The received view of theories is a position in the philosophy of science that
identifies a scientific theory with a set of propositions which are considered
to be linguistic objects, such as axioms. Frederick Suppe describes the
position of the received view by saying that it identifies scientific theories
with an "axiomatic calculi in which theoretical terms are given a partial
observation interpretation by mean of correspondence rules." [1] The received
view is generally associated with the logical empiricists.
Recently, the received view of theories has been displaced by the semantic view
of theories as the dominant position in theory formulation in the philosophy of
science.
The semantic view of theories is a position in the philosophy of science that
holds that a scientific theory can be identified with a collection of models.
The semantic view of theories was originally proposed by Patrick Suppes in “A
Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models in Mathematics and the
Empirical Sciences”[1] as a reaction against the received view of theories
popular among the logical positivists. Many varieties of the semantic view
propose
identifying theories with a class of set-theoretic models in the Tarskian
sense, [2] while others specify models in the mathematical language stipulated
by
the field of which the theory is a member[3]
-Wiki
Ron:
As we can see, Bodvar supports a positivists view with the "recieved view of
theories" by stating that MoQ IS reality and S/O M
IS intellect. We may also see the correspondence with the semantic view that
theories are identified with models with the Pirsig
view of MoQ and SOM being such theoretical models.
Also we see the comparison with the positivists view of deductive reductionism
and analytic v.s. inductive observation.
"
"Analysis and reductionism
Analysis is the activity of breaking an observation or theory down into simpler
concepts in order to understand it.
Analysis is as essential to science as it is to all rational enterprises. It
would be impossible, for instance, to
describe mathematically the motion of a projectile without separating out the
force of gravity, angle of projection
and initial velocity. Only after this analysis is it possible to formulate a
suitable theory of motion.
Reductionism in science can have several different senses. One type of
reductionism is the belief that all fields
of study are ultimately amenable to scientific explanation. Perhaps a
historical event might be explained in
sociological and psychological terms, which in turn might be described in terms
of human physiology, which
in turn might be described in terms of chemistry and physics. The historical
event will have been reduced to a
physical event. This might be seen as implying that the historical event was
'nothing but' the physical event,
denying the existence of emergent phenomena.
Daniel Dennett invented the term greedy reductionism to describe the assumption
that such reductionism was
possible. He claims that it is just 'bad science', seeking to find explanations
which are appealing or eloquent,
rather than those that are of use in predicting natural phenomena.
Arguments made against greedy reductionism through reference to emergent
phenomena rely upon the fact
that self-referential systems can be said to contain more information than can
be described through individual
analysis of their component parts. Examples include systems that contain
strange loops, fractal organization
and strange attractors in phase space. Analysis of such systems is necessarily
information-destructive because
the observer must select a sample of the system that can be at best partially
representative."-wiki
Ron:
This is where we see how Pirsigs interpretation trumps Bodvars, Pirsigs
interpretation embraces induction.
"Induction
One solution to this problem is to rely on the notion of induction. Inductive
reasoning maintains that if a situation
holds in all observed cases, then the situation holds in all cases. So, after
completing a series of experiments
that support the Third Law, one is justified in maintaining that the Law holds
in all cases.
Explaining why induction commonly works has been somewhat problematic. One
cannot use deduction,
the usual process of moving logically from premise to conclusion, because there
is simply no syllogism
that will allow such a move. No matter how many times 17th century biologists
observed white swans,
and in how many different locations, there is no deductive path that can lead
them to the conclusion that
all swans are white. This is just as well, since, as it turned out, that
conclusion would have been wrong.
Similarly, it is at least possible that an observation will be made tomorrow
that shows an occasion in
which an action is not accompanied by a reaction; the same is true of any
scientific law.
One answer has been to conceive of a different form of rational argument, one
that does not rely on deduction.
Deduction allows one to formulate a specific truth from a general truth: all
crows are black; this is a crow;
therefore this is black. Induction somehow allows one to formulate a general
truth from some series of
specific observations: this is a crow and it is black; that is a crow and it is
black; therefore all crows are black".-wiki
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