Matt, Caution: If you let dmb frame the issue "Let me put it this way", he just might try to screw you with it.
Marsha On Nov 29, 2010, at 11:54 PM, david buchanan wrote: > > Let me put it this way; The question is not whether philosophy deals in > abstractions or not. Of course it does and it must. The question is whether > or not it's a good idea to exclude certain kinds of experience from our > reflections. Is it good to have a starting point that says only certain kinds > of experiences are worthy of philosophical reflection and articulation? The > radical empiricist says "no". He says all experience is worthy. He complains > that a certain range of experience has been excluded for metaphysical reasons > and he thinks it's time to correct that mistake. This particular radical > empiricist thinks Rorty only repeats that mistake. > >> From: [email protected] >> To: [email protected] >> Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2010 21:36:22 -0700 >> Subject: Re: [MD] Philosophy and Abstraction >> >> >> Matt quoted his essay: >> "I think at the heart of the difference between philosophers attracted to >> the classical pragmatists but repelled by Rorty is the thought that radical >> empiricism returns us to the scene of life, a counter to abstract >> philosophical sterilities. I can empathize with the formulation, to the idea >> of pragmatism "returning us to the scene of life," a formula I've grown fond >> of. However, what I think we should rather say in most cases, is that >> philosophy is abstract by nature--that's what it is--and returning to the >> scene of life is something that people need to figure out how to do, not >> necessarily philosophies, or other abstract activities. For instance, why >> would we necessarily want theoretical physics to do so? Philosophy is >> Dewey's indirect experience--returning to life is knowing, as Wittgenstein >> put it, when to put philosophy down." >> >> >> >> dmb says: >> I understand what you mean and it does get at the heart of the difference. >> This is an example of where you gleefully embrace a position that makes me >> cringe. I also think you're mis-characterizing and misreading the situation. >> >> Roughly, if the scene of life is DQ and philosophical abstractions are >> static quality, then you would be saying that DQ is something people need to >> figure out, not philosophies. Isn't that fair? >> >> I think it would only be natural for a MOQer to be alarmed by what you're >> saying. This is not just picking nits. I'm fairly certain that putting DQ >> into our philosophies - or rather some working concepts about DQ - is the >> main mission of the MOQ. >> We do want to maintain the distinction between the immediacy of life and >> reflective knowing and it's good to know when not to reflect. But you are >> taking a stance that very much opposes the MOQ's main thrust. For Pirsig, >> the great crime is that somewhere back in ancient Greece Quality was pushed >> under and made subservient to intellect. I think Rorty has his prints all >> over this stance, the Rortian lens at work again. From here it just looks >> like Plato slandering the Sophists all over again. And so I cringe. >> >> ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
