Krimel,
The paper you use as justification for your assertions 
"some problems of philosophy" is a paper focused
of that body of rationalism "Philosophy" itself.

"It
is possible therefore, to join the rationalists in
allowing conceptual knowledge to be self-suffic­
ing, while at the same time one joins the em­
piricists in maintaining that the full value of
such knowledge is got only by combining it
with perceptual reality again. This mediating
attitude is that which this book must adopt."

He then focuses his attention on sensory empiricism
leveling similar criticisms of only looking at one side of 
the coin.

"Percepts
and concepts interpenetrate and melt together,
 impregnate and fertilize each other. Neither,
taken alone, knows reality in its completeness.
We need them both, as we need both our legs
to walk with."
 
The conclusion is that our worldview does not need 
"extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but 
possesses in its own right a concatenated or 
continuous structure."
 
James is in fact refining empiricism to exclude "trans-empirical
connective support" which is a kind of rationalism, the charge
against positivism as well. Pragmatic Value and meaning therefore has
a "truer" grip on the interpretation of experience.
 
I think the evidence points to James focus on the primacy of percept
in "some problems of philosophy" is contextualy aimed at the tendancy for the 
discipline of Philosophy to ignore and discount percepts. Now if he would
have emphasised this in "Pragmatism" , "essays on radical empiricism",
"the meaning of truth" and/or "principles of psychology" you may have had
a valid point which would have shook the foundations of the school of 
continental philosophy.
 
 
 
 
 
 
  





________________________________
From: X Acto <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Sent: Wednesday, July 1, 2009 8:12:47 AM
Subject: Re: [MD] Reductionism

Krimel,
Therefore James is not expanding sensory empiricism, he is to a point,
but he is by limiting it to expereince, percept is actually a concept and
it's primacy is actually conceptual, it stands symbolically for raw sensory
data, but we never experience raw sensory data, it is an assumption 
drawn from experience. The reason he focuses on value and meaning
in his work on "Pragmatism".

-Ron




 



________________________________
From: X Acto <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Sent: Wednesday, July 1, 2009 8:00:23 AM
Subject: Re: [MD] Reductionism

Ron:
I think what he points to is the idea that sensory empiricism IS in fact a 
kind of rationalism, this is the rationalism he builds his arguement
against in his essays on radical empiricism. So you are correct, he
does rail against rationalism, but its the rationalism of sensory empiricism.

Ironicly, Dave is actually charging YOU with being a rationalist by calling
you a reductionist.


 



________________________________
From: X Acto <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Sent: Wednesday, July 1, 2009 7:39:19 AM
Subject: Re: [MD] Reductionism

[Krimel]
I get it. I was having trouble figuring out what you were getting at with
your last post. No, I have not been saying that James is the same as Hume
and Locke. He is adding the experience of conjunction and disjunction to
overcome the limits of simple sensory empiricism. In terms of radical
empiricism his aim to still to overcome rationalism. It certainly is not his
aim to do some kind of reverse zwabydah and turn empiricism into
rationalism. Dave would paint James as a rationalist in empirical clothing.
But I am saying that he is just adding to the British empiricists not
throwing them out. 

Ron:
Ok, I'm still not sure I understand, either James, like the sensory empiricists,
asserts that percepts are primary or he's not. If he is, then most of what he
wrote is a refinement of sensory empiricism and can not or would not suit
the term he chose, that of a "Radical" empiricism and would not correspond
with the body of his arguements leveled at sensory empiricism.








________________________________
From: Krimel <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2009 3:06:01 PM
Subject: Re: [MD] Reductionism


I think you would find at least the two chapters on concepts and percepts in
Some Problems of Philosophy very helpful.

http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=1051665 


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