Hey, Platt --
I feel we've covered this territory so much that there really is no point in arguing about it further. The new quote you cite is all well and good but tells us nothing about what moral good ought to be emotionally desirable. There are those who consider it good and emotionally desirable to cut off another's head. At least Pirsig gives us a rationale for determining the good from the bad by reference to his moral evolutionary levels. Decapitation is fine at the biological level, not good at the social, and definitely bad at the intellectual.
I'm not giving up that easily. You've put your finger on the "ought" question, which is what everybody seems to expect philosophy to answer. Beware of the philosopher who does!
I addressed this question in my Values Page last week which ran the David Brooks column you had cited earlier. I wrote: "A major concern of those who participate in philosophy discussions is: How should I act in a given situation? The presumption is that a philosopher should be able to tell us, or at least present a moral framework that can guide our behavior when faced with social decisions. ...Essentialism holds that the basis of any value system is individual preference. When people participate collectively in a culture, a community, or the workplace, it's the value preferences of the individual members that establishes the moral guidelines."
Brooks had quoted Steven Quartz of the California Institute of Technology, who said: "Our brain is computing value at every fraction of a second Everything that we look at, we form an implicit preference. Some of those make it into our awareness; some of them remain at the level of our unconscious, but ...what our brain is for, what our brain has evolved for, is to find what is of value in our environment." This I think is the key to teleology and the purpose of man's existence, but it won't make sense to those who deny the subjectivity of value sensibility.
You mention decapitation as an evil act. Remember what Sinnott wrote about evil in my quote from "Biology of the Spirit" yesterday? "What makes us do evil is that evil, for one reason or another, attracts us more than good does. Not until virtue is attractive FOR ITS OWN SAKE will men cleave always to it." What is "virtue" but a standard of moral excellence? And where does this standard come from but the perceived values of individuals like you and me? For a society to survive, its members must temper their response to values with "reason". Laws can be established to maintain peace and harmony. But a social order evolves BECAUSE its participants value the lives and freedom of their fellow human beings. Hence, what is "reasonable" in the collective sense is actually an expression of human compassion in the individual sense. Where value (moral excellence) is "attractive for its own sake" as well as the desired goal of autonomus individuals, the society will survive and flourish. This is the morality implicit in Essentialism.
By the way, where is Pirsig's rationale for determining that decapitation is bad? Do you really believe that domination of the intellectual level over the biological level will prevent acts of violence and cruelty against mankind? Do you regard values such as excellence, beauty, freedom, and compassion as "intellectual"? (Frankly, I think emotions are "psycho-somatic", and therefore at least as biological as they are intellectual.) But the issue here is Value, and I maintain that unrealized value does not exist. We are the sensible agents of value, and this sensibility is the driving force of civilization. If we nurture our value-sensibility in the realization that we all benefit from its potential, it is conceivable that societies and nations may one day coexist without the need for laws and edicts.
So long as you stick to your subjective-centered view of an objective reality Pirsig's moral inquiry will always be of little value to you. But for all the reasons given in Lila, I prefer his static/Dynamic division of a moral reality. Of course, my preference in no way affects my high regard of you. We see eye to eye on many important matters.
A reality without subjective awareness cannot be moral. However you conceive of value or quality, it always refers to what you are not. Even when you value "yourself" you are valuing your being-in-the-world objectively. That's why a subject/object reality is necessary for value to be realized. (It's why my metaphysical ontology is based on a Sensibility/Otherness dichotomy.)
I hold you in high regard also, Platt, which is why I've taken the trouble to explain my moral relativism to you, knowing that you will give it the benefit of your (subjective) consideration.
Respectfully, Ham _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
{Platt]> I have probably missed the point of your questions since it > seems obvious to me and probably to you that we as > human beings currently living in the West are much better off > than we were, say, in the Middle Ages or, going back even > further, when we were painting symbols of antelope in the caves > of Lascaux. As for the obvious "better offness" of morality, > we no longer live in a world where might makes right but in a > world of laws protecting individual rights to be free of social > (government) oppression -- rights that as you know are now > being threatened by Obamamania. Unfortunately the path to > betterness (individual liberty/personal responsibility) is never > without reversals and setbacks such as we are witnessing today.[Ham]I guess I've narrowed down my "mission" here to a single purpose: persuadingthe MoQers that value and morality start with the individual subject. Theproblem with you folks -- and that includes you, Platt -- is that Pirsig hasrejected subjectivity and you are all trying to get around it by impugningvalue to the insentient universe. This won't work epistemologically, metaphysically, or as a morality system. This isn't a political mission -- heaven knows we've been beating that to death for years. Rather, it's the principle that value sensibility isproprietary to the individual, not an attribute of the universe. Value isperceived differentially by the human being (organism) which intellectualizes (rationalizes) it as an "esthetic/moral spectrum" from goodness or excellence to evil or banality. What we experience are objectivized manifestations of these values, and morality represents an effort to ensure that human society survives and flourishes in the same way that biological instincts assure the survival of non-valuistic life forms. I believe that Mr. Pirsig was aiming for the same objective when decided to make LILA "An Inquiry into Morals". What muddied the waters was his refusal to acknowledge subjective awareness as the locus of value, replacing it with an evolutionary system of levels and patterns which, in effect, turns process and relations into "static" phenomena. Back in the '50s, I was intrigued by a small paperback in which a biologist outlined a moralistic philosophy based on attraction and desire. As a social moralist, you may find his line of reasoning of interest: "How much more certain a man is to do right if he not only knows what it is but WANTS to do it! This want guards him far more strongly against wrong than does the enforcement of his loyalty by law or obligation. A stong desire, a goal he seeks, is more powerful in the end than these. The lesson we must learn is that the only sure way to make man moral is through his motives, to make him WANT to do the things he OUGHT to do. The means to save society may be as simple--and as difficult--as that. What makes us do evil is that evil, for one reason or another, attracts us more rthan good does. Not until virtue is attractive FOR ITS OWN SAKE will men cleave always to it. Our motive, our emotions, our MOVINGS must be elevated iflife is to reach a higher moral plane. Many reformers think that emotions are a hindrance to man's attainment of the ideal society, and look forward to the day when reason only, unclouded by feeling, will guide his conduct. That day will never come, for emotion gives the motive power for behavior....Science can help develop techniques by which the good life can be found, but we shall never attain to it unless we earnestly DESIRE to do so." -- Edmund W. Sinnott: "The Biology of the Spirit" (1957) For all I know, Dr. Sinnott's little book may have sparked my interest inhuman value. (I no longer remember.) However, if you compare this simpleconcept with Pirsig's non-subjective, non-emotional, levels-driven universe, you may understand the reason for my discontent. Essentially yours, Ham
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