Let me put it this way; The question is not whether philosophy deals in abstractions or not. Of course it does and it must. The question is whether or not it's a good idea to exclude certain kinds of experience from our reflections. Is it good to have a starting point that says only certain kinds of experiences are worthy of philosophical reflection and articulation? The radical empiricist says "no". He says all experience is worthy. He complains that a certain range of experience has been excluded for metaphysical reasons and he thinks it's time to correct that mistake. This particular radical empiricist thinks Rorty only repeats that mistake.
> From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2010 21:36:22 -0700 > Subject: Re: [MD] Philosophy and Abstraction > > > Matt quoted his essay: > "I think at the heart of the difference between philosophers attracted to the > classical pragmatists but repelled by Rorty is the thought that radical > empiricism returns us to the scene of life, a counter to abstract > philosophical sterilities. I can empathize with the formulation, to the idea > of pragmatism "returning us to the scene of life," a formula I've grown fond > of. However, what I think we should rather say in most cases, is that > philosophy is abstract by nature--that's what it is--and returning to the > scene of life is something that people need to figure out how to do, not > necessarily philosophies, or other abstract activities. For instance, why > would we necessarily want theoretical physics to do so? Philosophy is Dewey's > indirect experience--returning to life is knowing, as Wittgenstein put it, > when to put philosophy down." > > > > dmb says: > I understand what you mean and it does get at the heart of the difference. > This is an example of where you gleefully embrace a position that makes me > cringe. I also think you're mis-characterizing and misreading the situation. > > Roughly, if the scene of life is DQ and philosophical abstractions are static > quality, then you would be saying that DQ is something people need to figure > out, not philosophies. Isn't that fair? > > I think it would only be natural for a MOQer to be alarmed by what you're > saying. This is not just picking nits. I'm fairly certain that putting DQ > into our philosophies - or rather some working concepts about DQ - is the > main mission of the MOQ. > We do want to maintain the distinction between the immediacy of life and > reflective knowing and it's good to know when not to reflect. But you are > taking a stance that very much opposes the MOQ's main thrust. For Pirsig, the > great crime is that somewhere back in ancient Greece Quality was pushed under > and made subservient to intellect. I think Rorty has his prints all over this > stance, the Rortian lens at work again. From here it just looks like Plato > slandering the Sophists all over again. And so I cringe. > > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
