> > > > Dan: > I don't know what you're talking about here, John. Perhaps you could > clarify what passage you are referring to me? >
John: Copleston Annotations, Dan. The passage in question is one I refer to as the "this is the nonsense that inspired logical positivism" passage. Goes like this: Copleston (quoting Coleridge): 'All knowledge rests on the coincidence of an object with a subject.' But though subject and object are united in the act of knowledge, we can ask which has the priority. Are we to start with the object and try to add to it the subject? Or are we to start with the subject and try to find a passage to the object? In other words, are we to take Nature as prior and try to add to it thought or mind, or are we to take thought as prior and try to deduce Nature? Coleridge answers that we can do neither the one nor the other. The ultimate principle is to be sought in the identity of subject and object. Pirsig: This is strikingly similar to the MOQ. Copleston: Where is this identity to be found? Pirsig: At this point Coleridge is at the same door that Phaedrus was at, but he doesn’t have the key of Quality with him. So he answers: 'Only in the selfconsciousness of a spirit is there the required identity of object and of representation.' What in the world is selfconsciousness of a spirit? John (Lennon): I can't tell you, but I know it's mine. Copleston: But if the spirit is originally the identity of subject and object, it must in some sense dissolve this identity in order to become conscious of itself as object. Pirsig: Ridiculous. Copleston: Self-consciousness, therefore, cannot arise except through an act of will, Pirsig: How did will get in here? Copleston: and 'freedom Pirsig: How did freedom get in here? Copleston: must be assumed as a *ground *of philosophy, and can never be deduced from it'. The spirit becomes a subject knowing itself as object only through 'the act of constructing itself objectively to itself'. Pirsig: This is the sort of nonsense that has inspired logical positivism. John: I disagree with Pirsig. I think Coleridge is right. I think free will has to be assumed as a ground of philosophy and can never be deduced from it. I think free will is co-fundamental with Quality and I think much of what Ham has been hammering at all these years has merit in this regard. > >John: > > My problem, is that when I ask for some explanation, I get a lot of abuse > > and obfuscation and spluttering of various kinds. No real well-thought > > answers at all. It's sadly disappointing to me, because I believe the > MoQ > > is an excellent metaphysical foundation for thought, and you'd expect a > > little more quality intellect than I find amongst its fiercest advocates. > > Dan: > This is disconcerting to read. Apparently I (and many others here) > have done nothing but waste time in attempting to offer up our > interpretations of the MOQ. > > John: Actually dan, I don't think any interpretation of the MoQ is a "wasted time" but I do think there is a tendency to refuse to think about things that are assumed. dan: If you honestly believe the MOQ is an excellent metaphysical > foundation for thought, why don't you practice it? Like I told you > before, I've seen nothing in your posts that is indicative of it. You > have seemingly very little regard for its author and even less for > those who've studied it for years, as evidenced here. > > John: Well... I'm sorry for that. I've tried to engage real dialogic debate over all kinds of issues, especially pertaining to the Copleston annotations, which seem to me a rich treasure trove for latching the MoQ onto classical philosophical problems. But the reactions I've gotten for even trying to do so are, to my mind, absolutely intellectually outrageous. Aspersions of self-aggrandizement are imputed against me and none of the real issues are looked at or ever dealt with. It's a shame, really. The MoQ could be an excellent platform for philosophical exploration, but there is so much resistance against the true questioning required for philosophical inquiry that there seems little hope for any real progress to be made. > >John: > > But I do believe it's important to assert that Quality is co-fundamental > > with Free Will. You literally cannot have Quality when you literally > have > > no choice. Therefore, Quality is dependent upon Choice and unlike Ham > > asserts, Choice is also dependant upon the existence of Quality. There > must > > be a criterion for the better alternative, in order for choice to be > real. > > Dan: > > Again, when I read passages like this, you seem to have little to no > grasp of the MOQ. Free will and determinism are both correct within > the MOQ. So to make statements like: "You literally cannot have > Quality when you literally have no choice" literally make no sense. > > Well, think about it. How can you have Quality if you have no choice? Values are only meaningful when there is freedom to choose, otherwise they don't equate to any kind of "value". If I can choose between A and B, then I have to think about which has more quality. But if I have no choice, if I just have A, then I don't think about the quality of A at all. If somebody believes there is no freedom in the universe, then they'd also have to conclude that there is no quality either. I choose to believe differently. John Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
