Mark, Platt, all, Thanks for that explication of Emergentism Mark, very interesting.
Platt, even though the given theories of Emergentism are incomplete as you point out, I can see a certain usefulness to the MoQ in their empirical demonstration of the existence of the levels. Which does lead next to the question Why? Which answer then puts us firmly in the MoQ. Emergentism, another methodology but not quite a metaphysics. John On Tue, Nov 17, 2009 at 7:02 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Mark, All > > Emergentism, whether British or Hungarian, suffers from a fatal flaw. It > is entirely bereft of scientific explanation because it fails to identify > deterministic causes or "mechanisms" for the phenomenon in question. > To say that this or that property "emerges" is to say nothing more than > from A comes B. It is a description, not an explanation. Or, if posited as > an explanation it amounts to "Oops." > > Emergentism is associated with chaos and system theories which deny > anything like Dynamic Quality influencing (or having influenced) > innovations. So to use the term with the MOQ is likely to be misleading. > > Regards, > Platt > > > > > > > On 16 Nov 2009 at 22:40, markhsmit wrote: > > > > > Hi, > > I was caught up in the concept of emergence, so I turned to the > > Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu). > > I got stuck reading about British Emergentism. This has probably > > already been discussed before in this forum because it appears to > > be similar to MoQ, in some ways. Take the following two summary > > paragraphs (some parts removed): > > > > 1.4 Summary of British Emergentism > > > > Let us sum up our discussion of the British Emergentists. Common to all > these theorists is a layered view of nature. The world is divided into > discrete strata, with fundamental physics as the base level, followed by > chemistry, biology, and psychology (and possibly sociology). To each level > corresponds a special science, and the levels are arranged in terms of > increasing organizational complexity of matter, the bottom level being the > limiting case investigated by the fundamental science of physics. > > > > Crucial to an account of emergence, however, is a view concerning > the relationship of such levels. On this score, we find that there are, in > fact, two rather different pictures of emergence, one represented by Mill > and Broad, and the other represented by Alexander. For Mill and Broad, > emergence involves the appearance of primitive high-level causal > interactions that are additional to those of the more fundamental levels. > Alexander, by contrast, is committed only to the appearance of novel > qualities and associated, high-level causal patterns which cannot be > directly expressed in terms of the more fundamental entities and principles. > But these patterns do not supplement, much less supersede, the fundamental > interactions. Rather, they are macroscopic patterns running through those > very microscopic interactions. Emergent qualities are something truly new > under the sun, but the world's fundamental dynamics remain unchanged. > > > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/ > > > > Does Pirsig discuss this philosophy? > > > > Mark > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > > Archives: > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
