator and monitor so that she can go to the bathroom, followed by a >> discussion in sign-language (she's deaf), making it clear to her that she >> must go back to sleep as it's only two thirty in the morning and she has to >> go to school tomorrow. She may have many health issues, but for all that >> she's a typical seven year old, with an infinite capacity for negotiation >> about stuff she doesn't feel like doing) - - >> >> - - Furthermore, I am immensely fortunate to live in a country where >> third level education - at state universities (and the *Fernuniversität >> Hagen <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FernUniversit%C3%A4t_Hagen> *is a >> fully recognised state university on the Open University model) is nearly >> completely free - it costs me € 300 per semester ... read it and weep, >> American readers! Now that my daughters are independently earning their own >> living,I've no one to look after except myself, which makes it all >> financially possible without having to go into horrific debt or live on >> bread and water in an unheated garret. >> >> Cultural Studies is an unusual beast. It was invented around thirty to >> forty years ago by Literature Departments to stave off their widely >> perceived danger of drifting into terminal irrelevance and extinction. In >> Hagen it's organised jointly by the (German) Literature Department and the >> History Department (which identifies strongly with a sociological >> approach <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bielefeld_School> to history and >> regards Max Weber as being only marginally inferior to God). As someone >> embarking on this intellectual journey, I do feel a certain need to try to >> identify my own particular standpoint with respect to all the diverse >> intellectual/academic directions, currents, schools and outlooks which one >> encounters in this area. All the more so as the specific subject of the >> Masters programme glories in the title "European Modernity." Sort of, >> "everything you wanted to know about the past two hundred and fifty years >> but were afraid to ask ... or answer." >> >> The more I read in this whole area, the more I find myself being >> stimulated and excited by the various *turns *in postmodernist thinking. >> Lyotard's scepticism regarding metanarratives (which you mentioned) echoes >> with me, as does a lot of stuff that Frederic Jameson writes - his analyses >> of particular works of modern architecture are great. Of course there's an >> awful lot of pretentious academic wanking around too, but at the moment I'm >> still at the stage of enjoying having my mind and concepts extended. If >> only there weren't such annoying things such as exams and reaserch papers >> (I'm currently trying to finish one on the protoindustrial development of >> the textile industry in the Duchy of Berg >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bergisches_Land> from 1700 to 1820 ... >> yawn!), but that's the price I have to pay for getting formally involved in >> the academic business once more. >> >> Of course I'm not going to save the world with any of this, but there is >> a great feeling of liberation in studying just for fun. And I can now once >> more officially regard myself as a student, which means I don't have to get >> up early in the morning if I don't feel like it. And maybe do all kinds of >> other mad stuff ... >> >> Am Sonntag, 8. März 2015 13:07:42 UTC+1 schrieb archytas: >> >> I suppose the collected works of Habermas and Luhmann would be about the >> size of a big wardrobe. I am not a believer, though find Habermas very >> tempting, "Descartes" (thought of in a long line that might include Molly >> and Orn) is about the pursuit of truth and this continues in social >> epistemology, dropping the solus ipse to a considerable extent - we >> certainly no longer hew to rigid introspectionism - though we can ask 'did >> we ever'? Molly and Orn don't work as people like that, though stand up >> well as examples of people trying for something I have deep respect for >> (there are some key epistemic issues in this - resolvable I think in terms >> of people who want peace and justice). >> >> "Whereas Descartes thought that truth should be pursued only by the >> proper conduct of "reason," specifically, the doxastic agent's own reason, >> social epistemology acknowledges what everyone except a radical skeptic >> will admit, namely, that quests for truth are commonly influenced, for >> better or for worse, by institutional arrangements that massively affect >> what doxastic agents hear (or fail to hear) from others. To maximize >> prospects for successful pursuits of truth, this variable cannot sensibly >> be neglected." >> >> This paragraph could do with some Chris-style 'stripping for >> translation'! Doxastic agents! It is surely 'bleedin' obvious' we are >> people of