Hi Ham, Thanks for the question. I'd like to suggest to you a certain perspective in your engagement with Pirsig's philosophy. I expect that you are very committed to some views that differ from Pirsig's and are unlikely to ever be a "convert" to the MOQ because of your commitment to Essentialism. My suggestion is that you don't view your exploration of Pirsig as a competition between two philosophical systems but rather that you examine these two intellectual realities the same way you examine paintings in an art gallery, not with an effort to find out which one is the real painting or even the better painting, but simply to understand and appreciate the accomplishment of a fellow artist. Doing so may keep you out of the trap of always reading Pirsig through the lens of Essentialism rather than trying to see what things look like through Pirsig's lens. If, on the other hand, you see your participation here as only for the purpose of promoting your Essentialism, I'm not interested in having a conversation with you. That sounds unfriendly, but I don't mean it to be. I'm just really not interested right now in that brand of philosophy.
Ham: > I asked why the author calls this division "the first slice of undivided > experience," since all experience is relative and diffferential. > > [Steve]: >> >> Likewise, we might ask, how could there be subjects and objects if >> there were no experiences? To your question, "who or what is having >> the experience?" you might consider that if there were no experiences >> this question could not be asked. Ham: > Pirsig equates Experience with Quality (DQ), Steve: Experience is Quality. DQ-sq is the first cut in defining Quality. Ham: ...which I assume is a unified > entity. My point was that before there were subjects and objects there > could be no experience. It is the subject who experiences, right? Steve: Your point that if before there were subjects and objects there could be no experiences and Pirsig's point that if there were no experiences there could be no subjects and objects have a "chicken and egg" sort of relationship. I think that there is about as much hope in settling the matter through arguments focused on this single point as in settling that old dilemma. Rather I think the idea here is that both notions (experience preceeds subjects and objects and vice versa) are reasonable postulates, so to decide between them we should look to the consequences of choosing one postulate or the other. Pirsig notes that the construction where subjects and objects are primary has a tough time accounting for values. It leads to the question, is value in the subject or the object? Since choosing either horn of this dilemma is inconsistent with other commitments we have (i.e. that quality is real is is not merely subjective but is also not measured objectively), we might favor the alternative Pirsig offers where "the subject who experience" is viewed as a deduction from experience rather than presupposed. Later, Pirsig recognizes that subject-object is not the only possible first cut of experience ad favors DQ-sq. Steve: >> So while it is common sense to think that there must be a subject >> that existed prior to the experience, Pirsig points out that this entity >> that is supposed to be having an experience, this subject, is just an >> idea. >> And (for empiricists anyway) ideas arise out of experiences rather than >> the other way around. Ham: > Even if the subject is "just an idea", where does it reside and what > possesses it? Are you suggesting that Quality is cognizant and has ideas of > its own? Steve: No, Quality is not viewed as cognizant. Ideas are a type of pattern of Quality. Your question is not one that gets asked from the perspective that Pirsig is asking you to take for a spin since a subject doesn't possess ideas in the MOQ. A subject IS ideas among other things. > [Steve]: >> >> Pirsig uses experience in an idiosyncratic way that it is difficult to >> wrap one's mind around, but he defends his usage. Here is an example >> from LC: >> >> 58. ...in all subject-object metaphysics, both the observed (the >> object) and the observer (the subject) are assumed to exist prior to >> the observation. In the MOQ nothing exists prior to the observation. >> The observation creates the intellectual patterns called “observed” >> and “observer.” Think about it. How could a subject and object exist >> in a world where there are no observations? > Ham: > Indeed, in this phenomenalistic scheme, how could a WORLD exist without > observations? > That's precisely my point. The subject is the observer. Prior to the > subject/object division, there could be no observations, no universe, no > existence. Steve: Chicken and egg again. Ham: Yet, you say "the subject is just an idea." As there is no > other agency, it must be Quality that generates the idea. Steve: Yes, Quality sort of "generates the idea," though it is not cognizant. The first cut of Quality is into an creative aspect (DQ) and a created aspect (sq). DQ is considered to be the source of all things. > > [Ham]: >> >> In any case, would it not have made more sense for Pirsig >> to say that the first slice of Quality divides objects from >> subjects? > > [Steve]: >> >> He did in ZAMM, but then he realized that this is just one way of >> many ways to think about defining Quality. Pirsig argues that there >> is a better way of thinking about this first slice as DQ/sq. > Ham: > If "a better way" is one that's more comprehensible, his argument doesn't > cut it for me. I have enough trouble trying to understand Quality as an > unexperienced source, let alone that existence (SOM) is "static" whereas DQ > is "dynamic". Steve: It may be worth the effort to understand and appreciate Pirsig as a fellow artist. > > [Ham]: >> >> I've reread Chpt. 8 and found no logical or epistemological support for >> "undivided" experience. Nor have I learned in any of Pirsig's writings how >> he accounts for evil in a world "composed of nothing but moral value." >> Perhaps you gentlemen can enlighten me. > > [Steve]: > I am glad to hear that you have read Pirsig and can now constructively > participate in this forum. As for "the problem of evil," Pirsig > explains this through different types of static patterns of value. > Participation in each level is always the pursuit of some sort of good > even though biological good is frequently social evil and social good > is frequently intellectual evil. > Ham: > For your information I have not only read ZMM, LILA, the SODV paper, and > Ant's doctorial, but have "chewed over" them for six years. Steve: Excellent! Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
