Marsha said to dmb:
I have read his biography and think William James was historically very
interesting. - Your words, on the other hand, do not ring good to my ears. I
do not think you know what you are talking about. ... Flush.
dmb says:
Of course my words don't ring true to you! That's what disagreement means,
obviously. But what about the words of the philosopher I quote against your
view? That is the evidence you are so willfully ignoring. Several times I have
quoted passages James and Pirsig as evidence against relativism. The evidence
should speak for itself. In other words, you should be able to see that the
pragmatic theory of truth and relativism are NOT the same thing. Reasonable
people respect the evidence, don't you think? Reasonable people can talk about
the meaning of the evidence, don't you think? Being nice to people you don't
like is just one of those things that grown ups have to do, don't you think?
The evidence is not altered by the fact that you have no respect for me
personally, right? It's not altered by my opinion of you either, right? It
comports with your interpretation or it doesn't. It supports my view or it
doesn't. Good evidence should be persuasive regardless of one's popularity or
personal relations, right?
>From "Pragmatism's Conception of Truth", pages 588-9:
"It is quite evident that our obligation to acknowledge truth, so far from
being unconditional, is tremendously conditioned. Truth with a big T, and in
the singular, claims abstractly to be recognized, of course; but concrete
truths in the plural need be recognized only when their recognition is
expedient. A truth must always be preferred to a falsehood when both relate to
the situation; but when neither does, truth is as little of a duty as
falsehood. If you ask me what o’clock it is and I tell you that I live at 95
Irving Street, my answer may indeed be true, but you don’t see why it is my
duty to give it. A false address would be as much to the purpose.With this
admission that there are conditions that limit the application of the abstract
imperative, THE PRAGMATISTIC TREATMENT OF TRUTH SWEEPS BACK UPON US IN ITS
FULNESS. Our duty to agree with reality is seen to be grounded in a perfect
jungle of concrete expediencies.When Berkeley had explained what people meant
by matter, people thought that he denied matter’s existence. When Messrs.
Schiller and Dewey now explain what people mean by truth, they are accused of
denying ITS existence. These pragmatists destroy all objective standards,
critics say, and put foolishness and wisdom on one level. A favorite formula
for describing Mr. Schiller’s doctrines and mine is that we are persons who
think that by saying whatever you find it pleasant to say and calling it truth
you fulfil every pragmatistic requirement.I leave it to you to judge whether
this be not an impudent slander. Pent in, as the pragmatist more than anyone
else sees himself to be, between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from
the past and the coercions of the world of sense about him, who so well as he
feels the immense pressure of objective control under which our minds perform
their operations? If anyone imagines that this law is lax, let him keep its
commandment one day, says Emerson. We have heard much of late of the uses of
the imagination in science. It is high time to urge the use of a little
imagination in philosophy. The unwillingness of some of our critics to read any
but the silliest of possible meanings into our statements is as discreditable
to their imaginations as anything I know in recent philosophic history.
Schiller says the true is that which ‘works.’ Thereupon he is treated as one
who limits verification to the lowest material utilities. Dewey says truth is
what gives ‘satisfaction.’ He is treated as one who believes in calling
everything true which, if it were true, would be pleasant.Our critics certainly
need more imagination of realities."
Does James sound like an epistemological relativist to you? If so, please
explain.
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