Hi Ham Of course before there is differentiation there is no other, no self, and only oneness. But a whole lot gets differentiated a long time before we get self-reflectiveness or language. And what is this differentiation, other than DQ or on-going emergence and creation. And what are things, other than an illusion, emerging and dis-emerging. And what is the self? No stable thing either, also always on the move, contracting, expanding, changing. No essences, no substances, just change and occasional patterns, be-coming and be-going. All powered by immense potential and possibilities. Endless and pouring forth. The alchemists like to see this reality as a fountain.
Ta David ----- Original Message ----- From: "Ham Priday" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, October 15, 2007 9:01 AM Subject: Re: [MD] "100% confident" > > [DMB says]: >> Well, I hate to sound like such a know-it-all, but I already knew about >> the James-Nashua connection. It played a substantial role in a paper I >> did a few months ago. Apparently, James was the only Western philosopher >> that made a lick of sense to Nashua, at least when he was getting >> started. >> In fact, I found basically this same idea in quite a number of thinkers >> including Bergson and Heidegger. James and Bergson were pen pals >> and admired each other very much. >> >> But my question remains. How does it make sense to say that all >> experience is conceptual and then quote James talking about that which >> "we can only feel without conceiving"? How does it make sense to deny >> that this feeling is an experience? Maybe I should be more generous and >> take this as an admission that you already see the point, that you >> already >> see the logical impossibility of your previous claims. Despite Krueger's >> injection of the material self or corporeal body, which doesn't reflect >> James's explanations of pure experience as neither physical nor psychica, >> this fairly well make the same point I was making. In any case, if this >> is >> what your "value-sensibility" is supposed to mean, then it shouldn't be >> much of a trick to see what Pirsig's Quality is. > > It makes sense to say that experience is conceptual because that's what it > is. Every experience is a conception of some aspect of beingness, whether > it's a tooth that aches, a song that exalts, a dance that titillates, a > lesson that motivates, a journey that excites, or a speech that inspires. > In fact, Krueger notes that "James was suspicious of the idea that > conceptual or propositional thought functions as the primitive-and thus > irreducible-interface between self and world. On this conceptualist or > 'intellectualist' line, as James refers to it, ALL THINKING AND EXPERIENCE > INVOLVES CONCEPTS. NO CONCEPTS, NO EXPERIENCE." [My emphasis] > > But pure, undifferentiated consciousness of the kind that intrigued James > and Nishida is what we "feel without conceiving". It is not "the > corporeal > body" as "a material entity over against other material entities," but the > affinity of the self for its complementary essence. Says Krueger: "Pure > experience is thus normatively superior to any other mode of experience in > which discriminations or distinctions of any kind have comprised the > immediacy and spontaneity of an experience without dualistic > bifurcations." > ... > > "According to Nishida, the authentic or "true self" is only realized in > pure > experience: it is a mode of being-in-the-world in which ego-consciousness > has been negated, and the 'emptied' self actively engages the world and > others in a state of selfless openness and radical receptivity." > > Philosophers can redefine common terms to designate or distinguish one > concept from another. So if the true self is only realized when > "ego-consciousness has been negated," why call it experience? It is not > experienced as an "other"; it is not even experienced as a proprietary > self. > Nishida called it the "emptied "self". I call it "sensibility" -- the > primary state of "selfness" prior to any relational construct of identity > or > intellection. Ergo: value-sensibility. Of course value does relate > (metaphysically) to the primary source, but this relationship is not a > conscious one, nor is it experienced as such. I suppose it's asking too > much for you to accept my view that value is man's link to Essence. But > does this definition of fundamental selfness make no sense to you? > > --Ham > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
