Hey Ham,
[Platt]
> > I feel we've covered this territory so much that there really
> > is no point in arguing about it further. The new quote you cite
> > is all well and good but tells us nothing about what moral
> > good ought to be emotionally desirable. There are those who
> > consider it good and emotionally desirable to cut off another's
> > head. At least Pirsig gives us a rationale for determining the
> > good from the bad by reference to his moral evolutionary
> > levels. Decapitation is fine at the biological level, not good
> > at the social, and definitely bad at the intellectual.
[Ham]
> I'm not giving up that easily. You've put your finger on the "ought"
> question, which is what everybody seems to expect philosophy to answer.
> Beware of the philosopher who does!
I don't know why you warn us against a philosopher who attempts to answer
the "ought" question. Isn't that what philosophers are supposed to do --
offer some guidance on how to live a worthwhile life?
> I addressed this question in my Values Page last week which ran the David
> Brooks column you had cited earlier. I wrote: "A major concern of those
> who
> participate in philosophy discussions is: How should I act in a given
> situation? The presumption is that a philosopher should be able to tell
> us,
> or at least present a moral framework that can guide our behavior when
> faced
> with social decisions. ...Essentialism holds that the basis of any value
> system is individual preference. When people participate collectively in
> a
> culture, a community, or the workplace, it's the value preferences of the
> individual members that establishes the moral guidelines."
Well, there you go. Your answer to the "ought" question: act as you want
within the moral guidelines established by individual preferences of the
group you are part of. Of course that begs the question, "What do you do
when you disagree with your group?" Individuals who have marched to a
different drummer have often been the evolutionary movers and shakers.
> Brooks had quoted Steven Quartz of the California Institute of Technology,
> who said: "Our brain is computing value at every fraction of a second
> Everything that we look at, we form an implicit preference. Some of those
> make it into our awareness; some of them remain at the level of our
> unconscious, but ...what our brain is for, what our brain has evolved for,
> is to find what is of value in our environment." This I think is the key
> to
> teleology and the purpose of man's existence, but it won't make sense to
> those who deny the subjectivity of value sensibility.
It makes sense to me and I deny the subjectivity of value sensibility. Why?
Because such valuations occur before any word-thoughts such as brain,
awareness, environment, unconscious or subjectivity. Such words and
concepts are themselves the result of immediate, ineffable valuations.
Reality is not the words but what happens before you can think of the words
to describe reality.
> You mention decapitation as an evil act. Remember what Sinnott wrote
> about
> evil in my quote from "Biology of the Spirit" yesterday? "What makes us
> do
> evil is that evil, for one reason or another, attracts us more than good
> does. Not until virtue is attractive FOR ITS OWN SAKE will men cleave
> always to it." What is "virtue" but a standard of moral excellence? And
> where does this standard come from but the perceived values of individuals
> like you and me? For a society to survive, its members must temper their
> response to values with "reason". Laws can be established to maintain
> peace
> and harmony. But a social order evolves BECAUSE its participants value
> the
> lives and freedom of their fellow human beings. Hence, what is
> "reasonable"
> in the collective sense is actually an expression of human compassion in
> the
> individual sense. Where value (moral excellence) is "attractive for its
> own
> sake" as well as the desired goal of autonomus individuals, the society
> will
> survive and flourish. This is the morality implicit in Essentialism.
Islam has survived and flourished under Sharia law for thousands of years.
Would you say it represents "moral excellence" or "human compassion?" or
that it "values the lives and freedoms of their fellow human beings?" Then
I could mention other cultures such as China under Mayo, Russian under
Stalin, Cuba under Castro, and Germany under Hitler whose "morality of
participants" was less than sterling. I see little if anything in your
theory of morality, Ham, that is different from multiculturism -- the idea
that all cultures are morally equivalent.
> By the way, where is Pirsig's rationale for determining that decapitation
> is
> bad?
Physical violence against another with intent to harm is biological level
morality, a low level in Pirsig's evolutionary moral structure.
> Do you really believe that domination of the intellectual level over
> the biological level will prevent acts of violence and cruelty against
> mankind?
No. There will always be humans who act biologically against their fellow
man which is why societies have soldiers and police.
> Do you regard values such as excellence, beauty, freedom, and
> compassion as "intellectual"?
When verbalized they are intellectual. When felt they are innate. In many
societies they are perverted and/or smothered for purposes of state power
and order. We are witnessing that in the U.S. today, unfortunately.
> (Frankly, I think emotions are
> "psycho-somatic", and therefore at least as biological as they are
> intellectual.) But the issue here is Value, and I maintain that
> unrealized
> value does not exist. We are the sensible agents of value, and this
> sensibility is the driving force of civilization. If we nurture our
> value-sensibility in the realization that we all benefit from its
> potential,
> it is conceivable that societies and nations may one day coexist without
> the
> need for laws and edicts.
Maybe so, but it sounds like a Utopian dream to m.
[Platt]
> > So long as you stick to your subjective-centered view of an
> > objective reality Pirsig's moral inquiry will always be of little
> > value to you. But for all the reasons given in Lila, I prefer his
> > static/Dynamic division of a moral reality. Of course, my
> > preference in no way affects my high regard of you.
