Hi Krimel
[Krimel]
My problems with the levels not being discrete are on different grounds but
I think Craig raised a good point.
The quote from the letter just adds another "level" of confusion. If all
biological patterns are in inorganic, all social patterns, biological and
all intellectual patterns social doesn't that make all patterns inorganic?
Isn't this all just crass evil reductionism?
Aha, so that's what you think? Actually, the dependency part of the level inter
relationship *is* rather reductionist.
But it's the other aspect that adds the really juicy stuff. It acknowledges that
each level is a completely new type of experience, and as such a new (and
discrete) plane of existence.
Take for example smell, according to the reductionist dependency of the levels,
it's *possible* to describe parts of what a smell is in terms of inorganic
patterns. The parts we can describe is how a smell would look inorganically.
But what we *cannot* describe in that way is how that smell *smells* to an
animal. And the thing is, the animal couldn't care less how the smell's
inorganic patterns looks like, its only concern is how the smell *smells*. This
is the biological plane of existence and is absolutely discrete with regards to
the inorganic.
Magnus
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