Hi Ham, > [Steve]: >> >> "There already is a metaphysics of quality. A subject-object >> metaphysics is in fact a metaphysics in which the first division of >> Quality - the first slice of undivided experience - is into >> subjects and objects." >> >> Andre: >> Of course it is...from a Quality perspective it is. >> "The idea that the world is composed of nothing but moral value >> sounds impossible at first" (LILA CH.8). >> >> If Pirsig would have said otherwise he would have had to place it >> outside the DQ/SQ configuration, which is an impossibility. >> The problem with the 'first slice' into subjects and objects is that >> it killed Quality. The DQ/SQ slice preserves it.
Ham: > I think Andre (and Pirsig) have got it backwards. What kills Quality is > homogeneity; differentiation (relation) makes Quality experienceable. Can > you give me an example of "undivided experience"? > > Quality is the fundamental essence of the MoQ. Experience is what subjects > have. But even recalling from Steve's quote that Pirsig equates Quality > with Experience, by what logic does he come up with "undivided experience"? > If experience is undivided before that first slice into subjects, who or > what is having the experience? Steve: Pirsig uses experience in an idiosyncratic way that it is difficult to wrap one's mind around, but he defends his usage. Here is an example from LC: 58. ...in all subject-object metaphysics, both the observed (the object) and the observer (the subject) are assumed to exist prior to the observation. In the MOQ nothing exists prior to the observation. The observation creates the intellectual patterns called “observed” and “observer.” Think about it. How could a subject and object exist in a world where there are no observations? Likewise, we might ask, how could there be subjects and objects if there were no experiences? To your question, "who or what is having the experience?" you might consider that if there were no experiences this question could not be asked. So while it is common sense to think that there must be a subject that existed prior to the experience, Pirsig points out that this entity that is supposed to be having an experience, this subject, is just an idea. And (for empricists anyway) ideas arise out of experiences rather than the other way around. Ham: > In any case, would it not have made more > sense for Pirsig to say that the first slice of Quality divides objects from > subjects? Steve: He did in ZAMM, but then he realized that this is just one way of many ways to think about defining Quality. Pirsig argues that there is a better way of thinking about this first slice as DQ/sq. Ham: > I've reread Chpt. 8 and found no logical or epistemological support for > "undivided" experience. Nor have I learned in any of Pirsig's writings how > he accounts for evil in a world "composed of nothing but moral value." > Perhaps you gentlemen can enlighten me. Steve: I am glad to hear that you have read Pirsig and can now constructively participate in this forum. As for "the problem of evil," Pirsig explains this through different types of static patterns of value. Participation in each level is always the pursuit of some sort of good even though biological good is frequently social evil and social good is frequently intellectual evil. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