> > We see eye to eye on many important matters.
[Ham]
> A reality without subjective awareness cannot be moral. However you
> conceive of value or quality, it always refers to what you are not. Even
> when you value "yourself" you are valuing your being-in-the-world
> objectively. That's why a subject/object reality is necessary for value to
> be realized. (It's why my metaphysical ontology is based on a
> Sensibility/Otherness dichotomy.)
If you first divide the world into animate/inanimate your metaphysics
works. But if you first divide the world into static/Dynamic Quality, you
get a whole different picture. All depends on that first cut.
> I hold you in high regard also, Platt, which is why I've taken the trouble
> to explain my moral relativism to you, knowing that you will give it the
> benefit of your (subjective) consideration.
I have always given your philosophy serious consideration, Ham. I admit I
don't understand all of your terminology. So I don't know how much
"benefit" my subjective consideration is to you. But I do know that I enjoy
exchanging thoughts with you and am flattered you think of me as a worthy
conversationalist.
Warm regards,
Platt
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>
> > {Platt]
> >> > I have probably missed the point of your questions since it
> >> > seems obvious to me and probably to you that we as
> >> > human beings currently living in the West are much better off
> >> > than we were, say, in the Middle Ages or, going back even
> >> > further, when we were painting symbols of antelope in the caves
> >> > of Lascaux. As for the obvious "better offness" of morality,
> >> > we no longer live in a world where might makes right but in a
> >> > world of laws protecting individual rights to be free of social
> >> > (government) oppression -- rights that as you know are now
> >> > being threatened by Obamamania. Unfortunately the path to
> >> > betterness (individual liberty/personal responsibility) is never
> >> > without reversals and setbacks such as we are witnessing today.
> >
> > [Ham]
> >> I guess I've narrowed down my "mission" here to a single purpose:
> >> persuading
> >> the MoQers that value and morality start with the individual subject.
> >> The
> >> problem with you folks -- and that includes you, Platt -- is that
> Pirsig
> >> has
> >> rejected subjectivity and you are all trying to get around it by
> >> impugning
> >> value to the insentient universe. This won't work epistemologically,
> >> metaphysically, or as a morality system.
> >>
> >> This isn't a political mission -- heaven knows we've been beating that
> to
> >> death for years. Rather, it's the principle that value sensibility
> is
> >> proprietary to the individual, not an attribute of the universe. Value
> >> is
> >> perceived differentially by the human being (organism) which
> >> intellectualizes (rationalizes) it as an "esthetic/moral spectrum"
> from
> >> goodness or excellence to evil or banality. What we experience are
> >> objectivized manifestations of these values, and morality represents
> an
> >> effort to ensure that human society survives and flourishes in the
> same
> >> way
> >> that biological instincts assure the survival of non-valuistic life
> >> forms.
> >>
> >> I believe that Mr. Pirsig was aiming for the same objective when
> decided
> >> to
> >> make LILA "An Inquiry into Morals". What muddied the waters was his
> >> refusal
> >> to acknowledge subjective awareness as the locus of value, replacing
> it
> >> with
> >> an evolutionary system of levels and patterns which, in effect, turns
> >> process and relations into "static" phenomena.
> >>
> >> Back in the '50s, I was intrigued by a small paperback in which a
> >> biologist
> >> outlined a moralistic philosophy based on attraction and desire. As
> a
> >> social moralist, you may find his line of reasoning of interest:
> >>
> >> "How much more certain a man is to do right if he not only knows what
> it
> >> is
> >> but WANTS to do it! This want guards him far more strongly against
> wrong
> >> than does the enforcement of his loyalty by law or obligation. A
> stong
> >> desire, a goal he seeks, is more powerful in the end than these. The
> >> lesson
> >> we must learn is that the only sure way to make man moral is through
> his
> >> motives, to make him WANT to do the things he OUGHT to do. The means
> to
> >> save society may be as simple--and as difficult--as that. What makes
> us
> >> do
> >> evil is that evil, for one reason or another, attracts us more rthan
> good
> >> does. Not until virtue is attractive FOR ITS OWN SAKE will men
> cleave
> >> always to it. Our motive, our emotions, our MOVINGS must be elevated
> if
> >> life is to reach a higher moral plane. Many reformers think that
> >> emotions
> >> are a hindrance to man's attainment of the ideal society, and look
> >> forward
> >> to the day when reason only, unclouded by feeling, will guide his
> >> conduct.
> >> That day will never come, for emotion gives the motive power for
> >> behavior.
> >> ...Science can help develop techniques by which the good life can be
> >> found,
> >> but we shall never attain to it unless we earnestly DESIRE to do so."
> >> -- Edmund W. Sinnott: "The Biology of the Spirit" (1957)
> >>
> >> For all I know, Dr. Sinnott's little book may have sparked my interest
> in
> >> human value. (I no longer remember.) However, if you compare this
> >> simple
> >> concept with Pirsig's non-subjective, non-emotional, levels-driven
> >> universe,
> >> you may understand the reason for my discontent.
> >>
> >> Essentially yours,
> >> Ham
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