cultures. At risk of Gabby's wrath, I will mention again these >> cultures are Bacon's Idols. Feminism is a good example of a social >> epistemology in bringing out the male domination of control fraud >> knowledge. >> >> The message, eventually, after reading several wardrobes,, is that we are >> largely being being had through culturally transmitted control frauds. The >> questions really concern how we could do something better and how we can >> tell people they are being conned (a very difficult matter). Debates on >> epistemology that people can't understand, framed in academic ways of >> making livings, involving complex literacy and numeracy, hardly form >> anything easily translatable - the ways of making academic livings also >> control frauds. >> >> If one looks at a small area like forensic science, where on might assume >> well understood science would produce easily translatable facts, we get a >> lot of human corruption. The proper function of forensic science is to >> extract the truth. This function, unfortunately, is not well served by >> current practice. Saks et al. (2001: 28) write: "As it is practised today, >> forensic science does not extract the truth reliably. Forensic science >> expert evidence that is erroneous (that is, honest mistakes) and fraudulent >> (deliberate misrepresentation) has been found to be one of the major >> causes, and perhaps the leading cause, of erroneous convictions of innocent >> persons." One rogue scientist engaged in rampant falsification for 15 >> years, and another faked more than 100 autopsies on unexamined bodies and >> falsified dozens of toxicology and blood reports (Kelly and Wearne 1998; >> Koppl 2006, Other Internet Resources). Shocking cases are found in more >> than one country. >> >> Kelly, J. F. and Wearne, P. (1998), Tainting Evidence: Inside the >> Scandals at the FBI Crime Lab, New York: The Free Press. >> Koppl, Roger (2005), "Epistemic Systems," Episteme: A Journal of Social >> Epistemology, 2 (2): 91–106. >> >> We are affected by this in very practical ways. My contention is most of >> the problems could be brought to obvious light. We are 'allowed' the >> epistemological, but not practical action. Francis' hammock is in the >> right place, the metaphor replete with the quiescence involved in framing >> oneself as an academic (which Francis obviously isn't in the best sense I >> can mean that). I once 'fitted up' a paedophile for other crimes - he had >> committed them, so technically it wasn't a fit up. The institutional and >> legal barriers were too big to fight and still are. It got him off the >> streets for a couple of years, though he continued after release. Ugly Ray >> Terret has just been retrospectively convicted and given 25 years. One >> might think we could address the issues of social epistemology through >> practical examples everyone can grasp. Indeed, Kopl tries. Yet the >> ideologies of soaked-up knowledge, various COWDUNGS (conventional wisdoms >> of dominant groups) make this an act of heretic courage. There are still >> people who can't take the idea that, say, if born in the Muslim world they >> would be Muslim. >> >> In the West we are dominated by neo-liberalism and economic blather. >> Even if we vote to change this, as the Greeks just have, what can any >> politicians do confronted with the 'smoke filled rooms' they enter off the >> corridors of power with warnings that anything other than austerity will >> lead to disaster? Economics is largely a lie through which dominance is >> exerted and the West (now largely under the US military umbrella) 'stays >> ahead' - and who sensibly would not want this shield against even worse >> domination from elsewhere? >> >> There have been people talking about positive money, democratic foreign >> policy and radical democracy for more than 100 years. Yet in politics we >> get to vote for main parties making jawbs-groaf promises within >> neo-liberalism, corrupt banking and utterly false notions on how growth is >> achieved and what it should be. The real dialogue is made invisible, and >> Francis' hammock, if right in immanent academic consideration, is part of >> bearing witness before the crash. I'm not suggesting Francis is doing this >> >> We need to think global and beyond. Yet look what globalisation has done >> so far and what we fear leaders will do whatever they spout. >> >> On Sunday, March 8, 2015 at 2:35:19 AM UTC, frantheman wrote: >> >> Sheldon Cooper of *The Big Bang Theory *justifies his claim always to be >> right thus: "If I were wrong I would know it!" >> >> Am Sonntag, 8. März 2015 02:25:40 UTC+1 schrieb frantheman: >> >> What a wonderful overview, Neil! I envy your capacity to cook down the >> huge amount of controversy involving epistemology, sociology, ideology, >> modernism and post-modernism into a few comprehensible paragraphs. >> >> >> >> Personally, I