Thanks Adrie & Andre. I met Dean at the Liverpool conference. I wasn't interested in pragmatism at the time and he had moved on to study film and critical theory in grad school. We talked about movies, mostly. He's a bit shy but he seemed like a very smart dude. My thesis uses Pirsig's notion of Quality to illuminate James's notion of pure experience because I discovered in a survey of the literature that many James scholars find pure experience to be confusing. Quality, the equivalent of James's most perplexing term, is discussed and developed throughout both of Pirsig's book. If there is anything that would more helpful to James and James scholarship, I'd like to know what it is.
> Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2011 23:46:06 +0100 > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [MD] The Dynamics of Value > > For your information , Andre.(in regard of what David and you are trying to > explain) > > http://robertpirsig.org/Pragmatism.htm > > Some quality snips( out of context) > DEAN SUMMERS document. > > Under introduction- > Undoubtedly Pirsig's texts are unique in their synthesis of the forms of > fiction, autobiography, travelogue, chautauqua, ‘how to’ manual and > philosophy amongst others. However the agreement that they are unique seems > also to serve to identify the texts as cultish and to thereby contain and > remove Pirsig's philosophy from mainstream philosophical consideration. This > is quite probably a mistake at the expense of contemporary philosophy. In > this study we will try to show that Pirsig presents not only a coherent and > tenable theory, but that he has made a significant contribution to American > pragmatism. We will ignore the unique form of his work in order to focus on > the relevance and importance that his concepts might have for the mainstream > philosophical discourse > > and further.. > To give Pirsig his fair trial then we will be analysing his philosophy in > terms of the pragmatism of Peirce, James and Dewey. Regarding Pirsig we will > be necessarily reductionist, considering only the essentially philosophical > aspects of his texts and ignoring all other aspects. Regarding the founders > of pragmatism, we will be necessarily selective - we will select from their > rigorous and extensive arguments in order to support, clarify and achieve > the fullest possible exposition of Pirsig's rather sketchier arguments. The > crucial point of this is that Pirsig offers a significant development of > pragmatism. If it were simply that he agrees with or is in line with the > pragmatists, then Pirsig's philosophizing might be of little interest to us. > The importance of his work is that his specific concept of Quality is an > original and valuable development of American pragmatic philosophy. > > Further.. > The Metaphysics of Quality is a continuation of the mainstream of > twentieth-century American philosophy. It is a form of pragmatism, of > instrumentalism. (Pirsig, 1991, 373) These claims, which seem to involve > only the central concepts of his and James' positions, are quite specific. > We will address them in this study but our aim is also to make a wider > comparison than Pirsig has done - wider in the sense that it extends to > Peirce and Dewey too, and wider in the sense that we will consider the full > extent of Pirsig's position, including the general motives and the > criticisms of other philosophies which he shares with the founders of > pragmatism. It is hoped that in doing so we might initiate a revised > understanding of Pirsig's unique inquiries into values and morals, and that > we might indicate further areas of Pirsig's philosophy which require > necessary critical analysis. > > Under Quality and reality- > > It seems from this outlining of a connection that the pragmatists arguments > not only agree with Pirsig's but can also reinforce it. Furthermore Pirsig's > concept of dynamic quality is seen to be a development of Peirce's > metaphysical inquiries. It seems that Pirsig has given a name to that which > Peirce all but names himself - quality. Turning to James' idea of reality we > see that the connection is equally strong. We can agree with him that he is > a pluralist but still identify his metaphysics as monistic. James' pluralism > covers his concept of truth and meaning, but does not extend to his concept > of reality. He conceives of reality as “neutral stuff” , neither mind nor > matter, which can only be described as flux. Again, we can understand this > to mean ‘that which is without essential qualities, something which is > no-fixed-thing - in short - dynamic. And as we have argued, the only > candidate (except nothingness, which we have discounted) for this flux is > Pirsig's ‘quality.’ Only quality can be qualityless and thus dynamic or > 'flux' in James' terms. There is no obvious difference between Pirsig's > monism – dynamic quality - and James' “neutral stuff.” For James the > separation of this neutral stuff into mind and matter is a later conscious > addition to the prior experience. This is the central point of James' > doctrine of immediate perception - that there is no separation of subject > and object, of knower and known at the moment of experiencing. James calls > the neutral stuff of reality “pure experience” (James, 1912, 93) – Pure > experience is the name which I gave to the immediate flux of life which > furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual > categories. (James, 1912, 93) > Furthermore.. > > The past exists only in our memories, the future only in our plans. The > present is our only reality. The tree that you are aware of intellectually, > because of that small time lag, is always in the past and therefore is > always unreal. Any intellectually conceived object is always in the past and > therefore unreal. Reality is always the moment of vision before the > intellectualization takes place. There is no other reality. This > pre-intellectual reality is what he had identified as Quality. Since all > intellectually identifiable things must emerge from this pre-intellectual > reality, Quality is the parent, the source of all subjects and objects. > (Pirsig, 1974, 249-250) Here Pirsig inverts the relationship of quality, > subject and object. In what he calls a “Copernican inversion” (Pirsig, 1974, > 249) the dualistic picture in which the experience of quality is the product > of the relationship of subject and object is reversed so that the concepts > of subject and object arise out of the experience of quality. Subjects and > objects are part of the material which, in James' terms, pure experience > furnishes our later conceptual categories. > > At this point we can now examine Pirsig's claim that his Metaphysics of > Quality seems to unite (James') pragmatism and radical empiricism into a > single fabric. (Pirsig, 1991, 372) > Pirsig takes the central theses of James' two philosophical systems, which > he was unable to unite satisfactorily himself, and finds that the concept of > quality makes that unification possible. Quality, or value, is the pragmatic > test of truth - and this is the essence of any form of Pragmatism (we will > discuss truth in chapter 2). The significance of Pirsig's theory is that he > also demonstrates that quality or value is the primary empirical experience, > in other words - that it is reality itself. Radical empiricism stated the > doctrine of immediate perception - that in experience the knower and the > known are not distinct, not separate, which Pirsig also maintains. He adds > to this that experience is value. Thus it is experience (which is value), > and not correspondence to the objective world (of knowledge) which is the > test of truth. A statement is true only if it is valuable...if it is good, > and we evaluate the statement on the basis of experience. Since quality is > reality in Pirsig's system, the ultimate guarantee of truth and meaning is > reality itself. He has developed a pragmatic conception in which pure > experience, reality and value are one and the same thing, thereby dissolving > the problem which plagued James' pragmatism - that the test of truth - > satisfaction - is entirely subjective. > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > (The past exists only in our memories, the future only in our plans. The > present is our only reality.) =>John Wheeler's dictum, present in both books > sometimes hidden in the formulation, still used today in quantum physiks.(my > comment) > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Under knowledge and truth (most important) > > Despite such statements though James' critics level their heaviest attacks > at this conception of facts, in which truth is determined by subjective > interests, and which is thus in constant danger of sliding into relativism. > Pirsig however prevents that slide. He offers a conception of truth in which > facts are pre-selected not on the basis of a relation of utility with our > interests, but on the basis of their quality - which is reality. A valuable > fact is one that agrees with experience. Since experience is of reality, the > test of the truth of a fact is, ultimately, reality. The problem that drives > Pirsig to this position is, in the first instance, his recognition of the > paradox involved in science's claim of objectivity. “Which facts are you > going to observe?” he asks, “There is an infinity of them.” (Pirsig, 197, > 267) Pirsig derives this question from Poincaré in whom he sees a direct > continuity of ideas with his own. This particular point is generated by > Poincaré’s proof of the infinity of mechanical models that can explain any > given phenomenon - see Pirsig, 1974, pp263-272. But Pirsig was independently > aware of this problem before reading Poincaré - see Pirsig, 1974, 117). > > Under conclusions- > "Perhaps though the most important thing, the ultimate demonstration of > Pirsig's pragmatism is that his philosophy grounds out in everyday > action...in everyday life. Like the founders of pragmatism Pirsig shows > above all that there is a demonstrable reason why that which we feel is > good, is good. Experience is not subjective, it is of the good, therefore > the moral good issues directly from reality. Pragmatism breaks the