Krimel said: dmb's comments below illustrate the point very nicely. What level does family fit into? In some ways your claim that it is social, works. But one could forcefully argue that the "family" is purely biological. The various forms that "family" takes in human communities is well with in the range of variation we see spread before us in the animal kingdom...
dmb says: Yes, you could argue that all social institutions are "purely biological". But that would just be speculation based on the assumptions of scientism and reductionism. [Krimel] Is that a sneer zinging over my head? Scientism? Reductionism? I am a naïve bandier of "isms". If I were the bearer of the Standard of Scientism I would say the science does not reduce "family" is a single discipline. "Family" is studied in many branches of science medically, genetically, statistically, biologically, sociologically, anthropologically, historically and on and on. In fact with a balanced interdisciplinary point of view the Standard Bearer of Scientism could zoom in on the family from almost any angle or step back and recognize the broad sweep of organisms nurturing their young. How do the assumptions of science diminish ones capacity for understanding? dmb said: The levels are one way to oppose exactly that. A line is drawn between the biological and social to indicate that the latter is not just an extension of the former, but is different in kind. [Krimel] Well if the levels are opposed to exactly that; I'm sure fire ag'in 'em now! There's a line been drawn. Then I'm gonna write my name on it. This bein' winter I think I'll write in yellow. dmb said: Its a way of saying that social structures are not reducable to biology. This irreducability simply says that when we reduce the social to the biological structures from which they sprang, the social structure itself is no longer present. In this way, reductionism doesn't explain a damn thing. [Krimel] I am not sure what you are talking about but Sociology and Biology as "levels" of the MoQ were lifted right out of a college catalog. From a biological point of view "family" serves a vital function, that of nurturing the next generation. How that function is manifest, what form it takes, is not reducible to biology. What is reducible to biology is the fact that the function must be served. The form, even in a single species like our own, can be manifest in a myriad of ways. We call the study of such forms sociology. Come to think of it psychology, anthropology even economics emerge in the same way. And between them they explain all manner of things with remarkable clarity and consistency. dmb said: It merely dissolves the subject matter so that there is no longer anything into which we can inquire. In other words, the biological roots of family structures should be used to enrich our understanding of the family as a social institution, not make it disappear. There is no scientific reason to think that the difference between survival in an ecosystem and adaptation to society is worthy of dismissal. The difference between these two aims is overlooked by the reductionist reading and that's so very narrowly empirical that it is not empirical at all. Its dogma. [Krimel] On what planet does reductionism, whatever that is supposed to mean, follow the trail you have laid out here. Note above. The specific form that a function takes is governed by the laws of evolution whether it be the function of a set of cells of a group of individuals. As Dawkins spelled out in the Selfish Genes, even ideas, memes, follow principles of survival in the face of change. Skinner claimed behaviorism was a direct extension of evolutionary principles to the behavior of organisms. By claiming that evolution strives for 'betterness' Pirsig fosters a gross distortion of the meaning of evolution. Or you might consider this from William James: "I have there tried to show that both mental and social evolution are to be conceived after the Darwinian fashion, and that the function of the environment properly so called is much more that of selecting forms, produced by invisible forces, than producing of such forms..." Krimel said: There is nothing wrong with looking at a system of levels. They are a useful heuristic but they are rules of thumb not metaphysical laws. They are metaphorical and in this case one might add merely metaphorical. dmb says: MERELY metaphorical? I'd agree that the levels are not supposed to be metaphysical laws, but why not take this idea for what it is, namely an idea. Does the concept work? Does it preform the task, accomplish its purpose? (Which doesn't involve finding the true nature of family, by the way.) That's the question to ask when evaluating the levels of the MOQ, don't you think? [Krimel] What task? What purpose? What has this conception done but foster quarrelling and misunderstanding? How does it enrich the theory of evolution? Pirsig's emphasis on patterns of stasis in a sea of change is simply a restatement of evolutionary ideas. Sure you can look at "levels" and as I said it has heuristic value but I seriously do not see it as a central part of the MoQ. 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