Hi Ham,
I feel we've covered this territory so much that there really is no point
in arguing about it further. The new quote you cite is all well and good
but tells us nothing about what moral good ought to be emotionally
desirable. There are those who consider it good and emotionally desirable
to cut off another's head. At least Pirsig gives us a rationale for
determining the good from the bad by reference to his moral evolutionary
levels. Decapitation is fine at the biological level, not good at the
social, and definitely bad at the intellectual.
So long as you stick to your subjective-centered view of an objective
reality Pirsig's moral inquiry will always be off little value to you. But
for all the reasons given in Lila, I prefer his static/Dynamic division of
a moral reality. Of course, my preference in no way affects my high regard
of you. We see eye to eye on many important matters.
Best,
Platt
{Platt]
> > I have probably missed the point of your questions since it
> > seems obvious to me and probably to you that we as
> > human beings currently living in the West are much better off
> > than we were, say, in the Middle Ages or, going back even
> > further, when we were painting symbols of antelope in the caves
> > of Lascaux. As for the obvious "better offness" of morality,
> > we no longer live in a world where might makes right but in a
> > world of laws protecting individual rights to be free of social
> > (government) oppression -- rights that as you know are now
> > being threatened by Obamamania. Unfortunately the path to
> > betterness (individual liberty/personal responsibility) is never
> > without reversals and setbacks such as we are witnessing today.
[Ham]
> I guess I've narrowed down my "mission" here to a single purpose:
> persuading
> the MoQers that value and morality start with the individual subject. The
> problem with you folks -- and that includes you, Platt -- is that Pirsig
> has
> rejected subjectivity and you are all trying to get around it by impugning
> value to the insentient universe. This won't work epistemologically,
> metaphysically, or as a morality system.
>
> This isn't a political mission -- heaven knows we've been beating that to
> death for years. Rather, it's the principle that value sensibility is
> proprietary to the individual, not an attribute of the universe. Value is
> perceived differentially by the human being (organism) which
> intellectualizes (rationalizes) it as an "esthetic/moral spectrum" from
> goodness or excellence to evil or banality. What we experience are
> objectivized manifestations of these values, and morality represents an
> effort to ensure that human society survives and flourishes in the same
> way
> that biological instincts assure the survival of non-valuistic life
> forms.
>
> I believe that Mr. Pirsig was aiming for the same objective when decided
> to
> make LILA "An Inquiry into Morals". What muddied the waters was his
> refusal
> to acknowledge subjective awareness as the locus of value, replacing it
> with
> an evolutionary system of levels and patterns which, in effect, turns
> process and relations into "static" phenomena.
>
> Back in the '50s, I was intrigued by a small paperback in which a
> biologist
> outlined a moralistic philosophy based on attraction and desire. As a
> social moralist, you may find his line of reasoning of interest:
>
> "How much more certain a man is to do right if he not only knows what it
> is
> but WANTS to do it! This want guards him far more strongly against wrong
> than does the enforcement of his loyalty by law or obligation. A stong
> desire, a goal he seeks, is more powerful in the end than these. The
> lesson
> we must learn is that the only sure way to make man moral is through his
> motives, to make him WANT to do the things he OUGHT to do. The means to
> save society may be as simple--and as difficult--as that. What makes us
> do
> evil is that evil, for one reason or another, attracts us more rthan good
> does. Not until virtue is attractive FOR ITS OWN SAKE will men cleave
> always to it. Our motive, our emotions, our MOVINGS must be elevated if
> life is to reach a higher moral plane. Many reformers think that emotions
> are a hindrance to man's attainment of the ideal society, and look forward
> to the day when reason only, unclouded by feeling, will guide his conduct.
> That day will never come, for emotion gives the motive power for behavior.
> ...Science can help develop techniques by which the good life can be
> found,
> but we shall never attain to it unless we earnestly DESIRE to do so."
> -- Edmund W. Sinnott: "The Biology of the Spirit" (1957)
>
> For all I know, Dr. Sinnott's little book may have sparked my interest in
> human value. (I no longer remember.) However, if you compare this simple
> concept with Pirsig's non-subjective, non-emotional, levels-driven
> universe,
> you may understand the reason for my discontent.
>
> Essentially yours,
> Ham
>
>
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