Matt said to Krimel:
The biggest trouble I've had with Pirsig, and which DMB has had with me, is 
that, after saying that we are always directly connected to reality--to dispose 
of the realism/idealism debate and pernicious representationalism--Pirsig 
insists on using a direct/indirect distinction in talking about experience.  
I've always thought this weird, and many of the attempts to gloss Pirsig I've 
thought unsuccessful in allaying fears that we are regressing.  However, there 
are ways to use the distinction, and I've read some interpretations of 
particularly Dewey (and, oddly enough, ancient Greek thought) that have begun 
to make sense of what they were trying to say.

dmb replies:
I think you've raised a crucial point here. Its a good example of the sort of 
unwarranted charge that invariably comes up whenever the topic is somewhere 
near mysticism. It's pretty clear that Pirsig's distinction between direct and 
indirect comes only after he's rejected the representational theory of 
knowledge. The difference is between two categories of experience, neither of 
which is any less "real" than the other. If memory serves, Dewey made the 
distinction between "had" experience and later reflection. He insisted that 
cognitive knowledge was not more real than the initial experience. This would 
be more or less the same as the difference between dynamic and static or direct 
and indirect. As Pirsig points out, the German language has two words for 
"knowing" that reflect this same distinction. One refers to a basic 
familiarity, something you "know" from experience even never deliberately think 
about it, like riding a bike, your grandmother's face, walking through a 
doorway. And then there is cognitive knowledge, where you "know" the principles 
of geometry or law. I think these guys are emphasizing the non-cognitive, 
pre-reflective mode of experience not because they think it is more real but 
because it has traditionally been ignored and excluded by philosophy. Pirsig 
traces it back to the Platonic demand for intelligibility, the one that tried 
to turn truth into a fixed, rigid thing. So I see Pirsig's distinction between 
static and dynamic as a move against Platonism and a rehabilitation of the 
non-conceptual "knowledge" he denigrated at every opportunity.


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