As a follow-up of my yesterday's Post (March 23rd)
I'd like to quote some paragraphs of H. Maturana's
"Ontology of Observing". I think these are quite
relevant to my comments on Bo's propositions, quote:
" Truth and objectivity is the same, I know of no
truth that's not objective - unless one reverts to
SOM's of looking upon the old myths as "their form of
reason" .
Maturana distinguishes two kinds of objectivity: one
is objectivity proper and the other "objectivity in
parenthesis" (the latter, I admit, not a very elegant
name but conveys the idea very well).
" The assumption of objectivity, objectivity without
parenthesis, entails the assumption that existence is
independent of the observer, that there is an
independent domain of existence, the universum, that
is the ultimate reference for the validation of any
explanation. With objectivity without parenthesis
things, entities, exist with independency of the
observer that distinguishes them, and it is the
independent existence of things (entities, ideas) that
specifies the truth."
This 'objectivity without parentheses' or objectivity
proper is, I assume, what Bo had in mind when writing
the paragraph above and,definitely ,what I had in
mind, when talking yesterday about "scientific
truths".
Maturana continues:
"Contrary to all this, objectivity with parenthesis
entails accepting that existence is brought forth by
the distinctions of the observer, that there are as
many domains of existence as kinds of distinctions the
observer performs: objectivity in parenthesis entails
the multiversa, entails that existence is
constitutively dependent on the observer, and that
there are as many domains of truths as domains of
existence she or he brings forth in her or his
distinctionsÂ…. Finally, under objectivity in
parenthesis, each versum of the multiversa is equally
valid if not equally pleasant to be part of, and
disagreements between observers, when they arise not
from trivial logical mistakes within the same versum,
but from the observers standing in different versa,
will have to be solved not by claiming a privileged
access to an independent reality, but through the
generation of a common versum through coexistence in
mutual acceptance."
Note that, for him, " there are as many domains of
truths as domains of existence she or he brings forth
in her or his distinctions" . That is, we may admit
the possibility of differing scientific truths about
the same group of phenomena; these various "truths"
may be compatible or may contradict; in the latter
case the disagreement will have to be solved by
attempting to find a common versum in which both sets
of ideas could be contrasted.
Don't know if I am extrapolating too much but
it looks to me that this procedure of 'validation' has
many traits in common with Bohmian dialogue. In many
cases differing opinions cannot be unequivocally
categorized as Right or Wrong or True or False; they
may be even both wrong or both right; just so happens
that they are formulated for different domains. If we
can arrive to a common versum, mutually accepted, we
could arrive to what Bohm calls a new shared meaning,
and, originally different sets of ideas, made to
coexist.
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