[Craig, previously] > Of course, the notion that the dice chooses to land in a particular way > is absurd. But nobody claims that. We would only say that "the dice > chooses to land in a particular way" if the dice AS A WHOLE so chooses. > But it is not so absurd to say of any of the minutest parts of a die (call
> it X), that it chooses a particular path. That the dice lands in a > particular way is the interaction of all the various paths of Xs. > Consider: > X chooses to go there > X prefers to go there > X values going there > X is caused to go there > X goes there because a nest of causality is invoked. > For Pirsig, all these record the same data. They differ only in their > explanatory power. Is "X goes there because a nest of causality is invoked" > any better an explanation than "X values going there"? > [Krimel] > Your first three examples here are exactly what you admit is absurd in > your first sentence. It is what is being claimed. They all imply that the > dice is a conscious agent and can decide for itself which number will come > up and that it could choose otherwise. [Craig] You're confusing "the dice AS A WHOLE" with "the minutest parts of a die (call it X)". If you re-read what I wrote without this confusing presupposition,I think you'll find it more appealing. [Krimel] I think you are confused if you think it matters whether the dice as a whole "prefers", "chooses", or "values" or whether X is the middle spot on the 3 face of the dice. [Krimel] > The point I have been attempting to make is that there is no single chain > of causality that leads to a particular outcome. Craig Let's take a specific example: Say I travel from New York City to Boston. You can say there is no single chain of causality that leads to that particular outcome, because I can walk, bicycle, drive a car, ride a train or fly by airplane. But suppose I made the trip in 4 hours. Then I couldn't have walked or ridden a bicycle. And if I went alone, I couldn't have gone by train or plane. So with each further specification that I make regarding the outcome, I eliminate possible chains of causality that lead to it. What reason is there to think that as the specification becomes infinitely fine, the number of possible chains of causality can't become ONE? [Krimel] I thought throwing dice _was_ a specific example but it really doesn't matter as your example is just more complex. As a result at each choice point in your journey all kinds of factors come into play. What I am saying is that those choice points extend from your "conscious decisions" down to the state of every particle in the universe. At each choice point some possibilities close and others open up. It is all probabilistic. In the present, at that instant of Now; all probability is at 100%. As you move in time away from the present instant, either toward the past or the future, probabilities change. You are claiming that in the present a single chain of probability merges into one. I am saying no, lots of chains converge in the present but there is no single chain. The reason we know that all of these factors, including particles in distant galaxies, do have in influence comes from the notion of the butterfly effect and sensitive dependence on initial conditions. The world remains totally deterministic but outcomes can not be specified precisely because it would take more computation power and time to calculate the future than it would to just wait and see what happens. This is why weather and markets are so unpredictable the farther out we try to make our guesses about them. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