picture > in which knowledge is somehow ‘higher’ than experience and action. It does > this by showing that knowledge is actually a form of action which is guided > by experience. Pirsig's contribution has been to show that that experience > is of an absolutely real good. Furthermore, the moral theory that this gives > rise to is an extremely interesting one. It is perhaps the most dramatic > advance that he makes upon pragmatism, which is itself, for most critics, > above all a moral philosophy. If for this reason alone, Pirsig's philosophy > deserves to be re-evaluated in order to generate further analysis of its > concepts." > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > Pirsig himself in Lila's Child. > 104. In the MOQ, and in William James’ pragmatism, truth is > described as high quality intellectual patterns. > > "LILA" > > But the Metaphysics of Quality also says that Dynamic Quality-the > value-force that chooses an elegant mathematical solution to a laborious > one, or a brilliant experiment over a confusing, inconclusive one-is > another matter altogether. Dynamic Quality is a higher moral order than > static scientific truth, and it is as immoral for philosophers of science > to try to suppress Dynamic Quality as it is for church authorities to > suppress scientific method. Dynamic value is an integral part of science. > It is the cutting edge of scientific progress itself. > Anyway, all this certainly answered the question of whether the Metaphysics > of Quality was a foreign, cultish, deviant way of looking at things. The > Metaphysics of Quality is a continuation of the mainstream of twentieth > century American philosophy. It is a form of pragmatism, of > instrumentalism, which says the test of the true is the good. It adds that > this good is not a social code or some intellectualized Hegelian Absolute. > It is direct everyday experience. Through this identification of pure > value with pure experience, the Metaphysics of Quality paves the way for an > enlarged way of looking at experience which can resolve all sorts of > anomalies that traditional empiricism has not been able to cope with. > Phædrus supposed he could read on into all this James material but he > doubted that he would find anything different from what he had already > found. > > Have to go now, have fun with Dean Summers > > > > 2011/3/7 Andre Broersen <[email protected]> > > > Marsha to dmb: > > > > > > Maybe you need a reading lesson, because there was no mention in the RMP > > quote of 'American pragmatism' being an exception. > > > > Andre: > > Seems to me that you are being obstinately difficult and cantankerous > > Marsha. Dmb has provided you (in six posts) with clarifications based on > > sound rhetoric which neatly tie together and (should) dissolve your concern, > > which, if I remember correctly is that Pirsig's MOQ be 'confined' to the > > Jamesian tradition. > > > > When Pirsig says that his MOQ 'adds to James' pragmatism and his radical > > empiricism...the idea that the primal reality from which subjects and > > objects spring is value' is he thereby 'confining' it to this tradition? I > > suggest NO! Quite the opposite! > > > > As Pirsig says in his introduction to Anthony's PhD: His[Anthony'] purpose > > 'is to permanently enlarge and improve understanding at the most general > > levels of philosophic comprehension'. Is the MOQ thereby 'confined' to those > > general levels? I suggest its opposite. > > > > Phaedrus has taken on the entire Western philosophical tradition dating > > back to pre-Plato times by 'following a path that to his knowledge had never > > been taken before in the history of Western thought',...(ZMM, p 231). Does > > that mean that it is 'confined' to Western thought? > > > > Anthony calls the MOQ 'one of the first indigenous forms of Zen Buddhism to > > appear in the United States' Is the MOQ thereby 'confined' to Zen Buddhism? > > > > Or are you suggesting that Pirsig's MOQ arose out of a vacuum, with no > > 'foundation' of tradition anywhere? Then I would suggest you re-read Pirsigs > > amendment to the Cartesian statement. > > > > 'The Metaphysics of Quality resolves the relationship between intellect and > > society, subject and object, mind and matter, by embedding all of them in a > > larger system of understanding'.(LILA, p 305) > > > > To comprehend the 'embedding' you must have something to 'embed' no? Dmb > > (and Pirsig) has adequately shown which traditions are contrary and which > > traditions show similarities. Reading both in the light of ZMM and LILA can > > greatly aid us in furthering our own understanding of everyday experience(as > > well as reinterpreting our past experiences). I do not call this > > 'confining', I call it enriching. > > > > Does that mean then that the MOQ is 'confined' to your experience? Your > > dismissive attitude tends towards that conclusion Marsha, so who is doing > > the 'confining'? > > > > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > > Archives: > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > > > > > > -- > parser > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