find myself suspended between the kind of modernism >> proposed by Habermas and the various post-modernist critiques of it. Not >> always an easy (or consistent) position, I'm trying to figure out a way to >> construct a hammock on the basis of this suspension which allows me to >> comfortably swing from one to the other as I please. And didn't someone >> once comment that consistency is the privilege of small minds? >> >> >> >> If critical theory has established anything, it's that the old >> metaphysical arguments about ontology and "das Ding in sich" are just a >> waste of time. We can't ultimately get out of our skins; our knowledge is >> *human *knowledge, worked out and communicated in *human *terms, and as >> such it will always have a cultural and societal framework. Such frameworks >> are dynamic, interacting with each other, growing, changing ... organic >> really - which is no wonder, given that humans are organic beings. "Pure" >> rationality is a chimera, because as humans we can only think in human >> categories. Should we ever encounter aliens, I suspect that the >> intercommunication would be difficult, frustrating and endlessly >> fascinating, because they might very well structure their thinking >> according to other categories (that's why they can travel faster than >> light, by the way, their way of doing logic doesn't see the problem of *e=mc2 >> – *they just take the interdimensional back-way through their granny’s >> garden. That is if we don’t kill them first, or they run away from us in >> horror to call the inter-stellar exterminators to come and deal with us >> because we’re not fit to be let loose on civilized galactic society). And, >> of course, one of the major – perhaps *the *major characteristic of the >> inevitable human context of our knowledge is language. >> >> >> >> Habermas is wonderfully attractive in his appeal for reasonable and >> reasoned discourse on societal issues - this conviction that it is possible >> through dialogue and mutual understanding to reach conclusions which will >> actually make things better. In the end, of course, he's a good >> old-fashioned bourgeois liberal who believes in "progress". The problem >> with him is that he is convinced that his position (and the post-WWII >> western German society in which he lived in, and which he has worked on >> forming all his adult life) is the *superior *position (as I said before >> - typical German philosopher). I become ever more suspicious of people who >> *know *that they're right - and that everyone else is consequently less >> right - or to put it more bluntly, *wrong.* >> >> >> >> This is where the post-modernists gleefully point their fingers at him. >> Denying others absolute truth, he implicitly and pragmatically claims it >> for himself. (It’s also why he can’t stand them!) On the other hand, the >> various post-modernist *turns *run the risk (and are repeatedly accused) >> of falling into complete *laissez-faire *multi-culti, anything-goes >> relativism. If our truth-values – to which our moral values belong – are >> societally, historically and culturally conditioned, what right do I have >> to claim my moral values are better than yours? Weren’t the niggers better >> off as slaves on the plantation, being looked after by a kind and >> paternalistic massa, than being condemned to living a constant life of >> danger, deprivation, drugs and depression in some run-down project in >> contemporary decrepit Detroit? Or let’s not even bother with spurious >> justifications, let’s go all the way to social Darwinism; the strong do as >> they will, and the weak suffer as they must. As it was in the beginning, is >> now, and ever shall be, world without end, Amen. >> >> >> >> So, at the moment, this is where I find myself intellectually at the >> moment, gently swinging in my hammock between these two positions. >> Descartes may have found his answer to doubt in his own affirmation of his >> self-cognitive rationality (though Dan Dennett >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_Explained> believes he can >> define this out of existence), but it’s still a big step to the conviction >> of the ultimate *rightness *of the particular positions one espouses. >> Maybe the recognition of the conditionality of our own premises, and the >> openness to the possibility of their correctibility – while not >> automatically offering them up as being completely conjectural and relative >> - is the real prerequisite for meaningful discourse. Or as Oliver Cromwell >> (normally not someone over-inclined to questioning his own righteousness) >> once asked the Assembly of the Church of Scotland, “I beseech you, in the >> bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken!” Of course, that >> still leaves the question open; how can you even begin to discuss with >> people who *know *they’re right? >> >> >> Am Samstag, 7. März 2015 12:54:02 UTC+1 schrieb archytas: >> >> Good to see you too Don. I'm not much into the nuances of translation >> stuff, partly because I lack Gabby's skills and Francis' patience. There >> are many versions of Chris' 'make the language simple enough for >> translation' angle - one here is called the 'Crystal Method' and is taught >> to our bullshit bureaucrats, so they can confuse us with smaller words. We >> scientists got the 'Fog Index', screwed as soon as you use an equation or >> start talking about attribution tests and extreme value analysis. >> >> I see another kind of 'translation'. Habermas is actually quite easy >> compared with other Germans like Gunter Ludwig on how scientific theories >> come about. Russell and Whitehead wrote three volumes on why one and one >> make two and, eventually, were wrong. Things get relative when we try to >> ground stuff in origin (I was told to remove the word 'stuff' from my >> thesis as it was too common a word). I translate this complex social stuff >> into a long line of philosophical effort. >> >> There is no 'start' or 'origin'. If I mention the pre-Socratics and >> the pyrrhonists, I know they were much influenced from Persia and India. >> They at least knew argument can nearly always be made in several different >> ways that are very difficult to choose between. One gets a line from this >> stuff to Descartes and that 'I am thinking therefore I am' stuff - I'm more >> of an I woke up and am still here bloke. Socrates and Bacon more or less >> said public opinion ain't worth shit and Descartes continued this in >> radical doubt, supposedly grounded on not being able to deny one's own >> presence. Actually, there being thoughts does not imply a thinker, and if >> you doubt everything you are, in fact, doubting nothing and have made doubt >> into something that can't ground itself. Wittgenstein eventually says we >> have been arguing over the same terrain for centuries, not resolved >> anything and thus must be bewitched by the language we are using. So we >> should know more about language. >> >> This turns into what we now call social epistemology, away from the >> individual introspective sole thinker to something more social. Marx is a >> classic example and the discipline of sociology. One can split this in >> many ways, though the standard differences are as follows: >> " The classical approach could be realized in at least two forms. One >> would emphasize the traditional epistemic goal of acquiring true beliefs. >> It would study social practices in terms of their impact on the >> truth-values of agents' beliefs. A second version of the classical approach >> would focus on the epistemic goal of having justified or rational beliefs. >> Applied to the social realm, it might concentrate, for example, on when a >> cognitive agent is justified or warranted in accepting the statements and >> opinions of others. Proponents of the anti-classical approach have little >> or no use for concepts like truth and justification. In addressing the >> social dimensions of knowledge, they understand "knowledge" as simply what >> is believed, or what beliefs are "institutionalized" in this or that >> community, culture, or context. They seek to identify the social forces and >> influences responsible for knowledge production so conceived. Social >> epistemology is theoretically significant because of the central role of >> society in the knowledge-forming process. It also has practical importance >> because of its possible role in the redesign of information-related social >> institutions." >> >> Karl Marx's theory of ideology could well be considered a type of social >> epistemology. On one interpretation of Marx's conception of "ideology", an >> ideology is a set of beliefs, a world-view, or a form of consciousness that >> is in some fashion false or delusive. The cause of these beliefs, and >> perhaps of their delusiveness, is the social situation and interests of the >> believers. Since the theory of ideology, so described, is concerned with >> the truth and falsity of beliefs, it might even be considered a form of >> classical social epistemology. >> Karl Mannheim (1936) extended Marx's theory of ideology into a sociology >> of knowledge. He classed forms of consciousness as ideological when the >> thoughts of a social group can be traced to the group's social situation or >> "life conditions". Critical theory aims at emancipation and enlightenment >> by making agents aware of hidden coercion in their environment, enabling >> them to determine where their true interests lie. Beliefs that agents would >> agree upon in the ideal speech situation are ipso facto true beliefs >> (Habermas and Luhmann 1971: 139, 224). Here a social communicational device >> is treated as a type of epistemic standard. >> Habermas, Jurgen