On 4/01/10 at 4:38 PM, David Buchanan wrote to Ham:
Positivism, which is one of the purest forms of traditional
empiricism is one of the most clear cut cases of subject-object
dualism. At the beginning of chapter eight in Lila, Pirsig
distinguishes traditional empiricism with his own.
"The MOQ subscribes to what is called empiricism. It claims
that all legitimate human knowledge arises from the senses or
by thinking about what the senses provide. Most empiricists
deny the validity of any knowledge gained through imagination,
authority, tradition, or purely theoretical reasoning. [because
valid empirical evidence is limited to sensory experience]
They regard fields such as art, morality, religion, and
metaphysics as unverifiable."
I agree that empirical knowledge arises from experience. But I think it's a
bit simplistic to claim that empiricists deny the value of insights gained
through intuition or theoretical reasoning. (I know Pirsig begs the question
by using "legitimate", "validity" and "imagination" rather than "empirical",
"value" and "intuition" in this statement, but this leaves reflective
reasoning outside the realm of "knowledge", despite the fact that scientific
conclusions are not possible without it.) That art, morality, religion, and
metaphysics are empirically "unverifiable" does not necessarily mean they
have no value -- even for the empiricist. If that were true, Pirsig could
not have claimed he "subscribes to empiricism."
"The MOQ varies from this by saying that the values of art and
morality and even religious mysticism are verifiable, and that
in the past they have been excluded for metaphysical reasons.
They have been excluded because of the METAPHYSICAL
ASSUMPTIONS that all the universe is composed of subjects
and objects and anything that can't be classified as a subject
or an object isn't real. There is no empirical evidence for this
assumption at all. It is just an assumption. ... If subjects and
objects are held to be the ultimate reality then we're permitted
only one construction of things - that which corresponds to the
> 'objective' world - and all other constructions are unreal."
Again, Dave, this argument is a scapegoat. Pirsig only now mentions
"values" in reference to art, morality, and mysticism, whereas in the first
paragraph he talks about the "validity of knowledge" relative to these
sources. (Clever wordplay?) Also "metaphysical assumptions" are not the
reason religion and mysticism are excluded from [scientific] knowledge. The
methodology of Science adheres strictly to empirical investigation and
confirmation. If scientific conclusions were based on subjective judgments,
it would not be an objective discipline. (Most liberal arts majors don't
appreciate the significance of objectivity in scientific research, or how
little progress Science would have made under the influence of moralistic or
religious authority.)
There is a similar explanation in chapter 5:
"Positivism is a philosophy that emphasizes science
as the only source of knowledge. It sharply distinguishes
between fact and value, and is hostile to religion and
traditional metaphysics. ..."
Frankly, I've seen much more "hostility" to religion and metaphysics from
the MoQists than from the logical positivists.
One thing worth noticing about Pirsig's criticism of the
positivists is that they were hostile to metaphysics for
metaphysical reasons. He's talking about a certain kind
of blindness on the part of the positivists with respect
to their own basic assumptions. They were so busy
asking questions about how to get our subjective ideas
to correspond with the objective reality, they forgot to
ask questions about those questionable questions.
Dave, if positivists are preoccupied with getting their subjective ideas to
conform with objective reality, they are not practicing Science.
Finally, at the end of chapter 29, Pirsig identifies his own
empiricism with James's radical empiricism, wherein,
"subjects and objects are not the starting points of
experience. Subjects and objects are secondary.
They are concepts derived from something more fundamental
which he [James] described as 'the immediate flux of life
which furnishes the material to our later reflection with its
conceptual categories'. In this basic flux of experience,
the distinctions of reflective thought, such as between
consciousness and content, subject and object, mind and
matter, have not yet emerged in the forms which we make
them. Pure Experience [DQ] cannot be called either physical
or psychical: it logically precedes this distinction."
The "Pure Experience" that Pirsig refers to is one of those intellectual
constructs that has no legitimate place in Science. To criticize scientists
for refusing to embrace such concepts is to deny the efficacy of the
empiricism MoQ's author subscribes to.
This is how subjects and objects are demoted from being
the two basic metaphysical categories that make experience
possible to secondary concepts which derived from a more
primary experience.
Yet, if experience were not possible, what would be the source of our
knowledge?
Don't get me wrong. They (subjects and objects) are ideas
derived from experience and function pretty well in
experience most of the time. But when you're asking certain
philosophical questions, that is not one of those times.
This is not one of those times.
You seem to be saying that it is not appropriate to discuss subjects and
objects in philosophical queries. Since philosophy is an exploration of the
nature of reality, why should experiential entities be exempted? Aristotle,
Kant, Spinoza, Descartes, and James certainly didn't exclude them. Why
would Mr. Pirsig, who called experience "the cutting edge of Reality",
consider it inappropriate to include the subject of experience in a
philosophical discourse, now or at any time?
Essentially speaking,
Ham
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