Hi Steve,

You'd asked if I had any thoughts in relation to the Sam Harris/"End of Faith" 
thread.  I have to confess that I haven't been following the thread, so I'm 
unsure of what's already been said.  I'm just kind of stumbling in in the 
middle (or end, for all I know).

I did find your question: "In his book, the End of Faith, Sam Harris counters 
the argument that without religion there would be no morality by claiming that 
morality is about happiness and suffering. I don't have the book with me today, 
but there are several examples of analyses he gives of moral decisions made on 
the basis of reducing suffering. 

I'm no philosophy expert, but his thinking sounded Kantian to me. Is that what 
Kant was about?

What are the arguments against basing ethics on happiness/suffering?"

In my view, one shouldn't counter the conflation of religion and morality by 
making a positive claim about what morality _actually_ is.  Rather, one should 
begin by pointing out the conflation.  Because if your opponent refuses to 
distinguish between religion and morality, then you'll lose every time because 
you've already given him the victory.  (In case of refusal to agree on this 
point, the only argumentative recourse you have is to point out that his 
arguments are begging the question because he's already assumed that religion 
and morality are one and the same, so no duh if you lose religion you lose 
morality.)  But say your opponent agrees that the two are distinct--then you 
have a very different kind of discussion.  This becomes a discussion about the 
relative merits of various ways of reinforcing morality, i.e. good ways of 
behaving.

The reason why Harris' way of going about things doesn't fly with me is 
because, yes, it seems Kantian (in what follows, I'm going to construe Harris 
as a Kantian, not because I know anything about Harris, but because you 
suggested it).  The reason I sense Kant in your description is because the 
positive answer (no, you don't need religion because you've misunderstood the 
nature of morality--it ain't about God, its about X) takes the form of a 
foundation.  The religionist Harris supposes is one who thinks, not without 
religion, but without God, there can be no morality.  Religion, as opposed to 
God, is a set of social practices.  If the religionist says that they rest on 
_religion_, then he's already given up the classical ground because now he's in 
the muddy fight of "Well, why do those practices need to be religious 
practices?  What if we can generate good behavior with non-religious 
practices?"  This is the discussion I suggested above, which is an inconclusive 
discussion because it's about betting: the religionist has a bet that good 
behavior will wane if we abandon religious practices and the X 
[atheist/agnostic/secularist/whatever] has a bet that better behavior will wax 
if we Y [abandon religious practices/not take them so seriously/keep them out 
of politics/etc.].  There is no knockdown argument _anywhere_ within range of 
this discussion.  (I've been having this interesting discussion with Sam Norton 
for years.)

So: say the choice is God (not religion).  If the religionist says God, our 
response is likely to be something like, "No, morality doesn't require 
grounding in God.  It's grounded in X."  If the X is "social practices," you 
have to have the muddy discussion (because religion will still have a claim 
going for it as a good set of practices).  Since people generally don't like 
muddy discussions, but would rather out-and-out win, they look for a knockdown 
argument and fill in X positively with an answer that will preclude, not only 
belief in God, but religious practices as a necessary piece of morality.

This is where Kant comes in.  Kant's answer was that morality wasn't based on 
God or social practices but on reason.  And he created an argument (the reason 
bit) that showed why we should be moral.  It was roughly a transcendental 
version of the Golden Rule--because reason is universal (what is true here is 
true everywhere) every action--to be called moral--must be able to pass the 
universal test: roughly, if you can't will it on yourself, why are you willing 
it on anyone?  It's a good rule of thumb, but the whole transcendental thing is 
a lame duck (for the usual pragmatist reasons having to do with Kant's 
assumption that he had no assumptions).  I say stick to social practice 
discussions, but doing that will make you suspicious of the harsh polemics 
being used by, e.g., Hitchens and Dawkins (and probably Dennett, too).

So, what about arguments against basing morality on happiness and suffering?  I 
don't have any because after getting rid of Kant, such bases will all be slug 
fests having to do with the relative features of happiness and suffering.  We 
aren't so simple as Bentham anymore.  We know that this isn't about counting up 
"pleasure points" or anything, but are about balancing various social 
practices.  Religion (and Platonist philosophers like Kant) breed what 
Nietzsche called metaphysical comfort, and religionists/philosophers will be 
unhappier after losing God/Reason/Science (all capitalized to denote idol 
worshiping), but who on earth said that we can't make a distinction between 
short-term and long-term and argue that, yes, every social change produces 
short-term unhappiness, but this change will produce greater happiness and 
reduce suffering in the long-run.  The only reason why we wouldn't be able to 
make that obvious distinction is if we were required to be Kantians--what is 
good here is good everywhere.  And requiring us to be Kantians begs the 
question: you've already assumed that distinctions between past, present and 
future (or more generally, distinctions between different contexts) are besides 
the point because of a Universal Reason.

Matt
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