Hi Platt --
> The "scale of being" is a construct of human intellection that > creates hierarchies. Pirsig's hierarchy is from least to most moral. > The classical "Great Chain of Being" goes from rocks at the > bottom to God at the top. In physics and science in general, > the hierarchy consists of increasing complexity.... The logic of your "morality" seems flawed to me. If, as you claim, the universe is inherently moral, then all its constituents are euqally moral. Is a rock less moral simply because it lacks the "complexity" of a cat or a man? Looked at this way, the rock can't help it if it doesn't have a nervous system. This isn't "immoral" on the rock's part. It can be no more "moral" than it is created to be. If what you really mean is that what has sensibility is more moral than what does not, I could accept the logic but not the definition. Morality infers "choice". As I see it, a rock has no choice but to be an inert chunk of matter. To say that this state represents a "low level of morality" is like blaming the pen's inability to write because it has no ink. > These hierarchies are intellect's way of bringing order out of > chaos. Your hierarchy of all embracing Essence down to > Man and below is another interesting "scale of being." Reason is what brings order out of chaos. (Or, as I would phrase it, balance out of diversity.) Labeling objects as species, phyla, types, divisions, and heirarchies is a way of reasoning. I don't see that it has any relevance to morality. > OK. But my question was about "feelings" which you > say is an attribute of sensibility occurring (I presume) > prior to the slightest emergence of cognizance. I would > think a bacterium exhibits sensibility but no perception >-- "the beginning of of cognizance." Is that right? That is stretching cognizance beyond reason. We cannot determine the capacity to sense (sensibility) by observing the object's responses to stimuli. Litmus paper turns red when dipped in an acid solution. This is a chemical reaction of a photosensitive substance. Are you going to impute morality to it? From my understanding of sensory mechanisms, there is no subjective "awareness" or "cognizance" on the part of an organism in the absence of a functioning central nervous system. You can cause a muscle fiber or a detached frog's leg to twitch in vitro, without any connection to the animal. That's an organic "response", not cognitive sensibility. > Oops, you introduce a new term not defined previously -- > "apprehension." Previously you said that awareness > (being aware) is "proprietary (self-conscious) perception. > So I assume "apprehension" is an attribute of self- > conscious organisms only, i.e., an exclusive property > of humans. Right? Back on 8/13 I said that all your words "relate to subjective apprehension", so I haven't introduced a new term. I'm simply trying to get across the concept of proprietary awareness at the root of subjective apprehension, which is not empirically testable. Unless an organism "KNOWS that it feels" it is not aware or sensible in the context in which I use these terms. I can't tell you precisely where this begins in the "Great Chain of Being" , or which species have this capacity, but I maintain that an integrating organ (i.e., brain or the equivalent) is critical for propietary awareness. [Ham, previously]: > One reason that consciousness is indefinable is that > it can't be localized in nature; it has no empirical existence. > ...The teleology of the universe--it's design, meaning and > purpose--is bound up in the primary source which, unlike > Pirsig's Quality, is non-relational. [Platt]: > Meaning that some questions are beyond human capacity > to answer with empirical certainty? Correct. But remember that "empirical certainty" only means that a particular statement or principle has been proven to be consistent with the theory or proposition against which it is tested. Since man has no way of testing "metaphysical certainty", we have to rely on the scientific method for valid information about the physical universe. > Just to be sure I understand, self-awareness is an attribute > solely of human beings? Worms, fish, frogs need not apply > whereas rats and cats, if they have any awareness of self > at all it is minimal, so as to be unimportant in the big scheme > of things? I don't know what is more or less important to "the big scheme", but I'm convinced that "things" themselves are only important (valuable) to man. > Thanks again for your responses and patience, Ham. You're quite welcome, Platt. I need such questions as a sounding board for presenting my thesis. In that sense, you've been most helpful. Best regards, Ham Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
