Steve and Andre quoting LILA . . .
[Steve]:
"There already is a metaphysics of quality. A subject-object metaphysics is in fact a metaphysics in which the first division of Quality - the first slice of undivided experience - is into subjects and objects." Andre: Of course it is...from a Quality perspective it is. "The idea that the world is composed of nothing but moral value sounds impossible at first" (LILA CH.8). If Pirsig would have said otherwise he would have had to place it outside the DQ/SQ configuration, which is an impossibility. The problem with the 'first slice' into subjects and objects is that it killed Quality. The DQ/SQ slice preserves it.
I think Andre (and Pirsig) have got it backwards. What kills Quality is homogeneity; differentiation (relation) makes Quality experienceable. Can you give me an example of "undivided experience"?
Quality is the fundamental essence of the MoQ. Experience is what subjects have. But even recalling from Steve's quote that Pirsig equates Quality with Experience, by what logic does he come up with "undivided experience"? If experience is undivided before that first slice into subjects, who or what is having the experience? In any case, would it not have made more sense for Pirsig to say that the first slice of Quality divides objects from subjects?
I've reread Chpt. 8 and found no logical or epistemological support for "undivided" experience. Nor have I learned in any of Pirsig's writings how he accounts for evil in a world "composed of nothing but moral value." Perhaps you gentlemen can enlighten me.
Thanks for allowing me to chime in. --Ham Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
