dmb, 

I think Radical Empiricism to you means that all and any experience 
that supports YOU is legitimate.  And Pragmatism for you is to define 
as true those concepts that are useful to YOU.  Flush.   



On Oct 6, 2010, at 1:51 PM, david buchanan wrote:

> 
> Marsha said to dmb:
> 
> I have read his biography and think William James was historically very 
> interesting.  -  Your words, on the other hand, do not ring good to my ears.  
> I do not think you know what you are talking about. ... Flush.
> 
> dmb says:
> 
> Of course my words don't ring true to you! That's what disagreement means, 
> obviously. But what about the words of the philosopher I quote against your 
> view? That is the evidence you are so willfully ignoring. Several times I 
> have quoted passages James and Pirsig as evidence against relativism. The 
> evidence should speak for itself. In other words, you should be able to see 
> that the pragmatic theory of truth and relativism are NOT the same thing. 
> Reasonable people respect the evidence, don't you think? Reasonable people 
> can talk about the meaning of the evidence, don't you think? Being nice to 
> people you don't like is just one of those things that grown ups have to do, 
> don't you think? The evidence is not altered by the fact that you have no 
> respect for me personally, right? It's not altered by my opinion of you 
> either, right? It comports with your interpretation or it doesn't. It 
> supports my view or it doesn't. Good evidence should be persuasive regardless 
> of one's popularity or personal relations, right?
> 
> From "Pragmatism's Conception of Truth", pages 588-9:
> "It is quite evident that our obligation to acknowledge truth, so far from 
> being unconditional, is tremendously conditioned. Truth with a big T, and in 
> the singular, claims abstractly to be recognized, of course; but concrete 
> truths in the plural need be recognized only when their recognition is 
> expedient. A truth must always be preferred to a falsehood when both relate 
> to the situation; but when neither does, truth is as little of a duty as 
> falsehood. If you ask me what o’clock it is and I tell you that I live at 95 
> Irving Street, my answer may indeed be true, but you don’t see why it is my 
> duty to give it. A false address would be as much to the purpose.With this 
> admission that there are conditions that limit the application of the 
> abstract imperative, THE PRAGMATISTIC TREATMENT OF TRUTH SWEEPS BACK UPON US 
> IN ITS FULNESS. Our duty to agree with reality is seen to be grounded in a 
> perfect jungle of concrete expediencies.When Berkeley had explained what 
> people meant by matter, people thought that he denied matter’s existence. 
> When Messrs. Schiller and Dewey now explain what people mean by truth, they 
> are accused of denying ITS existence. These pragmatists destroy all objective 
> standards, critics say, and put foolishness and wisdom on one level. A 
> favorite formula for describing Mr. Schiller’s doctrines and mine is that we 
> are persons who think that by saying whatever you find it pleasant to say and 
> calling it truth you fulfil every pragmatistic requirement.I leave it to you 
> to judge whether this be not an impudent slander. Pent in, as the pragmatist 
> more than anyone else sees himself to be, between the whole body of funded 
> truths squeezed from the past and the coercions of the world of sense about 
> him, who so well as he feels the immense pressure of objective control under 
> which our minds perform their operations? If anyone imagines that this law is 
> lax, let him keep its commandment one day, says Emerson. We have heard much 
> of late of the uses of the imagination in science. It is high time to urge 
> the use of a little imagination in philosophy. The unwillingness of some of 
> our critics to read any but the silliest of possible meanings into our 
> statements is as discreditable to their imaginations as anything I know in 
> recent philosophic history. Schiller says the true is that which ‘works.’ 
> Thereupon he is treated as one who limits verification to the lowest material 
> utilities. Dewey says truth is what gives ‘satisfaction.’ He is treated as 
> one who believes in calling everything true which, if it were true, would be 
> pleasant.Our critics certainly need more imagination of realities." 
> 
> 
> 
> Does James sound like an epistemological relativist to you? If so, please 
> explain. 
> 
> 
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