On 6/26/11 9:55 PM, "Ham Priday" <[email protected]> wrote:

<snip>
> How can free will exist without an independent agent?
> How can we be morally responsible if our values (and consequent actions) are
> predetermined?
> 
> Experiential existence hinges on autonomous value-sensibility.  It makes no
> sense to argue for or against free will unless you acknowledge that choice
> is the option of a free agent.
> 
> Valuistically speaking,
> Ham 

Hi Ham and all,

Pirsig proposes a metaphysics of DQ/SQ.  DQ is indefinable not unknowable.
The independent agent is DQ/SQ.  There is something in our actions that
enable the indefinable.  Free will enables action and an evolutionary
scenario limits free will.  I can't jump on my horse and ride off in all
directions!  Predetermination denies a DQ/SQ metaphysics.  I know the
indefinable and can act on it through analogy and metaphor.

Joe  


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