and Luhmann, Niklas (1971), Theorie der Gesellschaft >> oder Sozialtechnologie – Was Leistet die Systemforschung? Frankfurt: >> Suhrkamp. >> >> I could easily extend this to a book so tedious that Francis would be >> smashing windows rather than cleaning them. I have read loads of this >> stuff, only to conclude the mechanisms involved more or less avoid the >> human condition. In the 1930s, Ludwik Fleck (1896–1961), a Polish-Jewish >> microbiologist, developed the first system of the historical philosophy and >> sociology of science. Fleck claimed that cognition is a collective >> activity, since it is only possible on the basis of a certain body of >> knowledge acquired from other people. When people begin to exchange ideas, >> a thought collective arises, bonded by a specific mood, and as a result of >> a series of understandings and misunderstandings a peculiar thought style >> is developed. When a thought style becomes sufficiently sophisticated, the >> collective divides itself into an esoteric circle (professionals) and an >> exoteric circle (laymen). A thought style consists of the active elements, >> which shape ways in which members of the collective see and think about the >> world, and of the passive elements, the sum of which is perceived as an >> “objective reality”. What we call “facts”, are social constructs: only what >> is true to culture is true to nature. Thought styles are often >> incommensurable: what is a fact to the members of a thought collective A >> sometimes does not exist to the members of a thought collective B, and a >> thought that is significant and true to the members of A may sometimes be >> false or meaningless for members of B. >> >> The story goes on and on. Most people get more or less no chance to >> learn any of it. Fleck's ideas in brief are in“Crisis in Science. Towards >> a Free and More Human Science”, in R. S. Cohen and Th. Schnelle (eds.), >> 1986, pp. 153–158. >> >> One of the big questions is how we can translate much of this into >> something that translates to quick understanding and doesn't lead to a >> bunch of Guardians replacing current control as in Soviet Paradise or >> neo-liberalism under the US military umbrella. >> >> >> On Saturday, March 7, 2015 at 7:06:31 AM UTC, Don Johnson wrote: >> >> Very much enjoying the commentary. Gabby, I have read that the divide >> between what is classical-liberalism and modern-liberalism in the States >> began during FDR's administration. Campiagn speeches by Hoover and >> Roosevelt were both peppered with classical-liberal rhetoric. Indeed, there >> was some competition to see who would be the most fiscally conservative. >> FDR won. Then came the New Deal and unprecedented goverment spending and >> involvement in everyday life. Thus changing the public's view on what >> "liberalism" was all about. Now we have a neoclassical liberalism called >> Libertarianism. It will be interesting to see how this will be perverted in >> the decades to come as no doubt it will be if we ever get a President >> elected on this ticket. >> >> Nice to see the old crew at it again. >> >> dj >> >> >> On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 7:03 PM, frantheman <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Habermas is fine with "herrschaftsfreier Diskurs" as long as he has the >> "Herrschaft"! :-) >> >> I came at Habermas sideways this semester; I was doing pretty intensive >> work on the historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans-Ulrich_Wehler>, in particular his >> monumental five-volume *Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1770-1989*, and you >> can't work on Wehler without having to look at Habermas. The two of them >> met as kids in the Hitler-Jugend in Gummersbach, where Habermas was >> Wehler's *Gruppenführer*, and remained friends and close associates all >> their lives - coming to each other's defence in many of those vicious >> intellectual fights German academics are so fond of (e.g. the Sonderweg >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonderweg> discussion, or the >> Historikerstreit <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historikerstreit>). >> >> Both Habermas and Wehler are proponents of what is called in German the >> >> ... > > -- > > --- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > ""Minds Eye"" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','minds-eye%[email protected]');> > . > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > > --- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups ""Minds Eye"" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/minds-eye/wo_ToDMnO4s/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','minds-eye%[email protected]');> > . > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups ""Minds Eye"" group. 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