Hey, Ron --
Some questions to ask ourselves: ARE the levels discrete or continuous are they both or neither, IS DQ/SQ a schism? of objective entities in source? or is DQ/SQ a set of glasses to interpret experience? are the levels also a function of that set of glasses to interpret experience?
Let me try this out on you, since you may be the last one here to take me seriously.
Suppose we forget about levels, whether they are discrete, continuous, or only allegorical. Suppose we focus instead on the "reality experience", which Marsha's allegedly "Buddha-oriented" quotations seem to be pointing to.
Professor Wheeler suggests that "the universe [is] brought into being by the participation of those who participate". Capra says, "we can never speak about nature without, at the same time, speaking about ourselves". Lanza adds: "the observer in a significant sense creates reality and not the other way around." If all these statements are true, isn't it at least conceivable that what we call experience is not passive observation of a world external to us but the act of creating that world? When we intellectualize the sense data that make up our knowledge of reality, are we not defining the forms, order, and laws of the physical word we experience?
I'm not suggesting, as Donald Hoffman did, that Consciousness is the essence of reality. But I am reinterpreting what Pirsig may have had in mind when he said "experience is the cutting edge of reality," that when we experience value as being, we delineate its dimensions and properties and project them as an organized relational system of finite components. Furthermore, if we all start out with the same Quality (value), isn't it reasonable that the objective world we each construct as an individual represention of value will be a universally shared experience? And, if that is true, such a concept is not solipsism; it's phenomenalism.
I won't elaborate on the dynamics of this concept or their source, lest I be accused of logical errors. However, I would be interested in your evaluation of such an ontology, particularly as it relates to the statements of Stapp, Wheeler, Heisenberg, Schrodinger, et al. Does it in any way help to clear up the "core problems" of the MoQ? Or, does it only add more confusion
to Pirsig's levels? Many thanks, Ron. Essentially yours, Ham Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
