Hi Ron [Platt mentioned] --
> I find it most interesting how this thread naturally split in two, > one to the mind aspect one to the matter aspect, s/o. > I think this shift says something. Value when termed in the > realm of mind is best defined as subject object relations. > Value in material physics is best described as varing > forms and force of positive and negative attraction/repulsion > and their relative effects. A a probable stuckness point is > the translation of the mental concept of value to the physical > concept of value. I would argue that there is no difference between the "mental" and the "physical" concept of value. In philosophy Value seldom, if ever, connotes a quantitative measurement of magnitude, form, or force, so there need be no confusion in the reader's mind as to what Value means. The confusion arises when English professors apply their language skills to misconstrue or stretch common word associations in the hope that they will be credited for introducing a "seamless" new theory. When challenged for this abuse of language, they protest on the ground that defining a term destroys the author's concept. You have provided a case in point: > Dynamic Quality seems to be the only concept which unifies > the two, an incomprehensable source of all. It has been called > many things and has been warned that NAMING IT LEADS > TO TROUBLE. That has to be the ultimate excuse for a philosopher articulating a problematic theory. The implication is: It's better that the reader not understand the premise inasmuch as understanding it will may lead to trouble (i.e., incomprehension). Here's another example, courtesy of Platt: > Pirsig has EXTENDED the USUAL MEANING of morality to > encompass other entities and processes in addition > to human beings and their actions. Pirsig has also "redefined" Intellect as a level of Quality and human awareness as a static pattern. How many other perfectly good English words have been given this sleight-of-hand treatment in order to advance a revolutionary new theory? Is it the author's opinion that the end justifies the means, that belief is a "higher Quality" goal for his readers than understanding? If so, why does he deride religion and spiritualism? Apparently, he has no such compunction about mysticism: > Now, how does one present a philosophical unifying concept > that can not be communicated using relational terms? > This is why I believe Pirsig favors Zen and it's "isness". > Intellection taries in dualism. Ron, if you are presenting a philosophical concept that can't be communicated in relational terms, you use non-relational terms, defining them as necessary. For example, Absolute, Awareness, Beingness, Dichotomy, Differentiation, Finitude, Infinitesimilitude, Negate, Not-other, Otherness, Selfness, and Sensibility are all words that cross the threshold of relational existence in my philosophy and are defined in my Glossary. My usage of Dynamic, Static, Morality, Pattern, Value, Quality, and Intellect follows conventional (dictionary) meanings. Is this too much to ask of an author seeking to promote a radical new philosophy? We should not have to engage in semantic debates to glean the meaning of a philosopher's thesis. Nor should we assume that the causal reader of a fictionalized book will come away with a new understanding of experiential reality. But perhaps I have "tarried in dualism" too long to appreciate the musings of a poet. Thanks for your kind efforts to reconcile my differences. Regards, Ham Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
