DM said to dmb:
What an odd blind spot you have about how language works. Ham is entitled to 
make a distinction any way he likes. A good dose of Rorty would help you here. 
Ham says he calls what we sense prior to conceptualisation a sensation and what 
we conceptualise experience-proper. I assume he has his reasons for doing this. 
You and I may decide it does not work for us, it has no use, we can make better 
sense of our sensations and experiences with different language but it is easy 
to understand the distinction, it might have its uses. It is up to Ham to show 
what that use is. If we are gonna walk the MOQ walk we need to use lines of 
argument and justification that don't contradict our MOQ take on language. 
That's my view. You damage debate with these lapses.

dmb says:
Yes, I realize that Ham is defining experience as conceptual. That's what makes 
no sense and that's exactly my problem with Rorty. (The text is conceptual and 
its text all the way down.) As I see, this objection does not damage the 
debate. It IS the debate. Defining experience that way doesn't just fail to 
work for me, although that's true too, it doesn't work in the context of the 
MOQ. As I understand it, James and Dewey thought that definition made no sense 
and that defintion of experience excludes dynamic quality from the MOQ, 
construes it outside of experience. And in the MOQ that would put quality 
outside of reality. That is wildly opposed to the notion that reality is 
nothing but experience. That's why Ham's definition, my hair-brained friend, 
makes no sense. And neither does your defense of it. A dose of Rorty would help 
and you're sending Rorty to the rescue for Ham and the MOQ? Even if that were 
true, you gotta realize that is not going to persuade me. When have I ever said 
anything positive about Richard Rorty? I mean, dude, consider your audience 
here. This is so wrong that it becomes comedy. Reminds me of the time Ian took 
me for a bible-thumping Jesus freak. He confessed this just as I was about to 
deliver the "Fun with Blasphemy" paper. Or was it just after? In any case, it 
was funny and so is your advice here.

Besides, just in terms of common sense and conventional definitions, it makes 
no sense to say that what we endure, enjoy or otherwise go through is not an 
experience. If sensations are felt or lived through in what sense is that not 
an experience? Whatever we feel, face, undergo is experience. The certainty 
Descartes could establish without the help of God was his own doubt about 
everything else. All he could know for sure was the experience of doubting. His 
existence is an iffy deduction compared to that. Can't Ham's distinction be 
made without refusing to admit that sensations are experienced in some way? 
Isn't it simply more intelligible to distinquish between cognitive and 
non-cognitive experience rather than assert that one is not experience at all? 
As Dewey says, knowledge is not the only kind of experience and the there is a 
big difference between having an experience and KNOWING you had an experience. 
If anything, we should reserve the word for the actual having of experience and 
we should say the subsequent reflections and conceptions are something else 
derived from the real thing. That doesn't really work either, but I'm just 
saying that if we really HAD TO exclude one or the other, I would still object 
to Ham's definition. But maybe that's just how I define the meaning of the 
phrase "makes no sense". And since you such a good Rortian, you'll allow me to 
define things however I like. 




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