dmb, Right, the quote has no pragmatic value as stated, so you want to redefine it to suit your point-of-view. That sounds like a choice made relative to your personal interest. Hmmm.
For the last time: 'In fact, that's why I don't want to discuss with you, dmb. I think you don't really know what you're talking about. Sorry.' Marsha On Oct 6, 2010, at 3:37 PM, david buchanan wrote: > > I already commented on this at least once. Again, this describes truth as > provisional, not relative. If it's true "at a given time" as Ant puts it or > "useful until some better comes along" as Pirsig puts it, then that truth is > taken "provisionally". That's the word Pirsig uses and Ant should have used > it too. It's simply a better word within the surrounding context. Provisional > means "arranged or existing for the present, possibly to be changed later" > while "Relativism is the concept of points of view having no absolute truth > or validity, and have only relative, subjective values according to > differences in perception and consideration." > > > >> Here is a quote for you to consider: >> >> >> >> Anthony writes: >> “Intellectual values include truth, justice, freedom, democracy and, >> trial by jury. It’s worth noting that the MOQ follows a pragmatic >> notion of truth so truth is seen as relative in his system while >> Quality is seen as absolute. In consequence, the truth is defined >> as the highest quality intellectual explanation at a given time. >> >> RMP: >> If the past is any guide to the future this explanation must be taken >> provisionally; as useful until something better comes along. One can >> then examine intellectual realities the same way he examines paintings >> in an art gallery, not with an effort to find out which one is the ‘real’ >> painting, but simply to enjoy and keep those that are of value. There are >> many sets of intellectual reality in existence and we can perceive some >> to have more quality than others, but that we do so is, in part, the result >> of our history and current patterns of values. (Pirsig, 1991, p.103)” >> >> (McWatt,Anthony,MOQ Textbook) >> >> >> >> Marsha >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Oct 6, 2010, at 1:57 PM, MarshaV wrote: >> >>> >>> dmb, >>> >>> I think Radical Empiricism to you means that all and any experience >>> that supports YOU is legitimate. And Pragmatism for you is to define >>> as true those concepts that are useful to YOU. Flush. >>> >>> >>> >>> On Oct 6, 2010, at 1:51 PM, david buchanan wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> Marsha said to dmb: >>>> >>>> I have read his biography and think William James was historically very >>>> interesting. - Your words, on the other hand, do not ring good to my >>>> ears. I do not think you know what you are talking about. ... Flush. >>>> >>>> dmb says: >>>> >>>> Of course my words don't ring true to you! That's what disagreement means, >>>> obviously. But what about the words of the philosopher I quote against >>>> your view? That is the evidence you are so willfully ignoring. Several >>>> times I have quoted passages James and Pirsig as evidence against >>>> relativism. The evidence should speak for itself. In other words, you >>>> should be able to see that the pragmatic theory of truth and relativism >>>> are NOT the same thing. Reasonable people respect the evidence, don't you >>>> think? Reasonable people can talk about the meaning of the evidence, don't >>>> you think? Being nice to people you don't like is just one of those things >>>> that grown ups have to do, don't you think? The evidence is not altered by >>>> the fact that you have no respect for me personally, right? It's not >>>> altered by my opinion of you either, right? It comports with your >>>> interpretation or it doesn't. It supports my view or it doesn't. Good >>>> evidence should be persuasive regardless of one's popularity or personal >>>> relations, right? >>>> >>>> From "Pragmatism's Conception of Truth", pages 588-9: >>>> "It is quite evident that our obligation to acknowledge truth, so far from >>>> being unconditional, is tremendously conditioned. Truth with a big T, and >>>> in the singular, claims abstractly to be recognized, of course; but >>>> concrete truths in the plural need be recognized only when their >>>> recognition is expedient. A truth must always be preferred to a falsehood >>>> when both relate to the situation; but when neither does, truth is as >>>> little of a duty as falsehood. If you ask me what o’clock it is and I tell >>>> you that I live at 95 Irving Street, my answer may indeed be true, but you >>>> don’t see why it is my duty to give it. A false address would be as much >>>> to the purpose.With this admission that there are conditions that limit >>>> the application of the abstract imperative, THE PRAGMATISTIC TREATMENT OF >>>> TRUTH SWEEPS BACK UPON US IN ITS FULNESS. Our duty to agree with reality >>>> is seen to be grounded in a perfect jungle of concrete expediencies.When >>>> Berkeley had explained what people meant by matter, people thought that he >>>> denied matter’s existence. When Messrs. Schiller and Dewey now explain >>>> what people mean by truth, they are accused of denying ITS existence. >>>> These pragmatists destroy all objective standards, critics say, and put >>>> foolishness and wisdom on one level. A favorite formula for describing Mr. >>>> Schiller’s doctrines and mine is that we are persons who think that by >>>> saying whatever you find it pleasant to say and calling it truth you >>>> fulfil every pragmatistic requirement.I leave it to you to judge whether >>>> this be not an impudent slander. Pent in, as the pragmatist more than >>>> anyone else sees himself to be, between the whole body of funded truths >>>> squeezed from the past and the coercions of the world of sense about him, >>>> who so well as he feels the immense pressure of objective control under >>>> which our minds perform their operations? If anyone imagines that this law >>>> is lax, let him keep its commandment one day, says Emerson. We have heard >>>> much of late of the uses of the imagination in science. It is high time to >>>> urge the use of a little imagination in philosophy. The unwillingness of >>>> some of our critics to read any but the silliest of possible meanings into >>>> our statements is as discreditable to their imaginations as anything I >>>> know in recent philosophic history. Schiller says the true is that which >>>> ‘works.’ Thereupon he is treated as one who limits verification to the >>>> lowest material utilities. Dewey says truth is what gives ‘satisfaction.’ >>>> He is treated as one who believes in calling everything true which, if it >>>> were true, would be pleasant.Our critics certainly need more imagination >>>> of realities." >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Does James sound like an epistemological relativist to you? If so, please >>>> explain. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Moq_Discuss mailing list >>>> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >>>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >>>> Archives: >>>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >>>> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >>> >>> >>> >>> ___ >>> >>> >>> Moq_Discuss mailing list >>> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >>> Archives: >>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >>> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >> >> >> >> ___ >> >> >> Moq_Discuss mailing list >> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >> Archives: >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >> http://moq.org/md/archives.html > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
