Hi Horse --
Hi Ham
I think that Steve gave a very good answer to your question:
http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/2010-March/046553.html
Thanks for the link to Steve's post which I have just reviewed.
After explaining that SOM answers the quetrion of 'what exists?' in a
various ways, including "Locke's notion that there are two types of
substances: mental substance (minds) and material substance (objects), or
"collapsing
everything into [mental] substance or material substance," Steve asks:
"Where are the mental substance and material substance that make up
SOM ontology in this description? Nowhere of course. Intellect itself
does not require that we postulate such substances. We can think without
making any assertions about ontology whatsoever. Most people don't give any
thought to metaphysics. They just follow static intellectual patterns of
those who came before them, and SOME of these patterns rely on the S/O
ontological assumptions. But we can even use the words "subject" and
"object" themselves without any ontological implication that these
represent two types of fundamental substances that constitute all of
reality. It is only when we make this presupposition that we are doing
subject-object metaphysics.
"Pirsig's intellect--the manipulations of symbols--does not require us
to attach any ontological significance to the symbols as subjective
stuff and material stuff. To the MOQer, the symbols don't refer to any
kind of "stuff." The symbols are patterns of value, and they stand for
more patterns of value. There is no "stuff" to speak of except as a
sort of pattern of value. It is patterns all the way down."
Steve is right that we don't need to think about two fundamental substances
to experience physical reality and learn from it. The relation of a subject
to its objects is automatic and universal. It is the level or mode of
cognitive experience itself. That's why we don't need a metaphysics to
understand it. We do, however, need a metaphysics to understand relations
in opposition to the fundamental Reality. This is what the MoQ purports to
do by positing existential reality as a hierarchy of Quality levels and
patterns. But, as Bo reminds us, this heirarchy is itself an intellectual
concept, making "the MOQ just another SUBJECTIVE theory, which is back to
SOM-land."
In fact, the MOQ never rises above the relational world of experiential
existence. Even in its dismissal of subjects and objects, it is a doctrine
of patterns evolving in time and interacting in accordance with conflicting
moral principles, one of them being the endless path to "betterness". There
is no beginning or end to the Quality hierarchy, and no "first cause" or
primary source posited for its appearance.
It pains me to say this, but I tend to agree with Bo that to the extent
Pirsig "postulated Quality as the objective reality," and the MOQ as simply
an intellectual construct for that reality, it lacks both an ontology and a
cosmology, therefore does not qualify as a fully-developed metaphysical
thesis. I also think that, having discovered this shattered Humpty-Dumpty
by the wall, it's an exercise in futility on Bo's part to try to put the
pieces back together again in a "more workable" order.
But, of course, this is only one man's opinion, and I have no reason to
believe that it is shared by the MD community at large.
I do appreciate your response to my query, Horse, and for "suffering the
slings and arrows" of my nit-picking.
Happy Easter to you and yours,
Ham
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