Wisely spoken , Dave, your insights in what the words are carrying by context is astonishing, yes, the words are embedding value's by context, are harbouring secrets,...condensed patterns.
Like this one as example, " my goal is simple , it is to understand the complete universe and everything that is in it"(Hawking) It should be clear to see that only the message counts, as projected value, not the words separately,or the meaning of the components by ass ociation, oops! Adrie 2010/10/6 david buchanan <[email protected]> > > I already commented on this at least once. Again, this describes truth as > provisional, not relative. If it's true "at a given time" as Ant puts it or > "useful until some better comes along" as Pirsig puts it, then that truth is > taken "provisionally". That's the word Pirsig uses and Ant should have used > it too. It's simply a better word within the surrounding context. > Provisional means "arranged or existing for the present, possibly to be > changed later" while "Relativism is the concept of points of view having no > absolute truth or validity, and have only relative, subjective values > according to differences in perception and consideration." > > > > > Here is a quote for you to consider: > > > > > > > > Anthony writes: > > “Intellectual values include truth, justice, freedom, democracy and, > > trial by jury. It’s worth noting that the MOQ follows a pragmatic > > notion of truth so truth is seen as relative in his system while > > Quality is seen as absolute. In consequence, the truth is defined > > as the highest quality intellectual explanation at a given time. > > > > RMP: > > If the past is any guide to the future this explanation must be taken > > provisionally; as useful until something better comes along. One can > > then examine intellectual realities the same way he examines paintings > > in an art gallery, not with an effort to find out which one is the ‘real’ > > painting, but simply to enjoy and keep those that are of value. There are > > many sets of intellectual reality in existence and we can perceive some > > to have more quality than others, but that we do so is, in part, the > result > > of our history and current patterns of values. (Pirsig, 1991, p.103)” > > > > (McWatt,Anthony,MOQ Textbook) > > > > > > > > Marsha > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 6, 2010, at 1:57 PM, MarshaV wrote: > > > > > > > > dmb, > > > > > > I think Radical Empiricism to you means that all and any experience > > > that supports YOU is legitimate. And Pragmatism for you is to define > > > as true those concepts that are useful to YOU. Flush. > > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 6, 2010, at 1:51 PM, david buchanan wrote: > > > > > >> > > >> Marsha said to dmb: > > >> > > >> I have read his biography and think William James was historically > very interesting. - Your words, on the other hand, do not ring good to my > ears. I do not think you know what you are talking about. ... Flush. > > >> > > >> dmb says: > > >> > > >> Of course my words don't ring true to you! That's what disagreement > means, obviously. But what about the words of the philosopher I quote > against your view? That is the evidence you are so willfully ignoring. > Several times I have quoted passages James and Pirsig as evidence against > relativism. The evidence should speak for itself. In other words, you should > be able to see that the pragmatic theory of truth and relativism are NOT the > same thing. Reasonable people respect the evidence, don't you think? > Reasonable people can talk about the meaning of the evidence, don't you > think? Being nice to people you don't like is just one of those things that > grown ups have to do, don't you think? The evidence is not altered by the > fact that you have no respect for me personally, right? It's not altered by > my opinion of you either, right? It comports with your interpretation or it > doesn't. It supports my view or it doesn't. Good evidence should be > persuasive regardless of one's popularity or personal relations, right? > > >> > > >> From "Pragmatism's Conception of Truth", pages 588-9: > > >> "It is quite evident that our obligation to acknowledge truth, so far > from being unconditional, is tremendously conditioned. Truth with a big T, > and in the singular, claims abstractly to be recognized, of course; but > concrete truths in the plural need be recognized only when their recognition > is expedient. A truth must always be preferred to a falsehood when both > relate to the situation; but when neither does, truth is as little of a duty > as falsehood. If you ask me what o’clock it is and I tell you that I live at > 95 Irving Street, my answer may indeed be true, but you don’t see why it is > my duty to give it. A false address would be as much to the purpose.With > this admission that there are conditions that limit the application of the > abstract imperative, THE PRAGMATISTIC TREATMENT OF TRUTH SWEEPS BACK UPON US > IN ITS FULNESS. Our duty to agree with reality is seen to be grounded in a > perfect jungle of concrete expediencies.When Berkeley had explained what > people meant by matter, people thought that he denied matter’s existence. > When Messrs. Schiller and Dewey now explain what people mean by truth, they > are accused of denying ITS existence. These pragmatists destroy all > objective standards, critics say, and put foolishness and wisdom on one > level. A favorite formula for describing Mr. Schiller’s doctrines and mine > is that we are persons who think that by saying whatever you find it > pleasant to say and calling it truth you fulfil every pragmatistic > requirement.I leave it to you to judge whether this be not an impudent > slander. Pent in, as the pragmatist more than anyone else sees himself to > be, between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from the past and the > coercions of the world of sense about him, who so well as he feels the > immense pressure of objective control under which our minds perform their > operations? If anyone imagines that this law is lax, let him keep its > commandment one day, says Emerson. We have heard much of late of the uses of > the imagination in science. It is high time to urge the use of a little > imagination in philosophy. The unwillingness of some of our critics to read > any but the silliest of possible meanings into our statements is as > discreditable to their imaginations as anything I know in recent philosophic > history. Schiller says the true is that which ‘works.’ Thereupon he is > treated as one who limits verification to the lowest material utilities. > Dewey says truth is what gives ‘satisfaction.’ He is treated as one who > believes in calling everything true which, if it were true, would be > pleasant.Our critics certainly need more imagination of realities." > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> Does James sound like an epistemological relativist to you? If so, > please explain. > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> Moq_Discuss mailing list > > >> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > > >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > > >> Archives: > > >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > > >> http://moq.org/md/archives.html > > > > > > > > > > > > ___ > > > > > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > > > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > > > Archives: > > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > > > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > > > > > > > > ___ > > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > > Archives: > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > -- parser Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
